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Preface to the second edition 
 
 
The Two Traditions of Meditation in Ancient India has been out of print 
for a while. Reactions to the first edition have been varied, ranging from 
positive to critical. It is clear that these reactions are determined, at least 
to a large extent, by the positions of the scholars concerned with regard 
to the question of what can be expected from research into earliest 
Buddhism. The brief discussion that follows of some of the criticisms 
that have been expressed against the first edition, is therefore more than 
just a defence of this book; it is meant to be a contribution to a more 
general discussion regarding the aspirations and possibilities of 
scholarship in this particular field of study. 
Lambert Schmithausen has recently (1990) distinguished three 
positions held by scholars of Buddhism with regard to the question 
whether and to what extent the early Buddhist texts can be regarded as 
faithfully preserving the doctrine of the Buddha himself at least in 
essence. They might be presented as follows : (i) stress on the 
fundamental homogeneity and substantial authenticity of at least a 
considerable part of the Nikåyic materials; (ii) scepticism with regard to 
the possibility of retrieving the doctrine of earliest Buddhism; (iii) 
cautious optimism in this respect. This book takes position (iii). This 
position is to be preferred to (ii) for purely methodological reasons : only 
those who seek may find, even if no success is guaranteed.1 
The danger of position (i) is that it may raise a hypothesis into a 
principle. And once the homogeneity of the early Buddhist texts is taken 
as point of departure rather than as a hypothesis to be tested against the 
evidence, one is in the same situation as the Christian church, which 
managed to obstruct progress in Biblical studies for many centuries, 
precisely because it insisted on the fundamental homogeneity of its 
scripture.2 This parallelism becomes almost complete, once the further 
                                                
1. Position (ii) is essentially adopted in the review by S. Collins (1987). For a 
discussion of some of the points raised there, see my review of T. E. Vetter’s The 
Ideas and Meditative Practices of Early Buddhism in the Indo-Iranian Journal 36 
(1993), 63-68. 
2. I refer here to Gusdorf, 1988. 
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requirement is added that the early Buddhist texts have to be interpreted 
in the light of the later tradition.3 
It would be unfair to those who uphold position (i) to put too much 
emphasis on the parallelism with the unfortunate history of Biblical 
studies. We must assume that they look upon their position as, in their 
eyes, the best hypothesis available, which they are ready to abandon at 
any time, if only good enough evidence were forthcoming. The present 
book concentrates on contradictions and inconsistencies. Upholders of 
position (i) – such as R. Gombrich (1990) – argue that some lack of 
homogeneity is only to be expected in the early Buddhist texts, even on 
the assumption that all of them go back to the Buddha himself. No far-
reaching conclusions should therefore be drawn from ‘inconsistencies’ 
and ‘contradictions’, especially not where these latter occur in 
descriptions of such notoriously elusive ‘things’ as meditational states. 
Similar problems about ‘contradictions’ are voiced by D. S. Ruegg (1989 
: 9 n.9) who, while specifically referring to the first edition of the present 
book, complains that the “treatment of the relevant material is not 
infrequently based on unexplicated or unexamined (and anything but 
self-evident) presuppositions about ‘contradictions’ in the tradition”. 
It seems that the main arguments of this book have escaped 
Gombrich and Ruegg. They may escape other readers too. For this 
reason these main arguments will be once more presented in this Preface, 
but in an abbreviated and differently arranged form. This new 
presentation will, I hope, show that the criticisms mentioned above are 
not applicable to this book. Details and references will be found in the 
main body of the book. 
The point of departure is the undeniable fact that even the oldest 
Buddhist texts we have do not date back, in their present form, to the 
period of the Buddha. Linguistic considerations alone suffice to show 
that “all Buddhist texts, as they are read today, are not only heavily 
influenced by linguistic developments known to be much later than early 
days of Buddhism, but also reformulated perhaps, and certainly recast 
from one language into another before they reached their present 
linguistic shape” (Hinüber, 1991: 184). There is therefore no guarantee 
                                                
3. As is proposed by R. Gombrich (1988 : 21; cp. 1990 : 11-12). 
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whatsoever that all these texts represent the teachings of the Buddha, and 
it is at least conceivable that some of their contents are non-authentic. 
How can we imagine non-authentic views and practices to have 
found their way into the canonical collections, primarily the collections 
of SËtras ? This is not difficult. It is at least conceivable that in the 
process of collecting some texts or passages were included that contained 
elements that derived, ultimately, not from the teaching of the Buddha, 
but from other religious groups and ideals current at the time. 
The preceding remarks concern conceivable events; no evidence has 
yet been presented that they actually took place. Suppose they did take 
place. How could we ever discover the non-authentic elements in the 
Buddhist texts? In general this would be difficult or even impossible. 
Elements that were not part of the teaching of the Buddha but were not 
rejected either, might find their way in – after or even before the death of 
the Buddha – without anyone ever noticing, least of all the modern 
scholar. Perhaps the only hope ever to identify non-authentic elements in 
the Buddhist texts is constituted by the special cases where elements 
which are recorded to have been rejected by the Buddha, yet found their 
way into the texts, and, moreover, are clearly identifiable as belonging to 
one or more movements other than Buddhism. 
This gives us what might turn out to be an objective criterion for 
identifying foreign intrusions into the Buddhist texts : An element that is 
(i) rejected at some places in the Buddhist texts, (ii) accepted at others, 
and (iii) known to fit at least some non-Buddhist religious movements of 
the time, such an element is very likely to be a non-authentic intrusion 
into the Buddhist texts. As we have to work with only limited evidence, I 
would not know what better criterion there could be in the circumstances. 
Unfortunately, the importance of this criterion seems to have escaped all 
of my critics. 
Of course, having a criterion in theory is one thing, applying it to the 
texts, quite another. This book tries to apply this criterion to the one 
aspect of Buddhism – perhaps the only one – where it seems to work: that 
of meditation. Much of the book is dedicated to the presentation of the 
meditational and ascetic practices and related ideas found in early 
Jainism and other non-Buddhist religious movements of early India. 
Since no one has criticized this presentation, whereas several scholars 
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have expressed doubts with regard to the ‘inconsistencies’ and 
‘contradictions’ in the Buddhist texts (see above), I shall concentrate on 
the latter. I shall briefly discuss some examples, all of them taken from 
the main body of the book: 
 
1. The Mahåparinirvåˆa SËtra, in its various recensions, records a 
discussion of the Buddha with someone called Putkasa (in Sanskrit) or 
Pukkusa (in Påli). The Buddha here boasts that once, in a violent 
thunderstorm when lightning killed two farmers and four oxen nearby 
him, he did not notice it. It is known that abilities of this kind were 
sought after by certain non-Buddhists. Another Buddhist SËtra (the 
Indriyabhåvanå Sutta of the Påli canon and its parallel in Chinese 
translation), on the other hand, ridicules such ‘cultivation of the senses’ 
which leads to their non-functioning; the Buddha is here reported to say 
that if this is cultivation of the senses, the blind and deaf would be 
cultivators of the senses. 
The passages here mentioned may not logically contradict each 
other, yet they come about as close to that as one could hope for in this 
type of texts: on one occasion the Buddha disapproves of the practice 
that aims at the complete suppression of all sense-activities, on another 
he boasts about his attainments in this direction. This situation calls for a 
solution. One solution would be to think that the Buddha changed his 
mind about this practice. A more plausible explanation is that a practice 
that was respected among non-Buddhists came to be ascribed to the 
Buddha, either before or after his death. This latter explanation implies 
that the practice concerned is not authentically Buddhist. 
 
2. A SËtra of the Majjhima Nikåya (the CËÒadukkhakkhandha Sutta) as 
well as its parallels in Chinese translation describe and criticize the 
Jainas as practising ‘annihilation of former actions by asceticism’ and 
‘non-performing of new actions’. This can be accepted as an accurate 
description of the practices of the Jainas. But several other SËtras of the 
Buddhist canon put almost the same words in the mouth of the Buddha, 
who here approves of these practices (see note 8 to chapter 2, below). 
Did the Buddha first hold one opinion, then to change his mind ? Or did 
he not know how to describe his experiences ? Obviously it is far more 
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plausible that, again, practices that were widely accepted outside the 
Buddhist fold, but not inside it, found their way in. 
The argument here summarized is again presented, in a but slightly 
different form, by no one else than Ruegg, apparently without realizing 
it, in the very same book in which he dismisses my arguments. This 
situation is extraordinary enough to warrant quoting the passage 
concerned at length (Ruegg, 1989: 142-143): 
 
Now, in some old Buddhist canonical texts also there are in fact 
found certain references to the idea that liberation from Ill 
(du˙kha) results from, and consists in, the non-production of any 
future karman at all and from the ending, often through austerities 
(tapas), of any existing bad karman. This idea is there usually 
ascribed to the Nigaˆ†ha Nåtaputta (Nirgrantha Jñåt®putra), in 
other words to Mahåv¥ra and the Jainas. We also read that 
immobility of body and renunciation of speech bring Ease 
(sukha). Moreover, in a couple of Buddhist canonical texts the 
idea that no new karman at all should be generated, and that any 
existing karman should be ended, has even been connected with 
the Buddha himself in a sermon he once addressed to a Nirgrantha 
and in another one he addressed to Vappa, a disciple of the 
Nirgranthas. 
The connection of such a teaching with the Buddha himself seems 
nevertheless to be rare. When it does occur, it is evidently to be 
explained by the fact that his auditor was a Nirgrantha and that the 
teaching was thus intended as an introductory salvific device, a 
circumstance that would lend support to Kamalaß¥la’s statement 
denying that such relinquishement of all activity was the 
Buddha’s own teaching. In the majority of other places where it 
has been mentioned in the Påli canon, this doctrine has in fact 
been severely criticized. It is patently inconsistent with such basic 
principles of Buddhist doctrine as the four correct efforts 
(sammåppadhåna / samyakprahåˆa) ... 
 
It is not a little surprising to see how Ruegg, who rejects my 
arguments, arrives here at my conclusions, using my arguments and 
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basing himself on the inconsistencies whose very existence he had 
attributed to my ill-founded presuppositions. In the situation it is no 
doubt kindest to Professor Ruegg to assume that he dismissed my book 
without having read it. 
 
3. The Vitakkasanthåna Sutta of the Majjhima Nikåya and its parallels in 
Chinese translation recommend the practising monk to ‘restrain his 
thought with his mind, to coerce and torment it’. Exactly the same words 
are used elsewhere in the Påli canon (in the Mahåsaccaka Sutta, 
Bodhiråjakumåra Sutta and Sa∫gårava Sutta) in order to describe the 
futile attempts of the Buddha before his enlightenment to reach liberation 
after the manner of the Jainas. Once again it is hard to see a better 
explanation than that these Jaina practices had come to be accepted by at 
least some Buddhists. 
 
It would be unrealistic to expect that all ‘contradictions’ in the 
Buddhist canon are quite as explicit as the ones mentioned above. This 
does not however mean that they are any less real. Consider the 
following: 
 
4. Four states of meditation are often enumerated in the Buddhist SËtras 
in varying contexts, but almost always together. They are: l) the Stage of 
Infinity of Space; 2) the Stage of Infinity of Perception; 3) the Stage of 
Nothingness; 4) the Stage of neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation. The texts 
say little by way of explanation of these stages, but the names make clear 
that they together form a list of graded exercises aimed at the cessation 
of all ideations. This aim conforms very well with the aims we have to 
ascribe to the early Jainas and those of similar convictions. Moreover, 
the Jaina scriptures describe ‘reflection on infinity’ as one of the 
accompaniments of ‘pure meditation’. These stages are denounced 
elsewhere in the Buddhist canon, be it indirectly: The Buddha is said to 
have had two teachers before his enlightenment: Órå∂a Kålåma and 
Udraka the son of Råma. From the former he learned the Stage of 
Nothingness, from the latter the Stage of neither Ideation nor Non-
Ideation. However, the Buddha left these teachers, because he came to 
believe that these Stages would not lead him to his goal. 
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Here the question seems justified: do these stages lead to the goal or 
do they not ? Various answers can be imagined, such as, “they do to 
some extent, but not all the way”, “the Buddha had second thoughts 
about the usefulness of these stages”, etc. But I insist that there is a 
problem here that demands an answer, and not just a manifestation of my 
“unexplicated or unexamined (and anything but self-evident) 
presuppositions about ‘contradictions’ in the tradition”, as Ruegg would 
have it. Criticism of this kind, which refuses to study arguments, is not 
only counter-productive, it constitutes one of the greatest enemies of 
scholarship which, as Gombrich rightly points out, should at least try to 
progress by argument. Returning to the Stage of Nothingness and the 
Stage of neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation, it will hardly be necessary to 
add that in my opinion they comply with the criterion of foreign intrusion 
into the Buddhist texts formulated above. 
The conclusion that the above four meditational Stages were not 
accepted in earliest Buddhism finds support in an altogether unexpected 
quarter; for a detailed presentation of the argument I must refer the 
reader to BSOAS 48, 1985, pp. 305 f.4 Among the early (Abhidharmic) 
måt®kås, one seems to have been considered particularly important. It 
occurs a number of times in the early texts, but not always in exactly the 
same form; to an original enumeration of merely mental characteristics, 
meditational states came to be added. But initially the meditational states 
thus added did not contain the four Stages discussed above, even though 
these Stages, collectively known as ‘the Formless States’, are very 
prominent in the Buddhist scriptures as we have them. The most 
plausible explanation is again that the Formless States were not accepted 
during the earliest period of Buddhism. 
 
5. The Buddhist texts are not of one mind concerning the time when 
liberation is reached. A great number of passages emphatically states that 
liberation is reached in this life, i.e., well before death. This is hardly 
surprising, for the Buddha himself is agreed to have passed many years 
teaching after his moment of liberation. Yet other passages speak about 
                                                
4. This article has been criticized by R. M. L. Gethin (1992: 281). Be it noted that this 
criticism –whatever its worth – does not affect the argument here presented. 
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liberation as taking place at death. As in all the preceding cases, there is 
here a contradiction in the texts. Various solutions are conceivable, such 
as “the Buddha didn’t know”, “he expressed himself variously”, “he 
changed his mind”, “some are liberated at death, others in life”, etc. 
Indeed, anyone with some imagination can add to this list of possibilities 
almost indefinitely. However, we know that among many non-Buddhists 
liberation took place at death, and that many Buddhist texts emphatically 
hold the opposite opinion. It is no doubt superfluous to add that an 
intrusion of foreign ideas seems to me most plausible here, too. 
 
These examples should suffice to induce critics, at last, to read this 
book, rather than presenting their a priori reasons for thinking that the 
effort made in it cannot possibly lead anywhere. Scholarship should and 
indeed can only progress by argument, and this implies also: trying to 
understand someone else’s arguments. Those who are not willing or able 
to do this, would have done better to ignore the book,5 rather than 
pronounce facile judgments about it. 
 
The first edition of this book was published in 1986, by Franz 
Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, Stuttgart. The preparation of this 
second edition has permitted me to correct a number of, usually minor, 
mistakes, and make other improvements. For ease of comparison, the 
page numbers of the first edition are indicated in the margin in the 
present edition. The help provided by Yves Ramseier in the preparation 
of this edition is here gratefully acknowledged. 
                                                
5. This is done in some recent surveys of Buddhism, such as Harvey, 1990; and 
Klimkeit, 1990. 
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Introduction 
 
The main aim of the present study is to find out what early Buddhist 
meditation was by ascertaining what it was not. The results are therefore 
largely negative, but not any less interesting. 
The fact is that everyone who wishes to form an opinion on early 
Buddhism has to choose from a bewildering mass of often contradictory 
statements in the Buddhist canon. This choice is in danger of being 
arbitrary, for little is known about the relative chronology of the different 
parts of the canon. There can be no doubt that the canon – including the 
older parts, the SËtra- and Vinaya-Pi†aka – was composed over a long 
period of time. Only by assuming this can we make sense of its often 
glaring contradictions. But which parts are the oldest ? 
In the following pages I shall try to answer this question in so far as 
it concerns Buddhist meditation by a method which, to my knowledge, 
has never yet been employed. At a number of places the Buddhist canon 
criticizes alternative practices which are claimed by others to lead to the 
highest good. These alternative practices can be identified in the early 
scriptures of Jainism and Hinduism. The idea behind this method is that 
those alternative practices, even when they are described and approved 
of in other parts of the Buddhist canon, cannot be considered to be 
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authentic to Buddhism; they must be looked upon as later borrowings 
from outside. Traces of earliest Buddhism therefore must be sought 
among the practices which are opposed to those alternative ones. 
Does this deny the possibility that early Buddhism shared certain 
features with the other religious movements that existed in India in its 
time ? Clearly not! We do not wish to exclude features from early 
Buddhism simply because they are present elsewhere. We wish to 
exclude such features only if other, contrasting or even contradictory, 
features exist in the early Buddhist scriptures which are explicitly 
preferred to the former ones in those scriptures. 
Why should features which are peculiar to Buddhism have greater 
likelihood to belong to early Buddhism than features which also occur 
elsewhere ? This is partly a matter of definition. By ‘early Buddhism’ we 
mean the beginning of the tradition peculiar to Buddhism. The question 
will remain whether all these peculiar features came more or less at the 
same time and can therefore be ascribed to a single founder of this 
tradition, i.e., to the historical Buddha. All we can say is that the 
Buddhist tradition clearly points to such a person. Moreover, it is known 
that religious traditions tend to be conservative. They may inadvertently 
borrow elements from outside; they may also develop and undergo 
modifications. They will not as a rule introduce complete novelties. This 
privilege is reserved for the founder of such a tradition. 
The execution of the above program will enable us to reach a better 
understanding of early Buddhist meditation. It also allows us to obtain 
more insight into the alternative, non-Buddhist, practices, especially of 
the early period. The circumstance that the two traditions intermingled at 
a rather early date had hidden from previous investigators the ideas 
underlying the non-Buddhist practices. It also obscured the influence 
which these ideas had on virtually all systems of Hindu philosophy. 
A few words must be said about methodology. This book presents a 
theory about what early Buddhism – or rather, certain aspects of it – was 
and what it was not. That is to say, this book does not merely reproduce 
the texts on which it is based, and is not simply the result of ‘just reading 
the texts’ (if such a thing is at all possible; cf. Bronkhorst, 1986 : 
Introduction). In a way it contains more than what can be found in the 
texts. In return, it explains contradictions and other features of the texts 
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which would otherwise remain obscure. There is no way to prove that the 
theory presented in this book is right. But this does not by itself detract 
from its value. A great deal, if not all, we know about the world is of 
such a theoretical nature. 
Such a starting point has consequences for those who wish to 
disagree with my theory. It will not just be enough to say that it has not 
been proved. It may be more worthwhile to try and show that the theory 
does not fit certain facts. Criticism of this kind, though not without value, 
will at best bring us back to the situation where the contradictions in the 
Buddhist canon are, again, unexplained. Really constructive criticism of 
my theory will present an even better theory. 
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Part I: Two traditions of meditation. 
 
I .  The ascetic practices of the Bodhisattva 
 
1.1. At three places6 in the Majjhima Nikåya of the Påli Buddhist canon 
an episode is found in which the Buddha describes how he, before his 
enlightenment, tried out two methods which he then discovered did not 
lead to the desired end. The two methods are ‘meditation without breath’ 
and ‘reduced intake of food’. The episode reads7 in the Mahåsaccaka 
Sutta:8 
                                                
6. Mahåsaccaka Sutta, MN I. 242-46, Nålandå ed. vol. I, p. 301-05; Bodhiråjakumåra 
Sutta, MN II.93, Nålandå ed. vol. II, p. 326-31; Sa∫gårava Sutta, MN II.212, 
Nålandå ed. vol. II, p. 490-94. 
7. References to other parts of the Påli canon where identical or closely similar 
passages occur are given to the left of the passages concerned. 
8. (p. 242, l. 23:) tassa mayhaµ aggivessana etad ahosi: yan nËnåhaµ dantehi dantam 
ådhåya jivhåya tåluµ åhacca cetaså cittaµ abhiniggaˆheyyaµ abhinipp¥Òeyyaµ 
abhisantåpeyyan ti / so kho ahaµ aggivessana dantehi dantam ådhåya jivhåya tåluµ 
åhacca cetaså cittaµ abhiniggaˆhåmi abhinipp¥Òemi abhisantåpemi / tassa mayhaµ 
aggivessana dantehi dantam ådhåya jivhåya tåluµ åhacca cetaså cittaµ 
abhiniggaˆhato abhinipp¥Òayato abhisantåpayato kacchehi sedå muccanti / seyyathå 
pi aggivessana balavå puriso dubbalataraµ purisaµ s¥se vå gahetvå khandhe vå 
gahetvå abhiniggaˆheyya abhinip¥Òeyya abhisantåpeyya, evam eva kho me 
aggivessana dantehi dantam ådhåya jivhåya tåluµ åhacca cetaså cittaµ 
abhiniggaˆhato abhinipp¥Òayato abhisantåpayato kacchehi sedå muccanti / 
åraddhaµ kho pana me aggivessana viriyaµ hoti asall¥naµ, upa††hitå sati 
asammu††hå, såraddho ca pana me kåyo hoti appa†ippasaddho ten’eva 
dukkhappadhånena padhånåbhitunnassa sato / evarËpå pi kho me aggivessana 
uppannå dukkhå vedanå cittaµ na pariyådåya ti††hati / 
 (p. 243, l. 4:) tassa mayhaµ aggivessana etad ahosi: yan nËnåhaµ appånakaµ 
jhånaµ jhåyeyyan ti / so kho ahaµ aggivessana mukhato ca nåsato ca assåsapassåse 
uparundhiµ / tassa mayhaµ aggivessana mukhato ca nåsato ca assåsapassåsesu 
uparuddhesu kaˆˆasotehi våtånaµ nikkhamantånaµ adhimatto saddo hoti / 
seyyathå pi nåma kammåragaggariyå dhamamånåya adhimatto saddo hoti, evam 
eva kho me aggivessana mukhato ca nåsato ca assåsapassåsesu / uparuddhesu 
kaˆˆasotehi våtånaµ nikkhamantånaµ adhimatto saddo hoti åraddhaµ kho pana 
me aggivessana viriyaµ hoti asall¥naµ, upa††hitå sati asammu††hå, såraddho ca 
pana me kåyo hoti appa†ippassaddho ten’eva dukkhappadhånena 
padhånåbhitunnassa sato / evarËpå pi kho me aggivessana uppannå dukkhå vedanå 
cittaµ na pariyådåya ti††hati / 
(p. 243, l. 18:) tassa mayhaµ aggivessana etad ahosi: yan nËnåhaµ appånakaµ 
yeva jhånaµ jhåyeyyan ti / so kho ahaµ aggivessana mukhato ca nåsato ca kaˆˆato 
ca assåsapassåse uparundhiµ / tassa mayhaµ aggivessana mukhato ca nåsato ca 
kaˆˆato ca assåsapassåsesu uparuddhesu adhimattå våtå muddhånaµ Ëhananti / 
seyyathå pi aggivessana balavå puriso tiˆhena sikharena muddhånaµ 
abhimantheyya, evam eva kho me aggivessana mukhato ca nåsato ca kaˆˆato ca 
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assåsapassåsesu uparuddhesu adhimattå våtå muddhånaµ Ëhananti / åraddhaµ kho 
pana me aggivessana viriyaµ ... na pariyådåya ti††hati / 
(p. 243, l. 32:) tassa mayhaµ aggivessana etad ahosi: yan nËnåhaµ˛ appånakaµ 
yeva jhånaµ jhåyeyyan ti / so kho ahaµ aggivessana mukhato ca nåsato ca kaˆˆato 
ca assåsapassåse uparundhiµ / tassa mayhaµ aggivessana mukhato ca nåsato ca 
kaˆˆato ca assåsapassåsesu uparuddhesu adhimattå s¥se s¥savedanå honti / seyyathå 
pi aggivessana balavå puriso daÒhena varattakhaˆ∂ena s¥se s¥save†haµ dadeyya, 
evam eva kho me aggivessana mukhato ca nåsato ca kaˆˆato ca assåsapassåsesu 
uparuddhesu adhimattå s¥se s¥savedanå honti / åraddhaµ kho pana me aggivessana 
viriyaµ ... na pariyådåya ti††hati / 
(p. 244, l. 9:) tassa mayhaµ aggivessana etad ahosi: yan nËnåhaµ˛ appånakaµ yeva 
jhånaµ jhåyeyyan ti / so kho ahaµ aggivessana mukhato ca nåsato ca kaˆˆato ca 
assåsapassåse uparundhiµ / tassa mayhaµ aggivessana mukhato ca nåsato ca 
kaˆˆato ca assåsapassåsesu uparuddhesu adhimattå våtå kucchiµ parikantanti / 
seyyathå pi aggivessana dakkho goghåtako vå goghåtakantevås¥ va tiˆhena 
govikantanena kucchiµ parikanteyya, evam eva kho me aggivessana adhimattå 
våtå kucchiµ parikantanti / åraddhaµ kho pana me aggivessana viriyaµ ... na 
pariyådåya ti††hati / 
(p.244, l. 23) tassa mayhaµ aggivessana etad ahosi: yan nËnåhaµ appånakaµ yeva 
jhånaµ jhåyeyyan ti / so kho ahaµ aggivessana mukhato ca nåsato ca kaˆˆato ca 
assåsapassåse uparundhiµ / tassa mayhaµ aggivessana mukhato ca nåsato ca 
kaˆˆato ca assåsapassåsesu uparuddhesu adhimatto kåyasmiµ ∂åho hoti / seyyathå 
pi aggivessana dve balavanto puriså dubbalataraµ purisaµ nånåbåhåsu gahetvå 
a∫gårakåsuyå santåpeyyuµ samparitåpeyyuµ, evam eva kho me aggivessana 
mukhato ca nåsato ca kaˆˆato ca assåsapassåsesu uparuddhesu adhimatto 
kåyasmiµ ∂åho hoti / åraddhaµ kho pana me aggivessana viriyaµ ... na pariyådåya 
ti††hati / 
(p. 244, l. 37:) api ’ssu maµ aggivessana devatå disvå evam åhaµsu: kålakato 
samaˆo gotamo ti / ekaccå devatå evam åhaµsu: na kålakato samaˆo gotamo, api 
ca kålaµ karot¥ti / ekaccå devatå evam åhaµsu: na kålakato samaˆo gotamo na pi 
kålaµ karoti, arahaµ samaˆo gotamo, vihåro tv eva so arahato evarËpo hot¥ti / 
(p. 245, l. 6:) tassa mayhaµ aggivessana etad ahosi: yan nËnåhaµ sabbaso 
åhårupacchedåya pa†ipajjeyyan ti / atha kho maµ aggivessana devatå 
upasa∫kamitvå etad avocuµ: må kho tvaµ mårisa sabbaso åhårupacchedåya 
pa†ipajji, sace kho tvaµ mårisa sabbaso åhårupacchedåya pa†ipajjissasi tassa te 
mayaµ dibbaµ ojaµ lomakËpehi ajjhoharissåma, tåya tvaµ yåpessas¥ti / tassa 
mayhaµ aggivessana etad ahosi: ahañ c’eva kho pana sabbaso ajaddhukaµ 
pa†ijåneyyaµ imå ca me devatå dibbaµ ojaµ lomakËpehi ajjhohareyyuµ tåya 
cåhaµ yåpeyyaµ, taµ mama assa muså ti / so kho ahaµ aggivessana tå devatå 
paccåcikkhåmi, halan ti vadåmi /  
(p. 245, l. 17:) tassa mayhaµ aggivessana etad ahosi: yan nËnåhaµ thokaµ thokaµ 
åhåraµ åhåreyyaµ pasataµ pasataµ, yadi vå muggayËsaµ yadi vå kulatthayËsaµ 
yadi vå kaÒåyayËsaµ yadi vå hareˆukayËsan ti / so kho ahaµ aggivessana thokaµ 
thokaµ åhåraµ åhåresiµ pasataµ pasatam, yadi vå muggayËsaµ yadi vå 
kulatthayËsaµ yadi vå kaÒåyayËsaµ yadi vå hareˆukayËsaµ / tassa mayhaµ 
aggivessana thokaµ thokaµ åhåraµ åhårayato pasataµ pasatam, yadi vå 
muggayËsaµ yadi vå kulatthayËsaµ yadi va kaÒåyayËsaµ yadi vå hareˆukayËsaµ, 
adhimattakasimånaµ patto kåyo hoti / seyyathå pi nåma ås¥tikapabbåni vå 
kålåpabbåni vå evam eva ’ssu me a∫gapacca∫gåni bhavanti tåy’ev’appåhåratåya, 
seyyathå pi nåma o††hapadaµ evam eva ’ssu me ånisadaµ hoti 
tåy’ev’appåhåratåya, seyyathå pi nåma va††anåvaÒ¥ evam eva ’ssu me pi††hikaˆ†ako 
unnatåvanato hoti tåy’ev’appåhåratåya, seyyathå pi nåma jarasålåya gopånasiyo 
oluggaviluggå bhavanti evam eva ’ssu me phåsuÒiyo oluggaviluggå bhavanti 
tåy’ev’appåhåratåya, seyyathå pi nåma gambh¥re udapåne udakatårakå 
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(p. 242, l. 23:) Then, Aggivessana, I thought : ‘Let me, closing my 
teeth, pressing my palate with my tongue, restrain my thought with 
my mind, let me coerce and torment it’. Then indeed, Aggivessana, 
closing my teeth and pressing my palate with my tongue, I 
restrained my thought with my mind, coerced and tormented it. 
While I, Aggivessana, closing my teeth and pressing my palate 
with my tongue, restrained my thought with my mind, coerced and 
tormented it, sweat came from my armpits. Just as when, 
Aggivessana, a strong man, taking a weaker man by his head or 
taking him by his shoulder, may restrain, coerce and torment him, 
just so indeed, Aggivessana, while I, closing my teeth and pressing 
my palate with my tongue, restrained my thought with my mind, 
coerced and tormented it, sweat come from my armpits. But, 
Aggivessana, my energy was aroused, not shrinking, my 
mindfulness was alert, not distracted, but9 my body was impetuous, 
not calmed, while I was harassed by that painful exertion. Even 
                                                                                                                   
gambh¥ragatå okkhåyikå dissanti evam eva ’ssu me akkhikËpesu akkhitårakå 
gambh¥ragatå okkhåyikå dissanti tåy’ev’appåhåratåya, seyyathå pi nåma tittakålåbu 
åmakacchinno våtåtapena sampu†ito hoti sammilåto evam eva ’ssu me s¥sacchavi 
sampu†itå hoti sammilåtå tåy’ev’appåhåratåya / so kho ahaµ aggivessana 
udaracchaviµ parimasissåm¥ ’ti pi††hikaˆ†akaµ yeva parigaˆhåmi, pi††hikaˆ†akaµ 
parimasissåm¥ ’ti udaracchaviµ yeva parigaˆhåmi / yåva ’ssu me aggivessana 
udaracchavi pi††hikaˆ†akaµ all¥nå hoti tåy’ev’appåhåratåya / so kho ahaµ 
aggivessana vaccaµ vå muttaµ vå karissåm¥ti tattheva avakujjo papatåmi 
tåy’ev’appåhåratåya / so kho ahaµ aggivessana imam eva kåyaµ assåsento påˆinå 
gattåni anomajjåmi / tassa mayhaµ aggivessana påˆinå gattåni anomajjato 
pËtimËlåni lomåni kåyasmå papatanti tåy’ev’appåhåratåya / 
(p. 246, l. 12:) api ’ssu maµ aggivessana manusså disvå evam åhaµsu: kåÒo 
samaˆo gotamo ti / ekacce manusså evam åhaµsu: na kåÒo samaˆo gotamo, såmo 
samaˆo gotamo ti / ekacce manusså evam åhaµsu: na kåÒo samaˆo gotamo na pi 
såmo, ma∫guracchavi samaˆo gotamo ti / yåva’ssu me aggivessana tåva parisuddho 
chavivaˆˆo pariyodåto upahato hoti tåy’ev’appåhåratåya / 
(p. 246, l. 20:) tassa mayhaµ aggivessana etad ahosi: ye kho keci at¥taµ addhånaµ 
samaˆå vå bråhmaˆå vå opakkamikå dukkhå tippå ka†ukå vedanå vedayiµsu, 
etåvaparamaµ nayito bhiyyo; ye pi hi keci anågatam addhånaµ samaˆå vå 
bråhmaˆå vå opakkamikå dukkhå tippå ka†ukå vedanå vedayissanti, etåvaparamaµ 
nayito bhiyyo; ye pi hi keci etarahi samaˆå vå bråhmaˆå vå opakkamikå dukkhå 
tippå ka†ukå vedanå vediyanti, etåvaparamaµ nayito bhiyyo / na kho panåhaµ 
imåya ka†ukåya dukkarakårikåya adhigacchåmi uttariµ manussadhammå 
alamariyañåˆadassanavisesaµ, siyå nu kho añño maggo bodhåyåti / 
9. MN I.21, 117, 186 have: “my energy was aroused, not shrinking, my mindfulness 
was alert, not distracted, my body was calmed, not impetuous, ...”. This justifies the 
translation ‘but’ for ca. 
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such a painful experience, Aggivessana, when it happened to me, 
did not completely take hold of my mind. 
(p. 243, 1. 4:) Then, Aggivessana, I thought: ‘Let me perform 
meditation without breath’. Then indeed, Aggivessana, I stopped 
breathing out and breathing in, both through the mouth and through 
the nose. When, Aggivessana, my breathing out and breathing in 
had been stopped, both through the mouth and through the nose, 
there came about the extremely strong noise of winds which went 
out through my ears. Just as when an extremely strong noise comes 
about when the bellows of a smith are blown, just so indeed, 
Aggivessana, there came about the extremely strong noise of winds 
which went out through the ears, when my breathing out and 
breathing in had been stopped both through the mouth and through 
the nose. But, Aggivessana, my energy was aroused, not shrinking, 
my mindfulness was alert, not distracted, but my body was 
impetuous, not calmed, while I was harassed by that painful 
exertion. Even such a painful experience, Aggivessana, when it 
happened to me, did not completely take hold of my thought. 
(p. 243 l. 18): Then, Aggivessana, I thought: ‘Let me perform 
meditation fully without breath’. Then indeed, Aggivessana, I 
stopped breathing out and breathing in through mouth, nose and 
ears. When, Aggivessana, my breathing out and breathing in had 
been stopped through mouth, nose and ears, extremely strong 
winds shook up my head. Just as when, Aggivessana, a strong man 
may destroy a head with the sharp edge of a sword, just so indeed, 
Aggivessana, extremely strong winds shook up my head, when 
breathing out and breathing in had been stopped through mouth, 
nose and ears. But, Aggivessana, my energy ... did not completely 
take hold of my mind. 
(p. 243, l. 32:) Then, Aggivessana, I thought: ‘Let me perform 
meditation fully without breath’. Then indeed, Aggivessana, I 
stopped breathing out and breathing in through mouth, nose and 
ears. When, Aggivessana, my breathing out and breathing in had 
been stopped through mouth, nose and ears, there came about 
extremely strong headaches in my head. Just as when, 
Aggivessana, a strong man may place a turban on a head with a 
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strong strip of leather, just so indeed, Aggivessana, there came 
about extremely strong headaches in my head when breathing out 
and breathing in had been stopped through mouth, nose and ears. 
But, Aggivessana, my energy did not completely take hold of my 
mind. 
(p. 244, l. 9:) Then, Aggivessana, I thought: ‘Let me perform 
meditation fully without breath’. Then indeed, Aggivessana, I 
stopped breathing out and breathing in through mouth, nose and 
ears. When, Aggivessana, my breathing out and breathing in had 
been stopped through mouth, nose and ears, extremely strong 
winds cut my belly all around. Just as when, Aggivessana, a skilled 
butcher or apprentice of a butcher may cut a belly all  
around with a sharp butcher’s knife, just so indeed, Aggivessana, 
extremely strong winds cut my belly all around. But, Aggivessana, 
my energy ... did not completely take hold of my mind. 
(p. 244, l. 23:) Then, Aggivessana, I thought: ‘Let me perform 
meditation fully without breath’. Then indeed, Aggivessana, I 
stopped breathing out and breathing in through mouth, nose and 
ears. When, Aggivessana, my breathing out and breathing in had 
been stopped through mouth, nose and ears, there came about an 
extremely strong heat in my body. Just as when, Aggivessana, two 
strong men, taking a weaker man by both his arms, may burn and 
roast him on a pit of burning coal, just so indeed, Aggivessana, 
there came about an extremely strong heat in my body when my 
breathing out and breathing in had been stopped through mouth, 
nose and ears. But, Aggivessana, my energy ... did not completely 
take hold of my mind. 
(p. 244, l. 37:) The gods moreover, Aggivessana, seeing me spoke 
thus: ‘The recluse Gotama is dead’. Some gods spoke thus: ‘the 
recluse Gotama is not dead, but he is dying’. Other gods spoke 
thus: ‘The recluse Gotama is not dead, nor is he dying, the recluse 
Gotama is an arahant, that condition is exactly the one of an 
arahant ’. 
(p. 245, l. 6): Then, Aggivessana, I thought: ‘Let me completely 
abstain from taking food’. Then indeed, Aggivessana, the gods, 
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approaching me, said this: ‘Don’t   
you, Sir, completely abstain from taking food. If indeed, Sir, you 
will completely abstain from taking food, then we shall feed you 
divine nutritive essence through the pores of your skin, and thereby 
you will stay alive’. Then, Aggivessana, I thought: ‘If I promised 
to completely abstain from taking food, these gods would feed me 
divine nutritive essence through the pores of my skin, and thereby I 
would stay alive; thus I would [speak] untruth’. Then indeed, 
Aggivessana, I rejected those gods, and said ‘enough’. 
(p. 245, l. 17:) Then, Aggivessana, I thought: ‘Let me take food 
little by little, drop by drop, soup of kidney-beans, or soup of 
vetch, or soup of chick-peas, or soup of peas’. Then, Aggivessana, 
while I took food little by little, drop by drop, soup of kidney-
beans, or soup of vetch, or soup of chick-peas, or soup of peas, my 
body became extremely thin. Just like the joints of the ås¥tika or the 
joints of the kåla, my limbs, great and small, became just   
so on account of taking so little food. Just like the foot of a camel, 
my behind became just so on account of taking so little food. Just 
like a line of balls, my backbone became similarly bent up and bent 
down, on account of taking so little food. Just as the supporting 
beams in an old shed are breaking off and falling to pieces, just so 
my ribs were breaking off and falling to pieces on account of 
taking so little food. Just as in a deep well the glitter of water is 
seen, deep and low-lying, just so the glitter of my eyes was seen, 
deep and low-lying in the sockets, on account of taking so little 
food. Just as a bitter gourd, cut off while still unripe, becomes 
shrivelled and withered on account of wind and heat, just so the 
skin of my head became shrivelled and withered on account of 
taking so little food. Then indeed, Aggivessana, [thinking:] ‘I shall 
touch the skin of my belly’, I got hold of my backbone, [thinking:] 
‘I shall touch my backbone’, I got hold of the skin of my belly, 
since, Aggivessana, the skin of my belly had become stuck to my 
backbone on account of taking so little food. Then indeed, 
Aggivessana, [thinking:] ‘I shall defecate or urinate’, I fell down, 
head forward, at that very place, on account of taking so little food. 
Then indeed, Aggivessana, soothing this my body I rubbed over 
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my  
limbs with my hand. While I, Aggivessana, rubbed over my limbs 
with my hand, the hairs, having fetid roots, fell down from my 
body on account of taking so little food. 
(p. 246, l. 12:) People moreover, Aggivessana, seeing me spoke 
thus: ‘The recluse Gotama is black’. Some people spoke thus: ‘The 
recluse Gotama is not black, the recluse Gotama is brown’. Other 
people spoke thus: ‘The recluse Gotama is not black, nor is he 
brown, the recluse Gotama has a fair10 skin (ma∫guracchavi)’. So 
much, Aggivessana, the colour of my skin, [though] fully clean and 
fully pure, had become destroyed on account of taking so little 
food. 
(p. 246, l. 20:) Then, Aggivessana, I thought: ‘The recluses or 
Brahmins of the past who experienced painful, sharp, severe 
sensations [which were] due to [self- inflicted] torture,11 
[experienced] this much at the most, not more than this. Also the 
recluses or Brahmins of the future who will experience painful, 
sharp, severe sensations [which will be] due to [self-inflicted] 
torture, [will experience] this much at the most, not more than this. 
Also the recluses or Brahmins of the present who experience 
painful, sharp, severe sensations [which are] due to [self-inflicted] 
torture, [experience] this much at the most, not more than this. But 
indeed I do not attain,  
through these severe and difficult practices, excellence in 
knowledge and insight which is truly noble and transcends the 
human condition. Could there be another road toward 
enlightenment ?’ 
 
This episode contains two features which suggest that non-Buddhist, 
most probably Jaina, practices are described : 
 
                                                
10. See below, point (iv). 
11. opakkamika. The parallel passages in the Mahåvastu (II, p. 130) and Lalitavistara 
(p. 263) have åtmopakramika; see also Mahåvastu II, p. 121-23, Lalitavistara 
p. 246-48. 
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(i) After the “meditation fully without breath”, some gods think that 
Gotama is dead, others that he is dying, others again observe that “that 
condition is exactly the one of an arahant ”. Obviously Gotama’s 
condition is not “exactly the one of an arahant”  in the Buddhist sense of 
this word. Here the term arahant is reserved12 for those who have 
followed to the end the road to salvation taught by the Buddha, as also 
for the Buddha himself after his enlightenment. The practices described 
in the present passage are without value for the attainment of (Buddhist) 
salvation, and to be discarded by Buddhist arahants. However, this same 
term (or its equivalent, in Sanskrit arhant, in Ardha-Mågadh¥ araha,  
arihaµta) was also used by the Jainas, and perhaps the Ój¥vikas (see 
Basham, 1951: 56, 140), to designate those who have reached the highest  
stage possible while still embodied as human beings.13 Both the Jainas 
and the Ój¥vikas are known for their inclination towards asceticism, so 
that we must conclude that the gods used the word arahant in the sense 
current among these religious wanderers. 
(ii) The reduced intake of food is preceded by the intention to 
completely abstain from taking food. The reduced intake of food, with all 
its horrors, is therefore no more than a second choice. The story loses 
much of its force by the fact that the exalted initial intention comes to 
nothing. Why then was it added?14 The question resolves itself once we 
assume that our episode is directed against the Jainas, among whom the 
                                                
12 A few possible exceptions occur in the På†ika Sutta (nr. 24) of the D¥gha Nikåya (III, 
7, 10, 11), where the term is used - by Sunakkhadatta, who has left the Buddhist 
order - in connection with certain ascetics. It is hard to decide if the term is used 
here, for once, in its literal sense (‘deserving, respectable’), or if it is used to 
indicate the foolishness of Sunakkhadatta, who indeed is repeatedly called 
moghapurisa ‘foolish man’ in that SËtra. T.W. and C.A.F. Rhys Davids’ (1921: 3-
6) contention that in the På†ika Sutta as well as in our Mahåsaccaka Sutta the term 
is used in its supposedly pre-Buddhistic sense (“we may take it that ... the word ... 
had come to be popularly applied, not only to priests and kings, but also to 
ascetics”) is unacceptable, the more so since this part of the Mahåsaccaka Sutta 
cannot be very early; see below, § 1.4. Some more places where arahant may be 
used in its literal sense have been noted by Franke (1913: 300-301). See further 
Horner, 1936: 77-95. 
13 Also the Vråtyas used the term; see Weber, 1876: 85. 
14 It is not present in the parallel passage in the Mahås¥hanåda Sutta of the Majjhima 
Nikåya (I.80). 
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most respected way of dying is by voluntary starvation.15 
The following feature points in the same direction: 
(iii) The phrase “painful, sharp, severe sensations [which are] due to 
[self-inflicted] torture” (opakkamikå dukkhå tippå ka†ukå vedanå) 
occurs, apart from this episode, in two and only two other contexts in the 
Påli canon, both times in connection with Jainas (Nigaˆ†ha; see below): 
in the Devadaha Sutta (nr. 101 of the Majjhima Nikåya, vol. II, p. 218-
19) and in the CËÒadukkhakkhandha Sutta (nr. 14 of the Majjhima 
Nikåya, vol. I, p. 92). 
Perhaps we may add: 
(iv) The reduced intake of food is said to evoke three kinds of 
reactions from onlookers. Some say that Gotama is black, others that he 
is brown, others again that he has a fair skin (ma∫guracchavi). The exact 
significance of ma∫guracchavi is not known. It occurs always16 (DN I. 
193; 242; MN I. 429; II. 33; and here) in the company of kåÒa, “black”, 
såma “brown”. The three terms seem intended to cover among them the 
whole range of colours a human being can have: in three of the five cases 
they enumerate the varieties of complexion that an unknown beautiful 
girl can have, so that “having a fair skin” seems to be a reasonable 
translation. In the circumstances, only the first two terms are appropriate. 
                                                
15 Cf. Schubring, 1935: 182-83; Kamptz, 1929; and ch. III below. Perhaps we may look 
at the following as a confirmation that our episode is directed against the Jainas : 
the gods assure Gotama that they will keep him alive in a way which is familiar 
from the Jaina scriptures. They want to feed Gotama divine nutritive essence 
through the pores of his skin (lomakËpesu). Feeding of this kind (lom’ åhåra) is 
known from the (late) Paˆˆavaˆå Sutta (ch. 28, § 1859-61). “Here we learn that 
infernal beings, celestial beings and one-sensed beings undertake feeding through 
skin (1859-60). The two-sensed up to the five-sensed human beings undertake the 
feeding through skin as well as mouth (1861).” (Paˆˆavaˆå, part 2, Intr. p. 396-97). 
Cf. SËtrak®ta∫ganiryukti p. 228-29, gåthås 171f. 
16 That is to say, in the Påli canon. Prof. K.R. Norman informs me that ma∫guracchavi 
occurs with kåla and odåta at Vism 184 and Sp 238, and observes that it 
“presumably represents a colour (half-way) between black and white”, perhaps 
‘(dark) brown’. Norman further suggests a connection with ma∫gula / ma∫gul¥, 
which seems to be used only in a bad sense. 
It seems however dubious to attach too much worth to the opinions of the 
commentators, who may often, like us, have tried to make sense of the material 
before them and may occasionally have failed to draw the correct conclusions. 
Moreover, ma∫gura may be connected with ma∫kura, which has been preserved by 
the Sanskrit lexicographers in the sense ‘mirror’; this suggests ‘shining’ for 
ma∫gura. 
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The third one may have been added17 under the influence of and in order 
to ridicule the belief which survived among the Digambaras, that 
Mahåv¥ra shone like a crystal (Jaini, 1979:35; cf., e.g., Ravi∑eˆa’s 
Padmapuråˆa II.92 (vol. I, p. 18)). [This idea is not totally foreign to the 
ancient Buddhist scriptures. Sn 548 describes the Buddha as ‘golden 
coloured’ (suvaˆˆavaˆˆa), Sn 550 as ‘shining like the sun’ (ådicco va 
virocasi), Sn 551 as ‘whose skin resembles gold’ 
(kañcanasannibhattaca); see also Th 818f. See however ch. X below.] 
However, it is not impossible that the disagreement among the 
onlookers does not concern the present colour of Gotama, but rather his 
original colour which had now become unrecognizable.18  
 
1.2. The episode on meditation without breath and reduced intake of 
food occurs in the Ekottara Ógama preserved in Chinese, as well. It reads 
(T.125, p. 670c18-671b4):19  
 
(670c18:) Then I thought: ‘Why should I still eat ? I can 
completely abstain from taking food’. Because this thought arose 
in me, the gods came to me and said: ‘Do not now stop eating. If 
you’ll stop eating, we’ll prolong and preserve your life with the 
pure force of nectar’. Then again I thought: ‘What reason is there 
now to stop eating, [since] it will instigate the gods to give me 
nectar. I would deceive [others and myself]’. At that time I 
thought: ‘Now I can eat a residue of sesamum and rice’. Then I 
ate per day one [seed of] sesamum and one [grain of] rice. My 
body became deteriorated and weak, and my bones were joined 
together. A sore grew on top of my head, so that the skin [of my 
head] fell down of its own, piece after piece, and my head 
resembled a broken bottle-gourd. [The sore] did not leave my 
                                                
17 It is hard to believe that ma∫guracchavi was added by the redactors of the Påli canon 
in their efforts to unify the texts, since the Mahåvastu (II, p. 126-30) and the 
Lalitavistara (p. 255) use the corresponding term madguracchavi in the same 
context. 
18 This was pointed out to me by Prof. Schmithausen in a written communication. 
19 Prof. E. Zürcher was kind enough to lend assistance in reading this passage. The 
responsibility for the translation remains however mine. 
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head intact.20 At that time I was like this : a sore grew on top of 
my head, so that the skin [of my head] fell down of its own, piece 
after piece, all because I did not eat. And just like stars which are 
seen [reflected] in deep water, so were my eyes at that time, all 
because I did not eat. My body resembled an old cart which 
breaks down. It was entirely destroyed and could not support and 
obey me. And my two buttocks were like the foot of a camel. 
When I put my hand on my belly, I got hold of the bones of my 
spine; and when I placed my hand on my spine, I got hold of the 
skin of my belly. My body was emaciated and weak, all because I 
did not eat. At that time, when I ate one [seed of] sesamum and 
one [grain of] rice and considered it my food, I did not in the end 
derive any benefit [from it]. And I did not attain to the most 
honourable dharma. When I wished to defecate or urinate, then I 
fell over on the earth and could not myself stand up and sit down. 
 (671a7: ) Gods, seeing me, thought this, saying: ‘This recluse 
(ßramaˆa) Gautama, he has come to extinction’. But there were 
some gods who said: ‘This recluse, his life has not yet ended, 
[but] today his life will certainly end’. Other gods again said: 
‘This recluse is not at the end of his life. This recluse is really an 
arhat. The dharma of a sage [called] arhat contains this painful 
practice’. At that time I still was conscious and knew the factors 
that came to me from outside. 
(671a12:) Then again I thought: ‘Now I can enter into meditation 
without breath’. I then entered into meditation without breath, and 
counted my exhalations and inhalations. Counting my exhalations 
and inhalations, I noticed that there was air coming out from my 
ears. The sound of [this] wind resembled the roll of thunder. 
(671a15:) Then again I thought: ‘Now I close my mouth and 
block my ears, [so that] my breath [can] not escape’. When my 
breath [could] not escape, the air inside came out from my hands 
and feet. Truly, I did not let my breath go out through my ears, 
nose and mouth. The inner sound [resulting from this] resembled 
the roar of thunder. Yet my consciousness revolved [through all 
                                                
20 Unclear. 
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this] along with my body.17 
(671a19:) Then again I thought: ‘I ought to enter into meditation 
without breath once more’. I then completely blocked all 
apertures [of my body]. Having blocked all exhalations and 
inhalations, I then suffered pain in my forehead. As if a man, 
taking hold [of me], pierced my head with a drill, so did I have 
extremely painful headaches. At that time, like before, I retained 
consciousness. 
 (671a23:) Then again I thought: ‘Now again I can sit down and 
meditate [such that] my breath cannot go out or in’. Then I 
blocked my exhalations and inhalations. Thereupon all my breaths 
gathered together in my belly. The breaths which then whirled 
around had extremely few points of support.21 Just as when a 
skilled butcher slaughters a cow with a knife, so did I suffer 
extremely severe pains. And as when two strong men together 
hold one weak man and toast him before a fire, [so that] he suffers 
extreme pains which he cannot bear, so did I [suffer such pains]. 
These severe pains cannot be wholly described. Yet I retained 
consciousness. 
(671a29:) On that day, while I sat in meditation, my body did not 
have a human colour. At that occasion there were people who, 
seeing me, said: ‘The colour of this recluse is extremely black’. 
There were other people who, seeing me, said: ‘The colour of this 
recluse resembles green’. 
(671b3:) Monks (bhik∑u), you should know that in the six years 
that I did these painful practices I did not attain to the most 
honourable dharma. 
The episode from the Ekottara Ógama and the one from the Majjhima 
Nikåya clearly come from a common source. It seems a priori likely that 
the former is a later version, for the Ekottara Ógama is said to have been 
profoundly influenced by Mahåyåna, and to contain an “abundance of 
composite SËtras, artificially forged together by placing one after the 
other SËtras or portions of SËtras borrowed from other canonical texts” 
                                                
21 Unclear. 
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(cf. Lamotte,1967: 106; Bareau, 1963: 9). Some facts support this. 
The episode in the Ekottara Ógama reverses meditation without 
breath and reduced intake of food. Reduced intake of food comes here 
first, and this has given rise to an absurdity. At the beginning of his 
reduced intake of food the future Buddha decides not to undertake a 
complete fast, because the gods would keep him alive, would not let him 
die. But at the end of the reduced intake of food the gods are made to 
think that Gautama has died, or is about to die, without their having done 
a thing to prevent this. This inconsistency is absent from the Påli version 
where these thoughts on the part of the gods occur after Gautama’s 
meditation without breath. We may assume that the story got muddled up 
in the course of the longer tradition which underlay the version in the 
Ekottara Ógama. 
The statement at the end of the episode in the Ekottara Ógama that 
these painful practices were performed for six years is another indication 
that this is a later stage in the development of the story. The Påli canon 
does not, to my knowledge, indicate anywhere how long the future 
Buddha tried alternative methods. In the later literature,22 however, it is 
often said that it lasted six years. 
The Ekottara Ógama version of our episode preserves, in spite of its 
lateness, the two main indications that it originally dealt with non-
Buddhist, probably Jaina, practices: 
 (i)The gods call Gautama an arhat 
 (ii)The future Buddha intends to fast to death but abandons this idea. 
 
The third indication which we might expect, viz., something 
corresponding to ma∫guracchavi, is not found in the Ekottara Ógama. 
One thing is lacking in the Ekottara Ógama. The Påli version 
introduces the description of meditation without breath with an account 
of the Bodhisattva’s attempt to “restrain my thought with my mind, [to] 
coerce and torment it”. This is the only part of the whole episode which 
can properly be called a description of meditation. It is absent from the 
                                                
22 E.g., Aßvagho∑a’s Buddhacarita 12.95; Lalitavistara p. 250, 256, 257, 259, 260, 264, 
265; Mahåvastu II, p. 241. It is also mentioned in the introduction to the Jåtakas (Ja 
I.67), which is late. For a comparative study of all these and other versions of our 
story, see Dutoit, 1905. 
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Chinese version. 
The explanation of this absence lies no doubt in the circumstance 
that the practice to “restrain one’s thought with one’s mind, to coerce and 
torment it” – here criticized – was taken over by the Buddhists themselves 
at an early date. This is most clearly shown by the fact that almost the 
same words which are used in the autobiographical account of the 
Buddha to ridicule this practice, are used elsewhere in the Majjhima 
Nikåya (I. 120-21; similarly MÓc p. 582c7-10) to recommend that same 
practice. Even the accompanying simile is there. This explains 
sufficiently the omission in the Ekottara Ógama. 
 
1.3. The Ekottara Ógama gives no real context to the autobiographical 
account which contains our episode. Only an introduction accompanies 
it, which reads (p. 670c2-3): “Thus it has been heard. At one time the 
Buddha was in a grove outside the city of Vaißål¥. Then the world-
honoured one spoke to the monks: ‘Formerly, when I had not yet attained 
enlightenment,23 ...’.” Following this comes the autobiographical account 
which contains our episode and which reaches up to the end of this unit. 
The Majjhima Nikåya gives the episode in three different contexts, 
one of which is of particular interest to us. The Mahåsaccaka Sutta may 
well contain the original context of the episode; at the very least it shows 
that early in the Buddhist tradition there was a clear awareness that our 
episode served the purpose of criticizing others, i.e., Jainas, for which a 
suitable context was created. The following points go to show this: 
(i) The Mahåsaccaka Sutta mainly describes a conversation between the 
Buddha and Saccaka Nigaˆ†haputta, alias Aggivessana. The Nigaˆ†has of 
the Påli canon are – as has been shown by Jacobi (1895: xivf.) – the 
Jainas. Saccaka is called ‘Nigaˆ†haputta’, i.e., ‘son of a Nigaˆ†ha’, which 
indicates that he was a Jaina.24  
 (ii) Saccaka points out that there are two extremes into which certain 
recluses and Brahmins fall. Some are devoted to the cultivation of the 
body, at the expense of the cultivation of the mind. Others are devoted to 
                                                
23 Lit. ‘the way of a Buddha’. 
24 On the pleonastic use of -putta / putra, see Alsdorf, 1969: 18 (375) n. 9, and esp. 
Alsdorf, 1951: 357-60 (587-90). 
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the cultivation of the mind, at the expense of the cultivation of the body. 
Both suffer the horrible consequences of this omission because they fail 
respectively to cultivate the mind or the body. Saccaka specifies that the 
disciples of the Buddha are devoted to the cultivation of the mind, at the 
expense of the cultivation of the body. Those who are devoted to the 
cultivation of the body, at the expense of the cultivation of the mind, are, 
apparently, Nanda Vaccha, Kisa Sa∫kicca, and Makkhali Gosåla. These 
three persons are mentioned at the beginning of a passage which gives an 
enumeration of ascetic practices. These practices fit very well with what 
we know about the Jainas (Jacobi, 1895: xxxi), yet neither Nigaˆ†ha 
Nåtaputta, i.e. Mahåv¥ra, nor his followers are here mentioned. The 
reason seems clear: Saccaka, himself a Jaina, cannot ascribe to the Jainas 
the extreme of only cultivating the body at the expense of cultivating the 
mind. The tenor of Saccaka’s exposition indicates that others such as 
Nanda Vaccha, Kisa Sa∫kicca, and Makkhali Gosåla – all of whom are 
normally associated with the Ój¥vikas (Basham, 1951: 27–30) – are guilty 
of this extreme, while the Jainas give mind and body their proper share. 
It is certainly significant that this same enumeration of ascetic practices 
occurs often in the Påli canon (see Franke, 1913: 135n.1), but never in 
connection with these three persons!25 Note that according to the 
composer of this part of the Mahåsaccaka Sutta the episode of meditation 
without breath and reduced intake of food is not directed against the 
Ój¥vikas. (MN I. 237-39, esp. p. 238, 1. 12-28). 
Perhaps the following point should be added: 
(iii) Towards the end of the SËtra (MN I. 249-50) Saccaka directs a final 
criticism at the Buddha. The Buddha, he points out, sleeps sometimes by 
day. This criticism makes sense against the background of the Jaina rule 
that monks should abstain from sleeping by day (Jaini, 1979: 251; cf. 
Óyår. 106 (1.3.1.1): suttå amuˆ¥ muˆiˆo sayå jågaraµti “The unwise 
sleep, the sages always wake” (tr. Jacobi, 1884: 28); SËy. 585 (1.14.6); 
                                                
25 Jacobi (1895: xxxi-xxxii), not taking into account the context, mistakenly thinks that 
this passage is “most easily ... accounted for by our assuming that the original 
Nigaˆ†has ... were not the section of the church, which submitted to the more rigid 
rules of Mahåv¥ra, but those followers of Pårßva, who, without forming a hostile 
party, yet continued ... to retain within the united church some particular usages of 
the old one.” 
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PËjyapåda’s Sarvårthasiddhi 9.19; Hemacandra’s Yogaßåstra with the 
own commentary (vol. II, p. 726); etc.).26  
The other two SËtras of the Majjhima Nikåya provide no context 
worth the name. The autobiographical account containing our episode is 
given in the Bodhiråjakumåra Sutta in reply to the faulty observation that 
“happiness should not be reached through happiness, happiness should 
be reached through hardship” (see however note 5 to ch. II). Here the 
features which point to specific non-Buddhistic, probably Jaina, practices 
remain unexplained. In the Sa∫gårava Sutta the autobiographical account 
follows the Buddha’s statement that he has achieved perfection of 
wisdom in this world (di††hadhammåbhiññåvosånapåramippatta) by 
having recognized the dhamma himself (MN II.211). This is hardly a 
fitting context for our episode. 
However, in all the three SËtras our episode is part of the same 
autobiographical account, portions of which do not appear to make sense 
in the Mahåsaccaka Sutta. One of those portions seems to fit much better 
in the Sa∫gårava Sutta. This is the story of the Bodhisattva’s training 
under ÓÒåra Kålåma and Uddaka the son of Råma, which he then 
discarded as useless. This story has nothing to do with the point which 
the Buddha wants to make to Saccaka. It is, on the other hand, a suitable 
introduction to the message which the Buddha wants to get across in the 
Sa∫gårava Sutta, viz., that he reached his goal all alone.27 One gets the 
impression that the long autobiographical account which is repeated in 
three contexts, contains some portions which at an earlier time occurred 
separately in those different contexts. 
Be this as it may, the autobiographical account in the Mahåsaccaka 
Sutta contains some further portions which do not make sense in the 
conversations with Saccaka, and which may therefore be later additions. 
They are the following: 
(i) Immediately after the account of the training under ÓÒåra Kålåma and 
Uddaka the son of Råma, the Buddha describes how three similes 
occurred to him which, briefly stated, showed him that no progress 
would be possible as long as desire for the objects of the senses were not 
                                                
26 The idea is also found in Brahmanical sources, e.g. ÓpDhS 1.2.24. 
27 This story occurs again in the Ariyapariyesana Sutta (MN I. 163-67). 
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abandoned (MN I. 240-42). This description serves no purpose in the 
reply to Saccaka. 
(ii) At the end of the Mahåsaccaka Sutta (MN I. 250-51) Saccaka 
contrasts the composed behaviour of Gotama with the evasive reactions 
of the six heretics, which include, as ever, Nigaˆ†ha Nåtaputta. Since 
there is no mention in the text that Saccaka was converted to Buddhism, 
he was still a follower of Nigaˆ†ha Nåtaputta. This episode is therefore 
inexplicable in this context. 
 
*** 
If we remove the portions indicated above from the Mahåsaccaka 
Sutta, we are left with what may be called the ‘Original Mahåsaccaka 
SËtra’. It is very likely that it once had an existence of its own, while 
additions were made to it later. From the beginning this Original 
Mahåsaccaka SËtra must have contained the episode on meditation 
without breath and reduced intake of food. This episode itself may or 
may not have existed before the composition of the Original 
Mahåsaccaka SËtra. 
 
1.4. Something can be said about the date of composition of the episode 
on meditation without breath and reduced intake of food. It must have 
been well before the final redaction of the Påli canon, because, as we 
have seen, the Original Mahåsaccaka SËtra suffered a number of 
additions. The Påli canon was written down in the first century B.C.28 
Our episode must be much earlier than this. 
One feature of our episode allows us to tentatively push this date 
back considerably. The Bodhisattva, we know, abandoned his intention 
to fast to death. The author of the episode really did not have much 
choice here, for if he had let the Bodhisattva die as a result of these 
hardships, the latter could not have reached enlightenment in the same 
life. Embarrassment could however have been avoided by placing the 
episode in an earlier existence of the Bodhisattva. In that case the 
                                                
28 Dates vary from between 35 and 32 B.C. (Lamotte, 1958: 404-05) to about 89-77 
B.C. (Bechert, 1974: 131). 
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Bodhisattva could finish his fast to death completely. Why was this not 
done? 
Stories about previous existences of the Buddha are a late feature of 
the canonical literature. Very few of them occur in the collections of 
SËtras (KË†adanta Sutta: DN I. 134-43, cf. DÓc p. 98b-100b; 
Mahåsudassana Sutta: DN II. 169-98, cf. DÓc p. 21b-24b, MÓc p. 515b-
518b; Mahågovinda Sutta: DN II. 220-51, cf. DÓc p. 30b-34a; 
Makhådeva Sutta: MN II. 74-82, cf. MÓc p. 511c-515a, EÓc p. 806c-
810a; Gha†¥kåra Sutta: MN II. 46-49, 54, cf. MÓc p. 499a-503a; see 
Winternitz, 1920: 91f.; Bareau, 1980: 5). A whole collection of such 
stories (the Jåtakas) came to be accepted in the Påli canon. We may 
assume that this happened before the time that these Jåtakas (Lüders, 
1941: 136f.; but cf. Lamotte, 1958: 444-45) were depicted at Buddhist 
monuments, especially in Bhårhut. These sculptures may be dated 
between 150 and 100 B.C. (Barua, 1934: 29-37; Rowland, 1967: 88). It 
seems that we must date our episode long before this time, i.e., in the 
third century B.C. at the latest (cf. Bareau, 1980: 5-6).29 
This conclusion seems supported by the fact that many Jåtakas 
contain verses in the new Óryå metre (Alsdorf, 1967: 23-51) and must 
therefore perhaps be dated before the supposed migration of Påli to 
Ceylon, in the middle or second half of the third century B.C. (Alsdorf, 
1965: 70; 1967: 5). This last consideration is however weakened by the 
possibility that the early Påli works which originated after this date may 
also have been composed on the mainland, not in Ceylon; cf. 
Frauwallner, 1971: 105-06.30 
With regard to the above conclusion some caution must be 
exercised. It is likely that some kind of tradition regarding the pre-
enlightenment hardships of the Buddha existed prior to the composition 
of our episode (see below). This may have prevented the transposition of 
                                                
29 A possible objection would be that the Bodhisattva is said to abandon a full fast 
merely to indicate that he would be kept alive by receiving divine food through his 
pores. This point of view does not however seem to do full justice to our episode. 
30 It is not likely that our episode was part of the original Skandhaka which Frauwallner 
(1956b: 67) dates a century after the death of the Buddha. Mukherjee (1966: 130-
32) argues convincingly that the original Skandhaka may not have contained any 
biographical material regarding the period preceding the enlightenment of the 
Buddha. 
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this episode to an earlier life of the Bodhisattva even at a time that stories 
about such earlier lives started playing a role. 
The episode on meditation without breath and reduced intake of 
food does not belong to the earliest layer of Buddhist literature. There is 
reason to believe that its composer made use of already existing passages 
(‘pericopes’), which may have been more or less freely floating. 
The Påli account of meditation fully without breath contains four 
comparisons: 
(i) “Just as when a strong man may destroy a head with the sharp edge of 
a sword, just so indeed extremely strong winds shook up my head” 
(ii) “Just as when a strong man may place a turban on a head with a 
strong strip of leather, just so indeed there came about extremely strong 
headaches in my head”31  
(iii) “Just as when a skilled butcher or apprentice of a butcher may cut a 
belly all around with a sharp butcher’s knife, just so indeed extremely 
strong winds cut my belly all around” 
(iv) “Just as when two strong men, taking a weaker man by both his 
arms, may burn and roast him on a pit of burning coal, just so indeed 
there came about an extremely strong heat in my body.” 
These comparisons also occur in the Ekottarågama version, even though 
there (i) and (ii) have been condensed into one: 
(i)-(ii) “As if a man, taking hold of me, pierced my head with a drill, so 
did I have extremely painful headaches” 
(iii) “Just as when a skilled butcher slaughters a cow with a knife, so did 
I suffer extremely severe pains” 
 (iv) “And as when two strong men together hold one weak man and 
toast him above a fire, so that he suffers extreme pains which he cannot 
bear, so did I suffer such pains.” 
 
                                                
31 Jha (1979: 276) observes: “The traditional scholars from South India very often say: 
kimarthaµ ßirove∑†ana-pråˆåyåma˙ ?” What could be the connection ? 
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These four32 comparisons must have occurred in the original version of 
our episode. 
But the same comparisons occur in the exact words elsewhere in the 
Påli canon and always in connection with a sick person: MN II. 193; SN 
IV. 56; AN III. 379-80. There can be no doubt that the comparisons fit a 
sick person much better than one engaged in meditation fully without 
breath. The important role allotted to wind in Indian medical treatises is 
well-known.33 Further, it is difficult to see why meditation without breath 
should bring about the extreme heat of the fourth comparison, which 
appears to describe fever, which is connected with bile ( pitta) and not 
wind (see note 28). It is however clear how the four comparisons could 
come to be transferred from a sick person to one engaged in meditation 
fully without breath; the first and the third mention wind, and winds are 
not allowed to leave the body in this kind of meditation. 
Another apparently borrowed part in the episode is the description 
of the horrible effects of the future Buddha’s reduced intake of food, 
which occurs in both the Påli and the Chinese versions. It occurs again in 
the Mahås¥hanåda Sutta of the Majjhima Nikåya (nr. 12, MN I.80) and, 
in a somewhat different form, in the Shên mao hsi shu ching (originally 
Romahar∑aˆ¥ya SËtra, cf. Lévi, 1932: 158n5; T. 757, p. 598a 25f.).34 In 
both these SËtras it is part of an account of the extreme ascetic practices 
which the Bodhisattva tried out. These practices include much besides 
fasting, but no meditation with or without breath. Since it is hard to see 
in what other context this part could originally have existed, we may 
assume that some sort of tradition regarding the pre-enlightenment 
hardships of the Buddha existed prior to the composition of our 
                                                
32 Four, not three. The Påli version must be closer to the original because two of its 
comparisons make a mention of winds, which the whole passage really is about. 
The mention of winds cannot be an adjustment après coup, for the four 
comparisons were taken from another context. See below. 
33 According to Agniveßa's Caraka Saµhitå, SËtrasthåna 20.11 (p. 113), headache 
(ßiroruc) and belly-ache (udaråve∑†a˙; the commentator Cakrapåˆidatta explains: 
udarasyåve∑†anam ivodaråve∑†a˙ ) are caused by wind (våta). This corresponds to 
comparisons (i)-(iii). Heat (dåha), on the other hand, is caused by bile ( pitta); see 
SËtrasthåna 20.14 (p. 114). 
34 The Romahar∑aˆ¥ya SËtra in its Chinese version is clearly influenced by our episode. 
It includes the remarks by onlookers regarding Gautama’s black or brown colour 
(p. 598b24) and is aware of the feeding of ojas through the pores (p. 599a24). 
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episode.35 The portion on meditation in our episode may not have been 
part of this tradition (it occurs nowhere except in our episode), and 
appears to have been composed for this episode. 
 
1.5. The most interesting result of the above observations is that, 
probably in the third century B.C., a Buddhist gave a description of a 
non-Buddhist, probably Jaina, method of cultivating the mind, called 
‘meditation’ (jhåna / dhyåna). Stripped from obvious exaggerations and 
repetitions it presents this picture : Among the non-Buddhists (Jainas), 
meditation was a forceful effort to restrain the mind and bring it to a 
standstill. Along with it, but perhaps only in a more advanced stage of 
meditation, breathing is stopped. 
This form of non-Buddhist meditation is contrasted with Buddhist 
meditation in the Mahåsaccaka Sutta, and probably also in the Original 
Mahåsaccaka SËtra which may have constituted the original context of 
our episode. The Bodhisattva is said to recall the First Dhyåna in a 
passage which appears to contain very old elements (Horsch, 1964; 
Bareau, 1963: 47-48, 52-53). It reads (MN I. 246-47; cf. T. 1428, p. 
781a4-11):36 
Then, Aggivessana, I thought: ‘I remember, indeed, that [once], 
during the work of my father the Sakka, while sitting in the cool 
shade of the rose-apple tree, separated from desires, separated 
from bad things (dhamma), I reached the First Dhyåna, which is 
accompanied by thought and reflection, born from separation, 
consists of joy and bliss, and remained [there]. Could this perhaps 
be the road toward enlightenment?’ Then, Aggivessana, following 
this memory I had this knowledge: ‘This is really the road toward 
                                                
35 This tradition, too, may have been strongly influenced by Jaina and similar practices. 
See Bollée, 1971; Verclas, 1978: 156-60. 
36 tassa mayhaµ aggivessana etad ahosi: abhijånåmi kho panåhaµ pitu sakkassa 
kammante s¥tåya jambucchåyåya nisinno vivicc’eva kåmehi vivicca akusalehi 
dhammehi savitakkaµ savicåraµ vivekajaµ p¥tisukhaµ pa†hamaµ jhånaµ 
upasampajja viharitå, siyå nu kho eso maggo bodhåyå’ti / tassa mayhaµ 
aggivessana satånusåri viññåˆaµ ahosi: eso va maggo bodhåyå’ti / tassa mayhaµ 
aggivessana etad ahosi: kin nu kho ahaµ tassa sukhassa bhåyåmi yan taµ sukhaµ 
aññatr ’eva kåmehi aññatra akusalehi dhammeh¥ ’ti / tassa mayhaµ aggivessana 
etad ahosi: na kho ahaµ tassa sukhassa bhåyåmi yan taµ sukhaµ añ~ñatr ’eva 
kåmehi aññatra akusalehi dhammeh¥ ’ti / 
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enlightenment’. Then, Aggivessana, I thought: ‘Indeed, I do not 
fear that bliss, a bliss which is apart from desires, apart from bad 
psychic states’. 
One cannot fail to be struck by the relaxed and friendly atmosphere 
which emanates from this passage, and which contrasts with the violent 
spirit ascribed to Jaina meditation. 
In the opinion of the author of the Original Mahåsaccaka SËtra 
Buddhist meditation consists of the so-called Four Dhyånas. This is 
shown by the fact that the autobiographical account in the Mahåsaccaka 
Sutta concludes with a description of the final enlightenment of the 
Buddha which follows his ascent through the Four Dhyånas. They are 
described as follows (MN I. 247):37 
Then indeed, Aggivessana, having taken ample food, and having 
recovered strength, being separated from desires, separated from 
bad things, I reached the First Dhyåna, which is accompanied by 
thought and reflection, born from separation, and consists of joy 
and bliss, and resided [there]. Even such a blissful experience, 
Aggivessana, when it happened to me, did not completely take 
hold of my mind. As a result of appeasing thought and reflection I 
reached the Second Dhyåna, which is an inner tranquillization, a 
unification of the mind, free from thought and reflection, 
consisting of joy and bliss that is born from concentration 
(samådhija), and resided [there]. Even such a blissful experience, 
Aggivessana, when it happened to me, did not completely take 
hold of my mind. 
                                                
37 so kho ahaµ aggivessana oÒårikaµ åhåraµ åhåretvå balaµ gahetvå vivicc’eva 
kåmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi savitakkaµ savicåraµ vivekajaµ p¥tisukhaµ 
pa†hamaµ jhånaµ upasampajja vihåsiµ / evarËpå pi kho me aggivessana uppannå 
sukhå vedanå cittaµ na pariyådåya ti††hati / vitakkavicårånaµ vËpasamå ajjhattaµ 
sampasådanaµ cetaso ekodibhåvaµ avitakkaµ avicåraµ samådhijaµ p¥tisukhaµ 
dutiyaµ jhånaµ upasampajja vihåsiµ / evarËpå pi kho me aggivessana uppannå 
sukhå vedanå cittaµ na pariyådåya ti††hati / p¥tiyå ca virågå upekhako ca vihåsiµ 
sato ca sampajåno, sukhañ ca kåyena pa†isaµvedesiµ yan taµ ariyå åcikkhanti : 
upekhako satimå sukhavihår¥ti tatiyaµ jhånaµ upasampajja vihåsiµ / evarËpå pi 
kho me aggivessana uppannå sukhå vedanå cittaµ na pariyådåya ti††hati / sukhassa 
ca pahånå dukkhassa ca pahånå pubbeva somanassadomanassånaµ atthagamå 
adukkhaµ asukhaµ upekhåsatipårisuddhiµ catutthaµ jhånaµ upasampajja vihåsiµ 
/ evarËpå pi kho me aggivessana uppannå sukhå vedanå cittaµ na pariyådåya 
ti††hati / 
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As a result of detachment from joy, I remained indifferent, 
attentive and mindful. I experienced with my body the bliss which 
the noble ones describe [in these terms]: ‘indifferent, with 
attentiveness, residing in bliss’; thus I reached the Third Dhyåna 
and resided [there]. Even such a blissful experience, Aggivessana, 
when it happened to me did not completely take hold of my mind. 
As a result of abandoning bliss, and abandoning pain, as a result 
of the earlier disappearance of cheerfulness and dejection, I 
reached the Fourth Dhyåna, which is free from pain and bliss, the 
complete purity of equanimity and attentiveness, and resided 
[there]. Even38 such a blissful experience, Aggivessana, when it 
happened to me, did not completely take hold of my mind. 
When we compare what we learned about non-Buddhist meditation with 
this description of the Buddhist Four Dhyånas (which is standard, and 
recurs numerous times in the Buddhist canon; see Schmithausen, 1981: 
203-04), we notice many differences. The one that is emphasized by the 
author of the Original Mahåsaccaka SËtra is that Buddhist meditation39 is 
a pleasant experience,40 accompanied by joy (p¥ti) and bliss (sukha), or 
bliss alone, in all but its highest stages, whereas non-Buddhist meditation 
is not described as pleasurable. 
                                                
38 This sentence is here rather absurd, and shows the unifying, but non-understanding 
hand of a redactor. 
39 By this I mean, of course, the Four Dhyånas. 
40 Note that SN I.l claims that Nirvån˝a is reached without effort; cf. Karunaratne, 1976. 
TWO  TRADITIONS OF  MEDITATION          
 
II .  Further Buddhist criticism of alternative practices.  
 
2.1. More information about the Jainas that is of interest to us can be 
gathered from various places in the Buddhist canon. Of particular interest 
is MN I. 92-95 (cf. T. 55, p. 850c-851a; MÓc p. 587b13f.; EÓc 
p. 744a27f.) where the Buddha is in conversation with the Sakka named 
Mahånåma:41 
At one time, Mahånåma, I resided in Råjagaha on the mountain 
GijjhakË†a. At that time there were many Nigaˆ†has on the black 
rock on the slope of [the mountain] Isigili, standing erect,42 
refusing to sit down, and they experienced painful, sharp, severe 
                                                
41 ekam idåhaµ mahånåma samayaµ råjagahe viharåmi gijjhakË†e pabbate / tena kho 
pana samayena sambahulå nigaˆ†hå isigilipasse kåÒasilåyaµ ubbha††hakå honti 
åsanapa†ikkhittå, opakkamikå dukkhå tippå ka†ukå vedanå vediyanti / atha kho 
’haµ mahånåma såyanhasamayaµ pa†isallåˆå vu††hito yena isigilipassaµ kåÒasilå 
yena te nigaˆ†hå ten ’upasa∫kamiµ, upasa∫kamitvå te nigaˆ†he etad avocaµ : kin 
nu tumhe åvuso nigaˆ†hå ubbha††hakå åsanapa†ikkhittå opakkamikå dukkhå tippå 
ka†ukå vedanå vediyathå’ti ? evaµ vutte mahånåma te nigaˆ†hå maµ etad avocuµ : 
nigaˆ†ho åvuso nåthaputto sabbaññË sabbadassåv¥ aparisesaµ ñåˆadassanaµ 
pa†ijånåti : carato ca me ti††hato ca suttassa ca jågarassa ca satataµ samitaµ 
ñåˆadassanaµ paccupa††hitan ti / so evaµ åha: atthi kho vo nigaˆ†hå pubbe påpaµ 
kammaµ katam, taµ imåya ka†ukåya dukkarakårikåya nijjaretha; yaµ pan’ettha 
etarahi kåyena saµvutå våcåya saµvutå manaså saµvutå taµ åyatiµ påpassa 
kammassa akaraˆaµ; iti puråˆånaµ kammånaµ tapaså byantibhåvå, navånaµ 
kammånaµ akaraˆå åyatiµ anavassavo, åyatiµ anavassavå kammakkhayo, 
kammakkhayå dukkhakkhayo, dukkhakkhayå vedanåkkhayo, vedanåkkhayå 
sabbaµ dukkhaµ nijjiˆˆaµ bhavissat¥’ti / tañ ca pan’amhåkaµ ruccati c’eva 
khamati ca, tena c’amhå attamanå’ti / ... na kho åvuso gotama sukhena sukhaµ 
adhigantabbaµ, dukkhena kho sukhaµ adhigantabbaµ / sukhena ca åvuso gotama 
sukhaµ adhigantabbaµ abhavissa, råjå mågadho seniyo bimbisåro sukhaµ 
adhigaccheyya, råjå mågadho seniyo bimbisåro sukhavihåritaro åyasmatå 
gotamenåti / … api ca aham eva tattha pa†ipucchitabbo : ko nu kho åyasmantånaµ 
sukhavihåritaro, råjå vå mågadho seniyo bimbisåro åyasmå vå gotamo ti / ... tena 
h’åvuso nigaˆ†hå tumhe va tattha pa†ipucchissåmi, yathå vo khameyya tathå naµ 
byåkareyyåtha / taµ kim maññath’åvuso nigaˆ†hå: pahoti råjå mågadho seniyo 
bimbisåro aniñjamåno kåyena abhåsamåno våcaµ satta (cha ... pañca ... cattåri ... 
t¥ˆi ... dve ... ekaµ) rattindivåni (rattindivaµ) ekantasukhapa†isaµved¥ viharitun ti / 
no h’idaµ åvuso / ahaµ kho åvuso nigaˆ†hå pahomi aniñjamåno kåyena 
abhåsamåno våcaµ ekaµ (dve ... t¥ˆi ... cattåri ... pañca ... cha ... satta) rattindivaµ 
(rattindivåni) ekantasukhapa†isamved¥ viharituµ / taµ kim maññath’åvuso nigaˆ†hå 
: evaµ sante ko sukhavihåritaro, råjå vå mågadho seniyo bimbisåro ahaµ vå’ti / 
evaµ sante åyasmå va gotamo sukhavihåritaro raññå mågadhena seniyena 
bimbisårenå’ti / 
42. T. 55 (p. 850c4) has ‘standing on their knees’, EÓc (p. 744b1) ‘squatting on the 
heels’. 
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sensations [which were] due to [self-inflicted] torture.43 Then, 
Mahånåma, having arisen in the evening from my retirement, I 
went to the black rock on the slope of [the mountain] Isigili where 
those Nigaˆ†has were; having gone there I said to those 
Nigaˆ†has: ‘Why, dear Nigaˆ†has, are you standing erect, refusing 
to sit down, and do you experience painful, sharp, severe 
sensations [which are] due to [self-inflicted] torture?’ When this 
was said, Mahånåma, those Nigaˆ†has said to me: ‘Friend, 
Nigaˆ†ha Nåthaputta, who knows all and sees all, claims complete 
knowledge and insight [saying:] “Always and continuously 
knowledge and insight are present to me, whether I walk, stand 
still, sleep or be awake.” He (i.e., Nigaˆ†ha Nåthaputta) says: 
“Formerly, Nigaˆ†has, you performed sinful activities; you must 
exhaust that [sinful activity] by means of this severe and difficult 
practice. Being here and now restrained in body, speech and 
mind, amounts to not performing sinful activity in the future. 
Thus, as a result of the annihilation of former actions by 
asceticism, and of the non-performing of new actions, there is no 
further effect in the future; as a result of no further effect in the 
future there is destruction of actions; as a result of the destruction 
of actions there is destruction of suffering; as a result of the 
destruction of suffering there is destruction of sensation; as a 
result of the destruction of sensation all suffering will be 
exhausted.” And this [word of Nigaˆ†ha Nåthaputta] pleases us 
and is approved of by us, and therefore we are delighted. ... 
Happiness, dear Gotama, should not be reached through 
happiness,44 happiness should be reached through hardship.45 If 
happiness should be reached through happiness, dear Gotama, 
king Seniya Bimbisåra of Magadha would reach happiness 
                                                
43. See note 6 to ch. I, above. 
44. The Jaina text SËyaga∂a 230 (I.3.4.6) criticizes some who say that happiness is 
reached through happiness (iham ege u bhåsaµti såtaµ såteˆa vijjat¥). Í¥lå∫ka 
(p. 64) identifies these as ‘Buddhists etc.’ (ßåkyådaya˙). 
45. The Ekottara Ógama completely reverses the situation and makes the Buddha say 
that happiness can only be reached through hardship, not through happiness (EÓc 
p. 744b9-10, 20-21). This must be due to outside influence; see § 1.2 above. 
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[hereafter, because] king Seniya Bimbisåra of Magadha lives in 
greater happiness than the venerable Gotama.’ [The Buddha 
replies:] 
‘With respect to this I should be asked: “Who of the [two] 
venerable ones lives in greater happiness, King Seniya Bimbisåra 
of Magadha or the venerable Gotama?” ... Therefore, dear 
Nigaˆ†has, I shall ask you [a question] which you may answer as 
seems right to you. What do you think, dear Nigaˆ†has, is king 
Seniya Bimbisåra of Magadha able to experience unalloyed 
happiness for seven (six ... five ... four ... three ... two ... one) 
nights and days [at a stretch] without moving his body and 
without saying a word?’ ‘No, friend.’ ‘But I, dear Nigaˆ†has, am 
able to experience unalloyed happiness46 for one (two ... three ... 
four ... five ... six ... seven) night and day [at a stretch] without 
moving my body and without saying a word. What do you think, 
dear Nigaˆ†has, who lives in view of this in greater happiness, 
king Seniya Bimbisåra of Magadha or I ?’ ‘In view of this the 
venerable Gotama lives in greater happiness than king Seniya 
Bimbisåra of Magadha’. 
We observe that here again the painful practices of the Jainas are 
contrasted with the happiness of the Buddhists. Unfortunately the 
contrast is not validly illustrated, because the Buddha himself – who has 
already reached the goal – is said to be happy, and those who have not 
yet reached the goal but are practising in the right way are not mentioned. 
Nevertheless, this passage contains one more piece of information 
about the Jainas as viewed by the Buddhists. The Jainas, we read, were 
“standing erect,47 refusing to sit down”. We may look upon this as an 
expression of their desire for ‘non-performing of new actions’ and 
‘annihilation of former actions by asceticism’.48 
                                                
46. EÓc p. 744bl4-15 seems to miss the point and makes the Buddha boast of being 
able “to sit cross-legged for seven days and nights without stirring the body”, not 
mentioning happiness. 
47. Or ‘standing on their knees’ and ‘squatting on their heels’ in the Chinese parallels. 
48. These words are again ascribed to Nigaˆ†ha Nåthaputta and his followers at AN I. 
220-21; MN II.214; cf. SÓc p. 147c8f.; MÓc p. 442c2f.
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The emphasis on bodily practices among the Jainas is explicitly 
mentioned in the Upåli Sutta /SËtra (MN no. 56, I.371f.; MÓc no. 133, 
p. 628a f.). The Nigaˆ†ha D¥ghatapass¥ tells the Buddha that of the three 
kinds of bad activities – of body, speech, and mind – bodily activities are 
the worst. The Buddha, on the other hand, is of the opinion that mental 
bad activities are the worst. 
2.2. The Indriyabhåvanå Sutta of the Majjhima Nikåya ( III. 298f.; 
cf. SÓc p. 78a22f.) criticizes such ‘cultivation of the senses’ (indriya-
bhåvanå) as leads to their non-functioning. Uttara explains, at the request 
of the Buddha, that his teacher Påråsariya teaches such cultivation of the 
senses that “one sees no form with the eye, hears no sound with the ear” 
(MN III.298: ...cakkhunå rËpaµ na passati, sotena saddaµ na suˆåti). 
The Buddha responds that then the blind and deaf will have cultivated 
the senses (bhåvitindriya), because they do not see with the eye, nor hear 
with the ear. The Buddha then explains to Ónanda that the best 
cultivation of the senses (anuttarå indriyabhåvanå) consists in equanimity 
(upekkhå) with respect to what is experienced through the senses. 
 
2.3. The main conclusions to be drawn from the material presented in 
chapters I and II are as follows. Certain non-Buddhist ascetics, in 
particular the Jainas, performed practices which are described as ‘non-
performing of new actions’ and ‘annihilation of former actions by 
asceticism’. The ‘non-performing of new actions’ implied apparently 
                                                                                                                   
It is noteworthy that almost the same words are placed in the mouth of the 
Buddha at AN I.221, II.197-98 (cf. MÓc p. 434b23; SÓc p.147c27): so navañ ca 
kammaµ na karoti, puråˆaµ kammaµ phussa phussa vyantikaroti ; the effects of 
activities are now said to wear out with death (AN II. 198-99; MÓc p. 434c5f.). At 
Ud 21, similarly, we are confronted with a monk “in a cross-legged position, with 
body erect, mindful and conscious, and bearing without a murmur, acute, piercing 
and terrible pains, the result of deeds done in the past” ( palla∫kaµ åbhujitvå ujuµ 
kåyaµ paˆidhåya puråˆakammavipåkajaµ dukkhaµ tippaµ kharaµ ka†ukaµ 
vedanaµ adhivåsento sato sampajåno avihaññamåno; tr. Strong, 1902: 27). At AN 
V.292, 294, 297, 298 (cf. MÓc p. 437b26f.) the Buddha is made to declare “that of 
intentional deeds done and accumulated there can be no wiping out without 
experiencing the result thereof, and that too whenever arising, either in this same 
visible state or in some other state hereafter” (nåhaµ bhikkhave sañcetanikånaµ 
kammånaµ katånaµ upacitånaµ appa†isaµviditvå vyantibhåvaµ vadåmi, tañ ca 
kho di††he va dhamme upapajjaµ vå apare vå pariyåye; tr. Woodward, 1936: 189, 
191). In all these cases we can be sure of outside influence on Buddhism. See 
ch. VII, below. 
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such feats of motionlessness as standing erect without ever sitting or 
lying down. The accompanying feelings of displeasure are probably what 
is meant by ‘annihilation of former actions by asceticism’. 
These practices on the part of the Jainas and other non-Buddhist 
religious ascetics were, in the view of the Buddhists, accompanied by 
others, of equally negative intent. One of these is the abstention from all 
food, until its inevitable result, death. Another one is described as 
‘meditation without breath’. The meditation-part of this practice 
consisted in a complete restraint of all mental processes. Along with this 
went an attempt to stop breathing. 
One more practice was described and assigned to non-Buddhists. 
Here the attempt is made to halt the functioning of the senses in such a 
way that “one sees no form with the eye, hears no sound with the ear”. 
The common denominator in all these practices is easily discerned. 
All of them aim at non-activity of a part, or of the whole, of the aspirant. 
Given the fact that many of the religious movements in the time of the 
Buddha and later strove to discard the evil consequences of activity 
(karman), this goal should not surprise us. 
It is perhaps more surprising that the early Buddhists are against all 
these practices. In some cases they contrast the non-Buddhist practices 
aiming at non-activity with what are, in their opinion, the practices to be 
performed in their stead. Rather than fasting, restraining the mind and 
stopping the breath, one should perform the Four Dhyånas. And rather 
than aiming at the non-functioning of the senses, one should remain 
equanimous in the face of the experiences they offer. 
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Part II: The main stream. 
 
III .  Early Jaina meditation. 
 
3.1. Probably the earliest surviving detailed description of the 
road leading to liberation in the Jaina scriptures is Óyåraµga (Óyår.) 
1.8(7).7.2-8 / 228-53:49 
                                                
49. jassa ˆaµ bhikkhussa evaµ bhavati ‘se gilåmi ca khalu ahaµ imammi samae 
imaµ  sar¥ragaµ aˆupuvveˆaµ parivahittae’ se aˆupuvveˆaµ åhåraµ saµva††ejjå, 
aˆupuvveˆaµ åhåraµ saµva††ettå kasåe pataˆue kiccå samåhiyacce 
phalagåvaya††h¥ u††håya bhikkhË abhiˆivvu∂acce ... taˆåiµ jåejjå, taˆåiµ jåettå se 
ttam åyåe egaµtam avakkamejjå, egaµtam avakkamettå ... taˆåiµ saµtharejjå, 
[taˆåiµ saµtharettå] ettha vi samae kåyaµ ca jogaµ ca iriyaµ ca paccakkhåejjå / ... 
//228// 
aˆupuvveˆa vimohåiµ jåiµ dh¥rå samåsajja / 
vasumaµto matimaµto savvaµ ˆaccå aˆelisam //229// 
duvihaµ pi viittå (so Schubring; Jambuvijaya reads vidittå) ˆaµ buddhå 
dhammassa påragå / 
aˆupuvv¥e saµkhåe åraµbhå ya tiu††ati //230// 
kasåe payaˆue kiccå appåhåro titikkhae / 
aha bhikkhË gilåejjå åhårasseva aµtiyaµ //231// 
j¥viyaµ ˆåbhikaµkhejjå maraˆaµ ˆo vi patthae / 
duhato vi ˆa sajjejjå j¥vite maraˆe tahå //232// 
majjhattho ˆijjaråpeh¥ samåhim aˆupålae / 
aµto bahiµ viyosajja ajjhatthaµ suddham esae //233// 
jaµ kiµcuvakkamaµ jåˆe åukhemassa appaˆo / 
tasseva aµtaraddhåe khippaµ sikkhejja paµ∂ite //234// 
gåme aduvå raˆˆe thaµ∂ilaµ pa∂ilehiyå / 
appapåˆaµ tu viˆˆåya taˆåiµ saµthare muˆ¥ //235// 
aˆåhåro tuva††ejjå pu††ho tattha hiyåsae / 
ˆåtivelaµ uvacare måˆussehiµ vi pu††havaµ //236// 
saµsappagå ya je påˆå je ya u∂∂ha-m-ahecarå / 
bhuµjaµte maµsasoˆiyaµ ˆa chaˆe ˆa pamajjae //237// 
påˆå dehaµ vihiµsaµti thåˆåto ˆa vi ubbhame / 
åsavehiµ vivittehiµ tippamåˆo ’dhiyåsae //238// 
gaµthehiµ vivittehiµ åyukålassa pårae / 
paggahitataragaµ cetaµ daviyassa viyåˆato //239// 
ayaµ se avare dhamme ˆåyaputteˆa såhite / 
åyavajjaµ pa∂iyåraµ vijahejjå tidhå tidhå //240// 
hariesu ˆa ˆivajjejjå thaµ∂ilaµ muˆiå sae / 
viyosajja aˆåhåro pu††ho tattha ’dhiyåsae //241// 
iµdiehiµ gilåyaµto samiyaµ såhare muˆ¥ / 
tahåvi se agarahe acale je samåhie //242// 
abhikkame pa∂ikkame saµkucae pasårae / 
kåyasåhåraˆa††håe etthaµ vå vi acetaˆe //243// 
parikkame parikilaµte aduvå ci††he ahåyate / 
†håˆeˆa parikilaµte ˆis¥ejja ya aµtaso //244// 
ås¥ˆe ’ˆelisaµ maraˆaµ iµdiyåˆi sam¥rate / 
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When50 a monk thinks: ‘I am indeed tired of carrying around this 
body in these circumstances’, he should gradually reduce his 
food; having gradually reduced his food and diminished his 
passions, his body being prepared, standing like a plank, his body 
pacified, ... he should ask for grass; having asked for grass and 
received it, he should go away to a lonely place; having gone 
away to a lonely place ... he should spread the grass; and having 
spread the grass, at that occasion, he should reject body, activity, 
and movement ... (228). 
The51 firm ones, having reached the [ways of] liberation, powerful 
and wise,52 knowing all that is excellent, (229)  
Having conquered the twofold (birth and death?), the awakened 
ones have gone to the other shore of the doctrine. And one rids 
oneself of activity when he has thought [about this] in due order. 
(230)  
 
                                                                                                                   
kolåvåsaµ samåsajja vitahaµ pådur esae //245// 
jato vajjaµ samuppajje ˆa tattha avalaµbae / 
tato ukkase appåˆaµ savve phåse ’dhiyåsae //246// 
ayaµ cåtatare (v.l. cåyatatare) siyå je evaµ aˆupålae / 
savvagåyaˆirodhe vi †håˆåto ˆa vi ubbhame //247// 
ayaµ se uttame dhamme puvva††hånassa paggahe / 
aciraµ pa∂ilehittå vihare ci††ham ≥  (so Schubring; Jambuvijaya reads ci††ha) 
måhaˆe //248// 
acittaµ tu samåsajja †håvae tattha appagaµ / 
vosire savvaso kåyaµ ˆa me dehe par¥sahå //249// 
jåvajj¥vaµ par¥sahå uvasaggå ya iti saµkhåya / 
saµvu∂e dehabhedåe iti paˆˆe ’dhiyåsae //250// 
bhiduresu ˆa rajjejjå kåmesu bahutaresu vi / 
icchålobhaµ ˆa sevejjå dhuvavaˆˆaµ sapehiyå //251// 
såsaehiµ ˆimaµtejjå divvamåyaµ ˆa saddahe / 
taµ pa∂ibujjha måhaˆe savvaµ nËmaµ vihËˆiyå (so Schubring, Jambuvijaya reads 
vidhËˆitå) //252// 
savva††hehiµ amucchie åyukålassa pårae / 
titikkhaµ paramaµ ˆaccå vimohaˆˆataraµ hitam //253// 
50 The meaning of the passage is not always clear. The translation often follows 
Schubring, 1926 : 111-15, and also owes much to the advice of Dr. H. Tieken. The 
suggestions of N. Balbir (Bulletin d’études indiennes 4, 1986, p.23*) have been 
gratefully incorporated. 
51 The remainder of this passage consists of verses which have been added to explain 
“body, activity and movement”. See Schubring, 1926: 113 n.3. 
52 Schubring takes vasumanto maimanto to be nom. sing., but there is nothing against it 
being nom. plural (Pischel, 1900: § 396, pp. 324-25). On vasuma(t) < Skt. 
*vaßamat, see Norman, 1976:49. 
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(1) Having diminished his passions he bears with little food. In 
case the monk gets ill in the presence of food, (231)  
He should not long for life, nor strive after death; he should not be 
attached to either, life or death. (232)  
Impartial, intent on the destruction of activity (ˆijjarå) he should 
preserve his concentration. Renouncing internally as well as 
externally he strives after a pure heart. (233)  
Whatever means he may know to secure his life [for another 
while, let the wise one quickly avail of that for an intervening 
period.53 (234)  
Having looked for a place in a village or in the wilderness,54 and 
knowing it to be with little life, the monk should spread out the 
grass. (235)  
He should lie without food; when affected [by discomfort] in that 
[position] he should bear it. He should not go beyond the 
boundary [which he has set himself], even when he has been 
affected55 by things human. (236)  
He should not hurt nor rub away living creatures which creep on 
the ground, or fly high or low, and eat his flesh and blood. (237) 
Creatures injure his body, yet he should not walk from his place. 
Being pained by all kinds of outside influences, he should bear [it 
all], (238) 
going to the other shore of his span of life, [free] from all kinds of 
knots. This is well-accepted by the self-controlled and 
understanding person. (239) 
 
(2) The following is another practice taught by the son of N˛åya 
(= Mahåv¥ra). One should abandon movement in the threefold 
three ways, except for [keeping] himself [alive]. (240) 
                                                
53 Í¥lå∫ka (p. 194) and Schubring (1926: 114 n. 1) point out that this extension of life is 
meant to make the monk ready for the death he has chosen. 
54 On the opposition between ‘village’ (gråma) and ‘wilderness’ (araˆya) in Vedic 
literature, see Sprockhoff, 1981: 32-43. 
55 pu††havaµ; cf. Pischel, 1900: § 396. 
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He should not sit down on green plants, but lie on the bare ground 
after inspecting it; renouncing, taking no food, he should bear 
[discomfort] when affected [by it] in that [position]. (241) 
While feeling aversion to his senses, the monk may take [as much 
food] as is appropriate.56 
Nevertheless, he is blameless who is motionless and concentrated. 
(242)  
He may step forward and backward, contract and stretch [his 
limbs], in order to keep body [and soul] together; or, alternatively, 
he [may become] unconscious in that same position. (243) 
He may walk around when tired, or [remain] standing as before. 
When tired of standing he may finally sit down. (244) 
While sitting he directs his senses to the excellent death [which he 
is going to die]. In case he stumbles upon a termite hill [for 
support], he should search for something different. (245) 
He does not lean on something from which something avoidable 
could originate. He should pull himself up from there and bear all 
that affects him. (246) 
 
(3) This one is [even] more intent (åyatatare) [on reaching the 
goal] who keeps to the following. While controlling all his limbs, 
let him not move away from his place. (247) 
This is the best practice, better than the preceding. Having 
cleansed [the place] for a short time, the Brahmin should remain 
there standing. (248) 
Having reached a place free from living beings, he should place 
himself there. He should renounce his body; thinking ‘there are no 
afflictions in my body, afflictions and troubles [last] as long as 
life’, he should bear them, being restrained, realizing that they 
lead to the destruction of the body. (249-50) 
He should not be attached to desires for transitory things, even 
when [they become] more numerous. He should not nourish 
wishes and greed, since he is looking for the unchanging 
character. (251) 
                                                
56 samiyaµ = samyak. See Schubring, 1910 : 105. 
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[A god] may offer him eternal things,57 [but] he should not trust 
this divine trick. Brahmin, recognize this, shaking off all that is 
inferior. (252) 
Not stupefied by all things he reaches the other shore of his span 
of life. Knowing that endurance is highest, each of the [three 
ways] of liberation is good. (253). 
Here we find a description of a voluntary starvation to death, 
accompanied by an as complete as possible restraint with regard to all 
activity and movement. It is the culmination of a life of training and 
preparation.58 
The emphasis on restraint of activity and movement should not 
surprise us. We read repeatedly in the Óyår. that suffering is the result of 
activity (åraµbha, kamma): “knowing that all this suffering is born from 
activity” (1.3.1.3 / 108 and 1.4.3.1/140; åraµbhajaµ dukkham iˆaµ ti 
ˆaccå); “no action is found in him who has abandoned activity, the 
condition [for rebirth] originates on account of activity, (1.3.1.4 / 110; 
akammassa vavahåro ˆa vijjati, kammuˆå uvådhi jåyati). 
The most obvious remedy against such a situation is to abstain from 
activity: “therefore he who does not act has ceased [from activity]; he 
who has ceased from that is called ‘homeless’” (1.1.5.1/40; taµ je ˆo 
karae esovarate, etthovarae esa aˆagåre tti pavuccati); “free from activity 
he knows and sees, he does not long for [anything] because of his 
insight; he is called ‘homeless’” (1.2.2.1 / 71; esa akamme jåˆati påsati, 
pa∂ilehåe ˆåvakaµkhati, esa aˆagåre tti pavuccati ); “But he is wise and 
awakened [who] has ceased from activity. ... Looking at those among the 
mortals in this world who are free from activity, having seen the result 
connected with activity, he who really knows turns away from that 
[activity]” (1.4. 4. 3 / 145; se hu pannåˆamaµte buddhe åraµbhovarae ... 
                                                
57 Prof. Tatia draws my attention to YogasËtra 3.51 and the Bhå∑ya thereon, where the 
gods are made to say to the yogin, among other things: “Have entrance to this high-
place which is unfading and ageless and deathless and dear to the gods.” 
( pratipadyatåm idam ak∑ayam ajaram amarasthånaµ devånåµ priyam; tr. Woods, 
1914: 286.) 
58 In these respects the above description contrasts with the later canonical descriptions 
of voluntary death contained in the Paiˆˆayas. This has been pointed out by Caillat 
(1977). 
11 
ˆikkammadaµs¥ iha macciehiµ kammuˆå saphalaµ da††hËˆa59 tato 
ˆijjåti vedav¥); etc. 
All this gives us a clear and intelligible picture of the way to 
liberation in early Jainism. Activity being the source of all unhappiness,60 
the attempt is made to put a stop to activity.61 This is done in a most 
radical way. The monk abstains from food and prepares for death in a 
position which is as motionless as possible. 
The passage translated above does not say a word about meditation 
( jhåˆa / Skt. dhyåna). This does not mean that nothing is said about the 
mental attitude of the monk. The monk is supposed to have diminished 
his passions, he should not long for life or death, must preserve his 
concentration and strive after a pure heart, etc. It is easy to guess that in 
the mental realm as in the bodily, cessation of activity is sought, but no 
detailed information is given in the Óyåraµga. 
 
3.2. For such information we turn to a slightly younger text, the 
Uttarajjhayaˆa, chapter 29. This chapter deals with the effects of a 
number of practices. Some of these are comparable with what we learned 
in the preceding section, others throw additional light on it. 
Comparable with our earlier findings are the following statements: 
“What does the soul produce by renouncing activity? By renouncing 
activity it produces a state without activity. By being without activity the 
soul does not bind new karman and destroys the karman that was bound 
before”. (29.37 / 1139; jogapaccakkhåˆeˆaµ ... j¥ve kaµ jaˆayaï? 
jogapaccakkhåˆeˆaµ ajogattaµ jaˆayaï / ajog¥ ˆaµ j¥ve navaµ kammaµ 
na baµdhaï, puvvabaddhaµ nijjarei) “By renouncing food it stops the 
many hundreds of existences (which it would otherwise be doomed to 
live)” (29.40 / 1142; bhattapaccakkhåˆeˆaµ aˆegåiµ bhavasayåiµ 
niruµbhaï). “By the possession of right conduct [the soul] produces the 
                                                
59 This v.l. da††hËˆa seems to make more sense than da††huµ, which Schubring (1926: 
89 n. 4) takes as “grammatisch ungenau fur påsai od. dergl.” 
60 Injury to living beings seems to be the intermediate link between activity and the 
resulting unhappiness. This explains the always repeated emphasis in the Jaina 
scriptures on abstention from injury. 
61 This is perhaps most concisely expressed at SËy. 1.15.7 / 613: “For him who does 
not act there is no new karman” (akuvvato ˆavaµ natthi kammaµ). Old karman, be 
it noted, is cut off by asceticism (Uttar. 29.27 / 1129) as well as by non-activity 
(Uttar. 29.37 / 1129; see below). 
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state [of motionlessness] of the king of mountains. Having reached the 
state [of motionlessness] of the king of mountains, the homeless [monk] 
destroys the four parts of karman which [even] a kevalin possesses. After 
that [the soul] becomes perfected, awakened, freed, completely 
emancipated, and puts an end to all suffering” (29.61/1163; caritta-
saµpannayåe ˆaµ seles¥bhåvaµ jaˆayaï / selesiµ pa∂ivanne aˆagåre 
cattåri kevalikammaµse khavei / tao pacchå sijjhaï bujjhaï muccaï 
parinivvåi savvadukkhåˆam aµtaµ karei /.) These passages confirm our 
idea that liberation is effected by bringing all activity to a standstill. 
The culmination of this process is described in Uttar. 29.72 / 1174:62 
Then having preserved his life [long enough], the remainder of 
life being less than the time of a muhËrta, he stops [all] activities 
and enters pure meditation (sukkajjhåˆa) in which only subtle 
activity remains and from which one does not fall back; he first 
stops the activity of his mind, then of his speech and body, then 
he puts a stop to breathing out and breathing in. During the time 
needed to pronounce hardly five short syllables the homeless 
[monk], being in pure meditation in which [all] activity has been 
cut off and from which there is no return, simultaneously destroys 
the four parts of karman [which remain]: pertaining to experience, 
span of life, name and lineage. 
Here we meet with the term ‘pure meditation’ (sukkajjhåˆa / Skt. 
ßukladhyåna). It is clear from the text that in this stage of pure meditation 
little or no activity remains. Initially only subtle activity remains, later all 
activity is cut off. The text adds, almost superfluously, that the monk 
stops the activities of his mind, speech and body, and even stops 
breathing. All this is exactly what we had expected on the basis of the 
supposition that early Jainism strives to obtain complete inactivity. This 
inactivity includes, we now know for certain, cessation of the mental 
processes. Let us however note that meditation, i.e. the attempt to stop 
                                                
62 ahåuyaµ pålaïttå aµtomuhuttaddhåvasesåue joganirohaµ karemåˆe suhumakiriyaµ 
appa∂ivåi sukkajjhåˆaµ jhåyamåˆe tappa∂hamayåe maˆajogaµ niruµbhaï, 
vaïjogaµ niruµbhaï, kåyajogaµ niruµbhaï, åˆåpåˆunirohaµ karei, 
¥sipaµcahrassakkharuccåraˆaddhåe ya ˆaµ aˆagåre samucchinnakiriyaµ aˆiya††iµ 
sukkajjhåˆaµ jhiyåyamåˆe veyaˆijjaµ åuyaµ nåmaµ goyaµ ca ee cattåri 
kammaµse jugavaµ khavei. 
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the mental processes, constitutes here no more than one relatively minor 
aspect of the road to liberation. 
 
3.3. A more detailed description of ‘pure meditation’ is found in the no 
doubt later Èhåˆaµga Sutta (Èhåˆ.) which, like the A∫guttara Nikåya of 
the Påli canon, classifies and orders subject matters on the basis of the 
number of their subdivisions. At Èhåˆ. 4.1.69-72 / 247 we read:63  
Pure meditation is of four kinds and has four manifestations: 1. in 
which there is consideration of multiplicity and changes of object; 
2. in which there is consideration of oneness and no change of 
object; 3. in which activity has become subtle and from which 
there is no return; 4. in which [all] activity has been cut off and 
from which one does not fall back. These are the four 
characteristics of pure meditation: absence of agitation, absence 
of delusion, discriminating insight, renunciation. These are the 
four supports of pure meditation: forbearance, freedom, softness, 
straightness. These are the four reflections of pure meditation: 
reflection on infinity, reflection on change, reflection on what is 
inauspicious, reflection on sin. 
 
The third and fourth kind of pure meditation are here described as in 
the passage from the Uttarajjhayaˆa (29.72 / 1174) studied above. The 
only difference is that the words “from which one does not fall back” 
(appa∂ivåt¥/-våi) and “from which there is no return” (aˆiyatt¥) have 
changed place. There is therefore no reason to doubt that the Èhåˆaµga 
Sutta follows in this point an older tradition. 
In order to find out whether the other kinds of pure meditation also 
existed in early Jainism, we shall compare the above description with 
some passages from Óyår. I, certainly one of the oldest texts of the Jaina 
canon. The few occurrences of ‘meditation’ ( jhåˆa), ‘meditate’ ( jhåti) 
                                                
63 sukke jhåˆe caüvvihe caüppaoåre pannatte, taµjahå – puhattavitakke saviyår¥ (1), 
egattavitakke aviyår¥ (2), suhumakirie aˆiya††¥ (3), samucchinnakirie appa∂ivåt¥ 
(4) / sukkassa ˆaµ jhåˆassa cattåri lakkhaˆå pannattå, taµjahå – avvahe asammohe 
vivege viussagge / sukkassa ˆaµ jhåˆassa cattåri ålaµbaˆå pannattå, taµjahå – 
khaµt¥ mutt¥ maddave ajjave / sukkassa ˆaµ jhåˆassa cattåri aˆuppehåo pannattåo, 
taµjahå – aˆaµtavattiyåˆuppehå vippariˆåmåˆuppehå asubhåˆuppehå 
avåyåˆuppehå / 
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etc. in Óyår. I are all of them found in the ninth (in some editions eighth) 
chapter which describes the vicissitudes of Mahåv¥ra and may be a later 
addition. Of this Great Hero it is said that “he meditates with care and 
concentration, exerting himself day and night” (1.9.2.4 / 280; råiµdivaµ 
pi jayamåˆe appamatte samåhite jhåt¥). Meditation is here said to be 
possible for long stretches of time, not, e.g., merely for a muhËrta as 
maintained by the later tradition. 
Óyår. 1.9.4.14 / 320 reads: “Further, the Great Hero meditates on 
what is above, below, beside, while remaining in his position, 
motionless, observing his concentration, without desires.”64 This 
indicates that meditation can have an object in the outside world. This 
fits the second kind of pure meditation described in the Uttarajjhayaˆa. 
In this form of meditation there is “consideration of oneness and no 
change of object”. A single object, we may assume, is made the focus of 
attention and this causes the mind to come to a standstill. The first kind 
of pure meditation must then be an introductory stage to the second kind. 
We see that the four kinds of pure meditation can be looked upon as 
stages on the road to complete motionlessness and physical death. At the 
first stage the mind still moves from one object to another. At the second 
stage it stops doing so and comes to a standstill. At the third and fourth 
stages motionlessness of the body comes about in addition to motionless-
ness of the mind. When complete motionlessness of body and mind has 
been reached, physical death takes place. 
It is characteristic for the emphasis on the body in early Jainism that 
even in the above description of pure meditation two of the four kinds of 
pure meditation are described in physical rather than mental terms. The 
third and fourth kind of pure meditation are characterized by little or no 
activity of the body, in addition to that of the mind. Only this 
interpretation, so it seems, makes satisfactory sense, and agrees with the 
earlier passages which we discussed. 
 
3.4. The description of pure meditation in the Èhåˆaµga Sutta does not 
stand alone. Pure meditation is presented as one (the last) of four types of 
                                                
64 avi jhåti se mahåv¥re åsaˆatthe akukkue jhåˆaµ / u∂∂haµ adhe ya tiriyaµ ca 
pehamåˆe samåhim apa∂iˆˆe / 
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dhyåna, viz. årta (AMg. a††a; afflicted), raudra (rodda; wrathful), 
dharmya (dhamma; pious), and ßukla (sukka; pure). The first three are 
described as follows (Èhåˆ. 4.1.61-68 / 247):65  
Afflicted dhyåna is of four kinds: 1. [one] is joined with what is 
not liked and also accompanied by the thought of separation 
therefrom; 2. [one] is joined with what is liked and also 
accompanied by the thought of non-separation therefrom; 3. [one] 
is joined with disease and also accompanied by the thought of 
separation therefrom; 4. [one] is joined with the experience of 
agreeable pleasures and also accompanied by the thought of non-
separation therefrom. These are the four characteristics of 
afflicted dhyåna: crying, grief, weeping, lamentation. 
Wrathful dhyåna is of four kinds: connected with injury, 
connected with robbery, connected with theft, connected with the 
protection [of worldly goods]. These are the four characteristics of 
wrathful dhyåna: [one] has abundant hatred, much hatred, hatred 
due to ignorance, hatred until the end which is death. 
Pious dhyåna is of four kinds and has four manifestations: 
examination of the commandments [of the Jinas], examination of 
sins, examination of the results [of actions], examination of the 
forms [of the constituents of the world]. These are the four 
characteristics of pious dhyåna: liking for the commandments [of 
the Jinas],66 liking for the natural state, liking for the scriptures, 
liking for pervasive study [of the scriptures]. These are the four 
                                                
65 a††e jhåˆe caüvvihe pannatte, taµjahå  amaˆunnasaµpaogasaµpaütte tassa 
vippaogasatisamaˆˆågate yåvi bhavati (1), maˆunnasaµpaogasaµpaütte tassa 
avippaogasatisamaˆˆågate yåvi bhavati (2), åtaµkasaµpaogasaµpaütte tassa 
vippaogasatisamaˆˆågate yåvi bhavati (3), parijusitakåmabhogasaµpaoga-
saµpaütte tassa avippaogasatisamaˆˆågate yåvi bhavati (4) / a††assa ˆaµ˛ jhåˆassa 
cattåri lakkhaˆå pannattå, taµjahå kaµdaˆatå sotaˆatå tippaˆatå paridevaˆatå / 
rodde jhåˆe caüvvihe pannatte, taµjahå hiµsåˆubaµdhi mosåˆubaµdhi 
teˆåˆubaµdhi sårakkhaˆåˆubaµdhi / roddassa ˆaµ˛ jhåˆassa cattåri lakkhaˆå 
pannattå, taµjahå – osaˆˆadose bahudose annåˆadose åmaraˆaµtadose /dhamme 
jhåˆe caüvvihe caüppa∂oyåre pannatte, taµjahå  åˆåvijate avåyavijate vivågavijate 
saµ†håˆavijate / dhammassa ˆaµ jhåˆassa cattåri lakkhaˆå pannattå, taµjahå – 
åˆåru¥ ˆisaggaru¥ suttaru¥ ogå∂haru¥ / dhammassa ˆaµ jhåˆassa cattåri ålaµbaˆå 
pannattå, taµjahå – våyaˆå pa∂ipucchaˆå pariya††aˆå aˆuppehå / dhammassa ˆaµ 
jhåˆassa cattåri aˆuppehåo pannattåo, taµjahå – egåˆuppehå aˆiccåˆuppehå 
asaraˆåˆuppehå saµsåråˆuppehå / 
66 Or: “liking for knowledge” (Alsdorf, 1966: 203-04 ((51)-(52))). 
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supports of pious dhyåna: recitation, questioning, repetition, 
reflection. These are the four reflections of pious dhyåna: 
reflection on being alone, reflection on transitoriness, reflection 
on there being no refuge, reflection on birth and rebirth of living 
beings. 
It is clear that in this passage dhyåna refers to a pondering over, a 
thinking about certain things, and not to the process of stopping the mind 
which we have designated ‘meditation’. Yet the term dhyåna covers both 
‘pondering’ and ‘meditation’. This is the reason that a classificatory text 
like the Èhåˆaµga can distinguish four types of dhyåna: afflicted, 
wrathful, pious, and pure.67 Only the last type – ßukla dhyåna – is of 
interest for our study of early Jaina meditation. 
However, these four types of dhyåna came to be looked upon as four 
types of meditation, and this led to peculiar results. The Viyåhapaˆˆatti 
Sutta (25.7.217 / 580) and the Uvavåiya Sutta (§ 30) distinguish six kinds 
of inner asceticism. The fifth is meditation (dhyåna). What is this 
meditation? That is explained at Viy. 25.7.237-49 / 600-12 and Uvav. § 
30 V', both of which are virtually identical with Èhåˆ. 4.1.61-72 / 247 
studied above; both therefore describe all four types of dhyåna. This is a 
plain absurdity. Afflicted and wrathful dhyåna at any rate cannot 
possibly be considered forms of asceticism. 
Interestingly, the confusion about dhyåna also found expression in 
an altogether different manner. The Óvassaya Sutta contains a sËtra 
(4.23.4) where the confessing monk is made to repent for “the four 
dhyånas: afflicted dhyåna, wrathful dhyåna, pious dhyåna, pure dhyåna” 
( pa∂ikkamåmi caühiµ jhåˆehiµ – a††eˆaµ jhåˆeˆaµ, ruddeˆaµ 
jhåˆeˆaµ, dhammeˆaµ jhåˆeˆaµ, sukkeˆaµ jhåˆeˆaµ).68  
                                                
67 The idea of four types of dhyåna may have been derived from a verse in the 
Uttarajjhayaˆa (30.35/1211): a††aroddåˆi vajjettå jhåejjå susamåhie / dhamma-
sukkåiµ jhåˆåiµ jhåˆaµ taµ tu buhå vae // It is not clear from this ßloka whether 
there is a distinction between dhamma jhåˆa and sukka jhåˆa. Perhaps pure 
meditation (sukka jhåˆa) is ‘in accordance with the doctrine’ (dhamma). It is 
certainly clear that afflicted and wrathful dhyåna are to be avoided. 
68 The ekottarikå-pattern of Óv. 4 (Bruhn, 1981:23) excludes the possibility that this 
sËtra originally enumerated fewer (or more) than four dhyånas. 
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All this makes sufficiently clear that the four types of dhyåna 
distinguished in the later texts of the Jaina canon are of no value for the 
study of meditation in early Jainism. 
 
3.5. Some more information about early Jaina meditation is gained from 
Uttarajjhayaˆa 29: 
“By making the mind onepointed [the soul] brings about the 
destruction of thought” (29.25 / 1127; egaggamaˆasannivesaˆayåe ˆaµ 
cittanirohaµ karei). “By renouncing existence [the soul] brings about 
[the state] from which there is no return. And the homeless [monk] who 
has reached [the state] from which there is no return destroys the four 
parts of karman which [even] a kevalin possesses, viz. pertaining to 
experience, span of life, name, and lineage. After that [the soul] becomes 
perfected, awakened, freed, completely emancipated, and puts an end to 
all suffering.” (29.41 / 1143; sabbhåvapaccakkhåˆeˆaµ aniya††iµ 
jaˆayaï / aniya††ipa∂ivanne ya aˆagåre cattåri kevalikammaµse khavei, 
taµ jahå – veyaˆijjaµ åuyaµ nåmaµ goyaµ / tao pacchå sijjhaï bujjhaï 
muccaï parinivvåi savvadukkhåˆaµ aµtaµ karei /.) 
“By watchfulness of the mind the soul brings about onepointed 
[thought]. When thought is onepointed and the mind is watched the soul 
becomes devoted to control.” (29.53 / 1155; maˆaguttayåe ˆaµ j¥ve 
egaggaµ jaˆayaï / egaggacitte ˆaµ j¥ve maˆagutte saµjamåråhae 
bhavaï /. ) 
 “By holding the mind together69 [the soul] brings about onepointed-
ness. Having brought about onepointedness it brings about modifications 
of knowledge. Having brought about modifications of knowledge it 
purifies right belief and destroys wrong belief. ... By holding speech 
together [the soul] purifies the modifications of belief which are mixed 
with speech. Having purified the modifications of belief which are mixed 
with speech [the soul] easily reaches enlightenment, and is no longer 
such that it reaches enlightenment with difficulty. ... By holding the body 
together [the soul] purifies the modifications of conduct. Having purified 
the modifications of conduct it purifies the conduct which is in accord 
with the word [of the t¥rtha∫karas]. Having purified the conduct which is 
                                                
69 samåhåraˆayå = Skt. samådhåraˆatå ? 
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in accord with the word [of the t¥rtha∫karas, the soul] destroys the four 
parts of karman which [even] a kevalin possesses. After that [the soul] 
becomes perfected, awakened, freed, completely emancipated, and puts 
an end to all suffering.” (29.56-58 / 1158-60; maˆasamåhåraˆayåe ˆaµ 
egaggaµ jaˆayaï / egaggaµ jaˆaïttå nåˆapajjave jaˆayaï / nåˆapajjave 
jaˆaïttå sammattaµ visohei, micchattaµ ca nijjarei / ... vaïsamåhåraˆayåe 
ˆaµ vaïsåhåraˆadaµsaˆapajjave visohei / vaïsåhåraˆadaµsaˆapajjave 
visohittå sulabhabohiyattaµ nivvattei, dullabhabohiyattaµ nijjarei / ... 
kåyasamåhåraˆayåe ˆaµ carittapajjave visohei / carittapajjave visohittå 
ahakkhåyacarittaµ visohei / ahakkhåyacarittaµ visohettå cattåri 
kevalikammaµse khavei / tao pacchå sijjhaï bujjhaï muccaï parinivvåi 
savvadukkhåˆam aµtaµ karei /.) “By subjugating the organ of hearing 
[the soul] brings about the subjugation of its likes and dislikes for 
pleasant and unpleasant sounds, it does not bind the karman which 
results therefrom, and destroys [the karman] which has been bound 
before. ... By subjugating the organ of sight [the soul] brings about the 
subjugation of its likes and dislikes for pleasant and unpleasant colours, 
it does not bind the karman which results therefrom, and destroys [the 
karman] which has been bound before. With regard to the organ of 
smelling it is the same, as also with the organ of taste, and the organ of 
touch.” (29.62-66 / 1164-68; soiµdiyaniggaheˆaµ maˆunnåmaˆunnesu 
saddesu rågadosaniggahaµ jaˆayaï, tappaccaïyaµ kammaµ na baµdhaï, 
puvvabaddhaµ ca nijjarei / ... cakkhiµdiyaniggaheˆaµ 
maˆunnåmaˆunnesu rËvesu rågadosaniggahaµ jaˆayaï, tappaccaïyaµ 
kammaµ na baµdhaï, puvvabaddhaµ ca nijjarei / ghåˆiµdie evaµ ceva 
/ jibbhiµdie vi / phåsiµdie vi /.) 
3.6. We can summarize the results of the above as follows. Early Jaina 
meditation was only one aspect of a more general attempt to stop all 
activities of body and mind, including even breathing. In order to bring 
about this mental state a number of means were employed. Reflections 
on infinity, on change, on what is inauspicious, and on sin were probably 
preparatory. More immediate precursors of meditation proper, we may 
assume, were certain mental states, viz. forbearance, freedom, softness, 
and straightness. Other supportive practices were onepointedness of the 
mind, watchfulness of the mind, holding the mind together, and 
19 
subjugation of the sense-organs. Meditation itself was characterized by 
absence of agitation, absence of delusion, discriminating insight, and 
renunciation. 
Meditation was said to have four kinds of manifestations, which 
must be understood to be four steps on the ladder to perfection. They are 
described thus: 1. in which there is consideration of multiplicity and 
change of object; 2. in which there is consideration of oneness and no 
change of object; 3. in which activity has become subtle and from which 
there is no return; 4. in which [all] activity has been cut off and from 
which one does not fall back. 
The fourfold division of meditation into afflicted, wrathful, pious 
and pure, is not reliable. Undoubtedly this division was made by early 
systematisers and must initially have been meant to be a division of 
dhyåna, which word means both ‘thought’ and ‘meditation’. Later 
theoreticians mistakenly took it to be a division of meditation only, and 
this did not fail to influence the later history of Jaina meditation. 
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IV. Meditation as part of asceticism in early Hindu 
scriptures.  
 
4.1. The main idea of the road to liberation in early Jainism is also 
expressed in Bhagavad G¥tå (BhG) 18.3 :70 “Some wise men say that 
[all] activity is to be abandoned as evil.” 
More details are given at Mahåbhårata (MBh) 1.86.14-16:71 
But the muni who behaves like a muni by abandoning desires, 
renouncing activity, and conquering his senses, he reaches 
perfection in the world (14). Who should not honour him who has 
clean teeth, whose nails are cut, who is always bathed and 
adorned, is not bound and performs [only] pure actions ?72 (15) 
Emaciated by austerities, patient, his flesh, bones and blood 
wasted away, when the muni becomes free from the pairs (of 
opposites, such as heat and cold), then he really behaves like a 
muni. Then, having conquered this world, he gains the other 
world (16). 
 
Briefly stated: “Such a muni reaches perfection which is the most 
important [thing there is], by living in the forest, his food and movements 
being restrained.”73 
 
Motionlessness of body and mind is emphasized at MBh 12.294.13-
18:74 
                                                
70. tvåjyaµ do∑avad ity eke karma pråhur man¥∑iˆa˙. 
71. yas tu kåmån parityajya tyaktakarmå jitendriya˙ / 
åti∑†heta munir maunaµ sa loke siddhim åpnuyåt //14// 
dhautadantaµ k®ttanakhaµ sadå snåtam alaµk®tam / 
asitaµ sitakarmasthaµ kas taµ nårcitum arhati //15// 
tapaså karßita˙ k∑åma˙ k∑¥ˆamåµsåsthißoˆita˙ / 
yadå bhavati nirdvandvo munir maunam samåsthita˙ / 
atha lokam imaµ jitvå lokaµ vijayate param //16// 
72. sitakarmastham. This expression is not fully clear. N¥lakaˆ†ha’s explanation (his 
text reads sitakarmåˆam) does not help much: sitakarmåˆaµ hiµsåyuktaµ 
dharmam api tyajantam (p. 170, on 1.91.15). 
73. MBh 1.86.4: tåd®∫ muni˙ siddhim upaiti mukhyåµ vasann araˆye niyatåhåra-
ce∑†a˙ // 
74. vimukta˙ sarvasa∫gebhyo laghvåhåro jitendriya˙ / 
pËrvaråtre pare caiva dhårayeta mano ’’tmani //13// 
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Freed from all attachments, taking little food, having conquered 
the senses , he should fix his mind on his self in the first and last 
part of the night (13). Having made his senses firm with his mind, 
oh lord of Mithilå, and having made his mind (manas) firm with 
his intellect (buddhi), he is motionless like a stone (14). He 
should be without trembling like a pillar, and motionless like a 
mountain; the wise who know to follow the precepts then call him 
‘one engaged in Yoga’ ( yukta) (15). He neither hears nor smells 
nor tastes nor sees; he notices no touch, nor does [his] mind form 
conceptions (16). Like a piece of wood, he does not desire 
anything, nor does he notice [anything]. When he has reached the 
Original Nature ( prak®ti), then sages call him ‘engaged in Yoga’ 
( yukta) (17). And he looks like a lamp shining in a place without 
wind; not flickering and motionless it will not move upward or 
sideward (18). 
 
The Ka†ha Upani∑ad (KU) is probably the earliest Upani∑ad which 
gives some detailed information about meditation. The concluding verse 
(6.18) declares that ‘the whole method of Yoga’ ( yogavidhiµ k®tsnam) 
has been presented. The most informative verses are KU 6.10-11:75 
When the five organs of knowledge stand still together with the 
mind (manas), and the intellect (buddhi) does not stir, that they 
call the highest course (10). This they consider as Yoga, a firm 
fixing of the senses. Then one becomes careful, for Yoga is the 
origin and the end (11). 
                                                                                                                   
sthir¥k®tyendriyagråmaµ manaså mithileßvara / 
mano buddhyå sthiraµ k®två på∑åˆa iva nißcala˙ //14// 
sthåˆuvac cåpy akampa˙ syåd girivac cåpi nißcala˙ / 
budhå vidhividhånajñås tadå yuktaµ pracak∑ate //15// 
na ß®ˆoti na cåghråti na rasyati na paßyati / 
na ca sparßaµ vijånåti na saµkalpayate mana˙ //16// 
na cåbhimanyate kiµcin na ca budhyati kå∑†havat / 
tadå prak®tim åpannaµ yuktam åhur man¥∑ina˙ //17// 
nivåte ca yathå d¥pyan d¥pas tadvat sa d®ßyate / 
niri∫gaß cåcalaß cordhvaµ na tiryag gatim åpnuyåt //18// 
75. yadå pañcåvati∑†hante jñånåni manaså saha / 
buddhiß ca na vice∑†ati tåm åhu˙ paramåµ gatim //10// 
tåµ yogam iti manyante sthiråm indriyadhåraˆåm / 
apramattas tadå bhavati yogo hi prabhavåpyayau //11// 
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KU 3.6 has the same tenor:76 
But he who has discernment, with an ever controlled ( yukta) 
mind (manas), his senses are subdued, like the good horses of a 
charioteer. 
The following description in the Ívetåßvatara Upani∑ad (2.8-9) 
gives also the bodily practices their due:77 
Holding the body straight, three parts of it stretched up, causing 
the senses to enter into the heart by means of the mind, the wise 
one should cross over all the frightening streams with the help of 
the raft which is Brahman (8). Having here suppressed his breaths 
and having brought his movements under control ( yuktace∑†a), 
when his breath has been diminished, he should take breath 
through his nose. Being careful, the wise one should restrain 
(dhårayeta) his mind like that chariot yoked with vicious horses 
(9). 
 
The Maitråyaˆ¥ya Upani∑ad (MU 6.18)78 speaks of a six-membered 
Yoga, consisting of restraint of the breath, withdrawal of the senses, 
meditation, fixing the mind, insight (tarka),79 concentration. All these 
terms, with the single exception of tarka, are known from the other early 
passages on meditation which we have studied. The explanation of 
‘fixing the mind’ (dhåraˆå) is interesting (MU 6.20):80 
                                                
76. yas tu vijñånavån bhavati yuktena manaså sadå / 
tasyendriyåˆi vaßyåni sadaßvå iva sårathe˙ // 
77. trir unnataµ sthåpya samaµ ßar¥raµ h®d¥ndriyåˆi manaså saµniveßya / 
brahmo∂upena pratareta vidvån srotåµsi sarvåˆi bhayåvahåni //8// 
pråˆån prap¥∂yeha sa yuktace∑†a˙ k∑¥ˆe pråˆe nåsikayocchvas¥ta / 
du∑†åßvayuktam iva våham enaµ vidvån mano dhårayetåpramatta˙ //9// 
78 pråˆåyåma˙ pratyåhåro dhyånaµ dhåraˆå tarka˙ samådhi˙ ∑a∂a∫ga ity ucyate yoga˙. 
79. The use of tarka here is surprising. The only meaning which seems to fit both here 
and at MU 6.20 (see below) is ‘insight’. A similar meaning is assigned to this term 
in Abhinavagupta’s Tantråloka (III.13-15, 34, 40); see Pandey, 1963: 535; Pensa, 
1973: 11-13. 
80. athånyatråpy uktam – ata˙ paråsya dhåraˆå / tålurasanågranip¥∂anåd vå∫mana˙-
pråˆanirodhanåd brahma tarkeˆa paßyati /. The readings ata˙ and tålurasanågra-
nip¥∂anåd (so Limaye-Vadekar, 1958: 343) seem to make more sense than atha and 
tålurasanågre nip¥∂anåd (so Van Buitenen, 1962: 112). 
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And elsewhere also it has been said: After this, the fixing of it 
(i.e., of the mind). As a result of pressing the tip of the tongue 
against the palate and suppressing speech, mind and breath, one 
sees Brahman through insight (?; tarka)81. 
The tip of the tongue is here said to be pressed against the palate. 
The same is said at Vi∑ˆusm®ti 97.1 and Trißikhibråhmaˆa Upani∑ad 93 
and 146. But this is exactly what the early Buddhist critic ridiculed the 
Jainas for in the Original Mahåsaccaka SËtra (above, § 1.1). A point of 
difference is that the Vi∑ˆusm®ti (97.1) and the Trißikhibråhmaˆa 
Upani∑ad (92 and 146) add that the teeth do not touch each other, 
whereas the Original Mahåsaccaka SËtra said they do. Here, however, 
the Mahå Upani∑ad (5.75) and the Muktikå Upani∑ad (2.42) agree with 
the account in the Original Mahåsaccaka SËtra, by talking about 
‘grinding the teeth’ (dantair dantån vicËrˆya). We see that the 
description of meditation in the Original Mahåsaccaka SËtra corresponds 
with these texts in this respect. 
Details of meditation are found in a few verses given at MU 6. 34 
(Van Buitenen, 1962: 105):82 
When [someone], having made his mind (manas) completely 
motionless, without dissolution or distraction, goes to a state 
without mind, that is the highest place (7). The mind has to 
remain suppressed until it is destroyed in the heart. This is 
knowledge, this is liberation; the rest, on the other hand, is 
bookish proliferation83 (8). The bliss, purified by concentration, 
which arises when the spotless mind (cetas) has been made to 
enter into the self, cannot be described with words. It is in that 
state (tadå) itself experienced by the inner organ (9). 
                                                
81. See note 10 above. 
82. layavik∑eparahitaµ mana˙ k®två sunißcalam / 
yadå yåty amanobhåvaµ tadå tat paramaµ padam //7// 
tåvan mano niroddhavyaµ h®di yåvat k∑ayaµ gatam / 
etaj jñånaµ ca mok∑aß ca ße∑as tu granthavistarå˙ //8// 
samådhinirdhautam amalasya cetaso, niveßitasyåtmani yat sukhaµ bhavet / 
na ßakyate varˆayituµ girå tadå, svayaµ tad anta˙karaˆena g®hyate //9// 
83. So Van Buitenen, 1962: 133. 
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It is remarkable that here bliss is said to accompany meditation which is 
clearly of the type also met with in early Jainism. The author of the 
Original Mahåsaccaka SËtra had denied experiences of bliss to Jaina 
meditation and reserved them for Buddhist meditation. Is the mention of 
bliss here due to influence from Buddhist meditation? It is possible, for 
influence from Buddhism in the Maitråyaˆ¥ya Upani∑ad seems likely 
(Horsch, 1966: 197-203; Pande, 1974: 575-76). It is however strange that 
not more features of Buddhist meditation are found in this Upani∑ad. 
 
4.2. Restraint of breath has been referred to a few times in the passages 
discussed in § 3.1. It recurs more emphatically in certain others. BhG 4. 
29 speaks of those “who having stopped the movements of breathing in 
( pråˆa) and breathing out (apåna) are devoted to pråˆåyåma” ( pråˆå-
pånagat¥ ruddhvå pråˆåyåmaparåyaˆå˙). This suggests that the term 
pråˆåyåma can refer to a complete cessation of breathing. This agrees 
with the definition of pråˆåyåma in Yoga SËtra (YS) 2.49 as “cutting off 
the movement of breathing out and breathing in” (ßvåsapraßvåsayor gati-
viccheda˙). 
The following passage brings restraint of breath in connection with 
fixing the mind (MBh 12.304.8-10):84 
But they say in accordance with the teaching of the sacred books 
that the highest Yoga-activity among [the different forms of] 
Yoga is of two kinds: with properties (saguˆa) and without 
properties (nirguˆa) (8). [These two are] fixing the mind and 
restraint of breath ( pråˆåyåma), oh king; restraint of breath is 
with properties, fixing the mind85 is without properties (9). Where 
[a Yogin] would be seen leaving his breaths free, oh best among 
                                                
84. dviguˆaµ yogak®tyaµ tu yogånåµ pråhur uttamam / 
saguˆaµ nirguˆaµ caiva yathåßåstranidarßanam //8// 
dhåraˆå caiva manasa˙ pråˆåyåmaß ca pårthiva / 
pråˆåyåmo hi saguˆo nirguˆaµ dhåraˆaµ (v.l. dhårayen) mana˙ //9// 
yatra d®ßyeta muñcan vai pråˆån maithilasattama / 
våtådhikyaµ bhavaty eva tasmåd dhi na samåcaret //10// 
85. The reading dhåraˆaµ mana˙ is hard to construe grammatically; the v.l. dhårayen 
mana˙ is better, but not completely satisfactory. Perhaps however we may accept a 
construction action noun + accusative as permissible for epic Sanskrit, as it is for 
Påli (Hinüber, 1968: 54-55). 
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the people of Mithilå, there is certainly an excess of air (våta); 
therefore one should not act [in such a manner] (10). 
The passage is obscure, but seems to consider pråˆåyåma less than and 
probably preparatory to fixing the mind. Verse 10 seems to indicate the 
need for pråˆåyåma; otherwise there would be an excess of air. This 
indicates that apparently pråˆåyåma remains a necessity also in the state 
‘without properties’, i.e., fixing the mind. It certainly shows that here too 
pråˆåyåma concerns the breath, not, or not only, the senses.86 
The following passage comes closer to the idea that saints stop their 
breathing moments before death (MBh 12.207.25):87 
Having reached equilibrium of the guˆas, performing [only] such 
actions as concern sustaining the body, and pushing at the time of 
death the breaths into the artery of the heart (manovahå) with 
merely the mind, one is liberated. 
The same may be intended at MBh 13.154.2, where in describing 
the death of Bh¥∑ma it is said:88 
The breaths of that great soul, forced together, went up. 
 
4.3. Fasting to death was practised by Yayåti (MBh 1.81.10-16):89 
King Yayåti the son of Nahu∑a anointed his younger son PËru king 
and then gladly departed for the forest (10). Having sent his sons 
                                                
86. This is maintained by Edgerton (1924: 41 n. 46). 
87. guˆånåµ såmyam ågamya manasaiva manovaham (v.l. manovahåm) / 
dehakarma (v.l. dehakarmå) nudan pråˆån antakåle vimucyate // 
88. tasyordhvam agaman pråˆå˙ saµniruddhå mahåtmana˙. 
89. yayåtir nåhu∑o råjå pËruµ putraµ kan¥yasam / 
råjye ’bhi∑icya mudita˙ pravavråja vanaµ tadå //10// 
ante∑u sa vinik∑ipya putrån yadupurogamån / 
phalamËlåßano råjå vane saµnyavasac ciram //11// 
saµßitåtmå jitakrodhas tarpayan pit®devatåh / 
agn¥µß ca vidhivaj juhvan vånaprasthavidhånata˙ //12// 
atith¥n pËjayåm åsa vanyena havi∑å vibhu˙ / 
ßiloñchav®ttim åsthåya ße∑ånnak®tabhojana˙ //13// 
pËrˆaµ var∑asahasraµ sa evaµv®ttir abhËn n®pa˙ / 
abbhak∑a˙ ßaradas triµßad ås¥n niyatavå∫manå˙ //14// 
tataß ca våyubhak∑o ’bhËt saµvatsaram atandrita˙ / 
pañcågnimadhye ca tapas tepe saµvatsaraµ n®pa˙ //15// 
ekapådasthitaß cås¥t ∑aˆmåsån anilåßana˙ / 
puˆyak¥rtis tata˙ svargam jagåm[a] ... 
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Yadu etc. to the borders [of the kingdom], the king lived for a long 
time in the forest, eating [only] fruits and roots (11). Firmly resolved, 
having conquered anger, satisfying manes and gods, and duly pouring 
oblations into the fires, [all] in accordance with the rules of forest-
dwellers (12), the mighty one honoured guests with oblations 
obtained from the forest. Adopting the mode of life by way of 
gleaning, eating remains of food (13),90 the king accepted this mode 
of life for a full thousand years. Eating [only] water for thirty 
autumns, he kept his speech and mind under restraint (14). Then he 
ate [only] wind for a year, free from lassitude. And the king 
performed asceticism in the midst of five fires for a year (15). And he 
stood on one foot for six months, eating [only] air. Then, having a 
reputation of virtue, he went to heaven, ... . 
 
Fasting; to death is prescribed, after a preparatory course of 
asceticism, at Yåjñavalkyasm®ti II.3.50-55 :91 
He should spend the time with fasts regulated by the moon, or he 
should continually be engaged in painful exercises. Or, alterna-
tively, he should eat when a fortnight has passed, or when a 
month, or a day, has passed (50). Being pure he should sleep on 
the earth at night, the day he should spend [standing] on the tip of 
his toes, or standing, sitting, or walking about, or again by 
practising Yoga (51). He should perform asceticism in the midst 
of five fires in summer, lying on the bare ground during the rains, 
and wearing wet clothes in winter, or he should perform 
                                                
90 On the meaning and implication of this term (ße∑ånnak®tabhojana) see Wezler, 1978, 
esp. p. 87-88. 
91 cåndråyaˆair nayet kålaµ k®cchrair vå vartayet sadå / 
pak∑e gate våpy aßn¥yåt måse våhani vå gate //50// 
ßucir bhËmau svaped råtrau divasaµ prapadair nayet / 
sthånåsanavihårair vå yogåbhyåsena vå puna˙ //51// 
gr¥∑me pañcågnimadhyastho var∑åsu sthaˆ∂i1eßaya˙ / 
årdravåsåß ca hemante ßaktyå våpi tapaß caret //52 // 
ya˙ kaˆ†akair vitudati candanair yaß ca limpati / 
akruddho ’paritu∑†aß ca samastasya ca tasya ca //53// 
agn¥n våpy åtmasåt k®två v®k∑åvås¥ mitåßana˙ / 
vånaprasthag®he∑v eva yatrårthaµ bhaik∑am åcaret //54// 
gråmåd åh®tya vå gråsån a∑†au bhuñj¥ta vågyata˙ / 
våyvaßana˙ prågud¥c¥µ gacched vå var∑masaµk∑ayåt //55// 
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asceticism according to his power (52). If someone pricks him 
with thorns, or anoints him with sandal, he is neither angry nor 
satisfied with all and with that man (53). Or having placed the 
fires upon himself, living under a tree, taking limited food, he 
should go for alms in order to prolong his life,92 only in the 
houses of forest-dwellers (54). Or, taking eight mouthfuls from a 
village, he should eat it, his speech remaining restrained. Or, 
eating [only] wind he should go to the north-east, until the 
destruction of his body ( 55). 
 
It deserves notice that the final fast is here not accompanied by motion-
lessness.93 
Death through fasting and restraint of breath is described at 
Ópastamb¥ya Dharma SËtra 2.9.23.1-2:94 
Or, if he desires [to perform] more restraint, he should collect 
things (i.e., food) every day, morning and evening, in a vessel (1). 
After that he should wander, surviving on roots, fruits, leaves, or 
grass; in the end he should live on what happens [to come to him], 
then on water, [then] air, [then] ether. Each next undertaking 
brings greater reward (2). 
 
4.4. It is clear that all the important features of early Jaina meditation are 
found in the early Hindu scriptures. Here too meditation is only one 
aspect of a more general process in which all bodily and mental activities 
are stopped. Fasting to death and stopping the breath, both of which we 
had come to know as characteristic accompaniments of early Jaina 
meditation, are also present in the Hindu scriptures. The same is true of 
bodily motionlessness, which is compared with the state of a stone, of a 
pillar, of a mountain. 
                                                
92 I understand, following Wezler in a private communication, yåtrå° as ellipsis for 
dehayåtrå°. 
93 This and the preceding case have affiliations with ‘Vedic asceticism’; see my The 
Two Sources of Indian Asceticism (Bronkhorst, 1993). 
94 bhËyåµsaµ vå niyamam icchann anvaham eva påtreˆa såyaµ pråtar artham åharet 
//1// tato mËlai˙ phalai˙ parˆais t®ˆair iti vartayaµß cared antata˙ prav®ttåni tato ’po 
våyum åkåßam ity abhinißrayet te∑åm uttara uttara˙ samyoga˙ phalato vißi∑†a˙ //2//. 
28 
As in early Jainism, meditation itself aims at the motionlessness of 
the mind. Here as well the sense organs are conquered. As a result the 
adept is said not to hear, smell, etc. 
There can be no doubt that the early Jaina and Hindu scriptures 
describe forms of meditation which belong to the same tradition. 
Therefore we shall speak of main stream meditation. It cannot be denied 
that this kind of meditation, and more in particular its accompaniments, 
have been described remarkably well, although not fully, by the author of 
the Original Mahåsaccaka SËtra and elsewhere in the Buddhist canon. 
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V. Theory and practice in the main stream. 
 
5.1. The idea that liberation from the effects of activity is obtained 
by abstaining from activity may have been criticized from the earliest 
period. We find it in the Bhagavad G¥tå 3.4-6:95 
A man does not reach the state free from activity by not 
performing actions; and he does not attain perfection by merely 
abandoning [activity] (4). For no one ever remains without 
activity even for a moment, because everyone, being powerless, is 
made to perform activity by the guˆas which are born from 
Original Nature ( prak®ti) (5). He who sits, restraining his organs 
of action [but] thinking with his mind of the objects of the senses, 
he is said to be deluded and of improper demeanour (6). But he, 
Arjuna, who performs discipline of action (karmayoga) with his 
organs of action, restraining his senses with his mind, unattached, 
he excels (7). 
 
The same criticism is expressed in BhG 18.11: “For it is not possible for 
an embodied being to abandon completely all actions” (na hi dehabh®tå 
ßakyaµ tyaktuµ karmåˆy aße∑ata˙). 
Criticism of this kind has to answer the question whether liberation 
can be attained in another way, and if yes, which way. The answer which 
is given is surprisingly simple. Liberation from the results of one’s 
actions is possible because in reality no actions are ever performed. They 
are not performed because man’s inner self, his soul, is completely 
different from his body and never acts.96 The Bhagavad G¥tå (3.27) puts 
                                                
95. na karmaˆåm anårambhån nai∑karmyaµ puru∑o ’ßnute / 
na ca saµnyåsanåd eva siddhiµ samadhigacchati //4// 
na hi kaß cit k∑aˆam api jåtu ti∑†haty akarmak®t / 
kåryate hy avaßa˙ karma sarva˙ prak®tijair guˆai˙ //5// 
karmendriyåˆi saµyamya ya åste manaså smaran / 
indriyårthån vimË∂håtmå mithyåcåra˙ sa ucyate //6// 
yas tv indriyåˆi manaså niyamyårabhate ’rjuna / 
karmendriyai˙ karmayogam asakta˙ sa vißi∑yate //7// 
96. This idea is already known to SËyaga∂aµga 13-14 (1.1.1.13-14); see Bollée, 
1977: 15 and 66f. In Buddhist literature the idea is primarily connected with PËraˆa 
Kassapa (Basham, 1951: 13), but sometime with others, such as Saµjayin 
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it like this:97 
Actions are, all of them, undertaken by the guˆas of Original 
Nature ( prak®ti). He who is deluded by egoism thinks ‘I am the 
doer’. 
It is sufficient to know that in reality one never performs any actions:98 
But he, oh long-armed one, who knows the truth about the 
category guˆa and the category action, knowing that the guˆas 
move about among the guˆas, he does not get attached (28). 
Those who are confused by the guˆas of Original Nature ( prak®ti) 
get attached to the guˆas and their actions. He who knows all 
should not disturb those dull [people] who do not know all. 
It is clear that in this way an altogether different road to liberation is 
introduced. The Bhagavad G¥tå (3.3) calls it jñånayoga ‘discipline of 
knowledge’ and mentions it together with the ‘discipline of action’ 
(karmayoga) which enjoins disinterested activity:99 
In this world a two-fold foundation (of religious salvation) has 
been expounded by Me of old : by the discipline of knowledge of 
the followers of Så∫khya, and by the discipline of action of the 
followers of Yoga. (tr. Edgerton, 1924: 1). 
This ‘discipline of knowledge’ is, of course, the såµkhya100 which 
is so often referred to in the Mahåbhårata, as has been shown by 
Edgerton in an important article (1924). But there are also passages in 
the Upani∑ads which show that the knowledge that the soul is 
                                                                                                                   
Vairå†¥putra (Vogel, 1970: 25f.). The idea is perhaps also present in MN III.19 and 
SN III.103, where the question is asked (and rejected) what self is affected by 
actions which have not been performed by a self, since the five skandhas are not the 
self; see however Schmithausen, 1986: 228-29 n. 122. 
97. prak®te˙ kriyamåˆåni guˆai˙ karmåˆi sarvaßa˙ / 
ahaµkåravimË∂håtmå kartåham iti manyate // 
98. BhG 3. 28-29: tattvavit tu mahåbåho guˆakarmavibhågayo˙ / 
guˆå guˆe∑u vartanta iti matvå na sajjate //28// 
prak®ter guˆasaµmË∂hå˙ sajjante guˆakarmasu / 
tån ak®tsnavido mandån k®tsnavin na vicålayet //29// 
99. loke ’smin dvividhå ni∑†hå purå proktå mayånagha / 
jñånayogena såµkhyånåµ karmayogena yoginåm // 
100. Different from the Såµkhya system of philosophy. 
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unchangeable and unaffected by actions was thought to bring about 
liberation. The soul is described at B®hadåraˆyaka Upani∑ad (BAU) 
4.4.22:101 
That Soul (åtman) is not this, it is not that (neti, neti). It is 
unseizable, for it cannot be seized. It is indestructible, for it 
cannot be destroyed. It is unattached, for it does not attach itself. 
It is unbound. It does not tremble. It is not injured. Him (i.e., that 
Soul) these two do not overcome – neither the thought ‘hence I did 
wrong’, nor the thought ‘hence I did right’. Verily, he overcomes 
them both. What has been done and what has not been done do 
not affect him. (cf. Hume, 1931: 143)  
The result of knowing the soul is presented in BAU 3.8.10-11:102 
10. Verily, O Gårg¥, if one performs sacrifices and worship and 
undergoes austerity in this world for many thousands of years, but 
without knowing that Imperishable, limited indeed is that [work] 
of his. Verily, O Gårg¥, he who departs from this world without 
knowing that Imperishable is pitiable. But, O Gårg¥, he who 
departs from this world knowing that Imperishable is a Brahmin. 
11. Verily, O Gårg¥, that Imperishable is the unseen Seer, the 
unheard Hearer, the unthought Thinker, the ununderstood 
Understander. Other than It there is naught that sees. Other than It 
there is naught that hears. Other than It there is naught that thinks. 
Other than It there is naught that understands. ... (tr. Hume, 1931: 
119) 
Since knowledge of the soul is something which is attained while being 
alive, the idea of liberation in this life could arise. It is described in BÓU 
                                                
101. sa e∑a neti nety åtmå / ag®hyo na hi g®hyate / aß¥ryo na hi ß¥ryate / asa∫go na hi 
sajyate / asito na vyathate / na ri∑yati / etam u haivaite na tarata iti / ata˙ påpam 
akaravam iti / ata˙ kalyåˆaµ akaravam iti / ubhe u haivai∑a ete tarati / nainaµ 
k®tåk®te tapata˙ // 
102. yo vå etad ak∑araµ gårgy aviditvå ’smiµl loke juhoti yajate tapas tapyate bahËni 
var∑asahasråˆy antavad evåsya tad bhavati / yo vå etad ak∑araµ gårgy aviditvå 
’smål lokåt praiti, sa k®paˆa˙ / atha ya etad ak∑araµ gårgi viditvå ’smål lokåt praiti, 
sa bråhmaˆa˙ //10// 
tad vå etad ak∑araµ gårgy ad®∑†aµ dra∑†r aßrutaµ ßrotr amataµ mantr avijñåtaµ 
vijñåt® / nånyad ato ’sti dra∑†® / nånyad ato ’sti ßrot® / nånyad ato ’sti mant® / nånyad 
ato’sti vijñåt® / ... //11// 
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4.4.6:103 
He who is without desire, who is freed from desire, whose desire 
is satisfied, whose desire is the Soul – his breaths do not depart. 
Being very Brahma, he goes to Brahma. (tr. Hume, 1931: 141) 
We may observe that this trend of thought exerted a lasting influence on 
later philosophical systems, most notably on the Såµkhya and Vedånta 
systems. In both these systems the soul is conceived as motionless and 
no party to the activity of body and mind.104 
 
5.2. If the knowledge that one’s real self is by its very nature free 
from activity is sufficient for being freed from the results of actions, one 
would think that no place is left for austerities and meditation. There can 
be no doubt that indeed knowledge fully replaced these alternative 
methods in the opinion of some. But others preferred a combination of 
knowledge and ascetic and meditative practices. Reasons for doing so are 
given at Ópastamb¥ya Dharma SËtra 2.9.21.13-16:105 
13. Abandoning truth and falsehood, pleasure and pain, the 
Vedas, this world and the next, he shall seek the soul. 
14. (Some say that) in a enlightened one there is obtainment of 
peace. 
15. (But) that (opinion) is opposed to the Íåstras. 
16. (For) if there were obtainment of peace in an enlightened one, 
then he ought not to feel pain even in this (world). (cf. Bühler, 
1879: 153) 
That is to say, in addition to knowledge of the soul something more 
                                                
103. yo ’kåmo ni∑kåma åptakåma åtmakåmo na tasya pråˆå utkråmanti / brahmaiva 
san brahmåpyeti /. Sprockhoff (1962) sees in passages like this ‘vage Ansätze’ to 
the concept of j¥vanmukti. 
104. The soul is in these systems as a rule considered to be omnipresent. The exception 
is Råmånuja, whose soul has the size of an atom; see Hohenberger, 1960: 67-68. 
105. satyån®te sukhadu˙khe vedån imaµ lokam amuµ ca parityajyåtmånaµ anvicchet 
//13// buddhe k∑emapråpaˆam //14// tac chåstrair viprati∑iddham //15// buddhe cet 
k∑emapråpaˆam ihaiva na du˙kham upalebheta //16// 
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is required. This something is here106 the ascetic mode of life described 
in the following SËtras (2.9.21.18 - 23.2). 
A different justification for combining the way of knowledge and 
the practice of bodily and mental restraint is given in the Ka†ha Up. 
(2.24):107 
Not one who does not abstain from bad acts, nor one who has not 
come to peace, nor one who is not concentrated, nor one whose 
mind has not come to peace, shall reach this [Self] by means of 
knowledge. 
In this passage ascetic practices are a precondition for the 
acquisition of knowledge. Similarly, BAU 4.4.22 first gives a description 
of the soul and then states that austerities are performed in order to gain 
knowledge of it:108 
Verily, he is the great, unborn soul, who is this [person] consisting 
of knowledge among the senses. He lies in the space within the 
heart, the ruler of all, the lord of all, the king of all. He does not 
become greater by good actions nor inferior by bad actions. He is 
the lord of all, the overlord of beings, the protector of beings. He 
is the separating dam for keeping these worlds apart. 
Such a one the Brahmins desire to know by repetition of the 
Vedas, by sacrifices, by offerings, by austerities, by fasting. On 
knowing him, in truth, one becomes an ascetic (muni). (cf. Hume, 
1931: 143) 
 
The two ways are also combined, e.g. in MBh 12.212.14-19:109 
                                                
106. We shall leave out of consideration other ways, such as karmayoga in the 
Bhagavad G¥tå; they are not directly relevant to the present discussion. See also 
note 16 below. 
107. nåvirato dußcaritån nåßånto nåsamåhita˙ / 
nåßåntamånaso vå ’pi prajñånenainam åpnuyåt // 
108. sa vå e∑a mahån aja åtmå yo ’yaµ vijñånamaya˙ pråˆe∑u / ya e∑o ’ntarh®daya 
åkåßas tasmiñ chete / sarvasya vaß¥ / sarvasyeßåna˙ / sarvasyådhipati˙ / sa na 
sådhunå karmaˆå bhËyån / no evåsådhunå kan¥yån / e∑a sarveßvara˙ / e∑a 
bhËtådhipati˙ / e∑a bhËtapåla˙ / e∑a setur vidharaˆa e∑åµ lokånåm asaµbhedåya / 
tam etaµ vedånuvacanena bråhmaˆå vividi∑anti yajñena dånena tapaså ’nåßakena / 
etam eva viditvå munir bhavati / 
109. imaµ guˆasamåhåram åtmabhåvena paßyata˙ / 
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He who looks upon this collection of guˆas as being the soul, due 
to wrong points of view, his suffering is infinite [and] does not 
cease (14). But when [suffering] for you (te) [= by you] is seen as 
not the soul, not as I, nor as mine, on what basis does [then] the 
stream of suffering continue ? (15) Hear in this connection the 
supreme teaching of renunciation called ‘Right Mind’, which 
when declared shall result in liberation for you (16). For mere 
renunciation (without knowledge of the soul) of all actions, also 
of the ones prescribed [by the Veda], is considered as an affliction 
of the wrongly educated which always brings suffering (17). 
When objects are renounced (dravyatyåge), however, [sacrificial] 
activities [are involved]; when property is renounced, also vows 
[are involved]; when happiness is renounced, this is the exertion 
of asceticism; when all is renounced, this is perfection (18). This 
one and only way of renunciation of all (viz. the one called ‘Right 
Mind’) is taught as leading to freedom from suffering; any other 
way leads to misery (19). 
5.3. A consequence of the fact that practice leads to liberation only in 
combination with the knowledge of the immovable nature of the soul, is 
that practice does no longer have to be predominantly bodily.110 Where 
practice is expected to bring about this knowledge, the mental part is 
bound to gain prominence. This means that now meditation can become 
the main means of liberation, at the expense of physical austerities. It can 
virtually by itself lead to knowledge of the true nature of the self. The 
following passage, which describes Yoga-activity ( yogak®tya) according 
                                                                                                                   
asamyagdarßanair du˙kham anantaµ nopaßåmyati //14// 
anåtmeti ca yad d®∑†am tenåhaµ na mamety api / 
vartate kimadhi∑†hånå prasaktå du˙khasaµtati˙ //15// 
tatra saµya∫mano nåma tyågaßåstram anuttamam / 
ß®ˆu yat tava mok∑åya bhå∑yamåˆaµ bhavi∑yati //16// 
tyåga eva hi sarve∑åm uktånåm (v. l. yuktånåm ) api karmaˆåm // 
nityaµ mithyåvin¥tånåµ kleßo du˙khåvaho mata˙ //17// 
dravyatyåge tu karmåˆi bhogatyåge vratåny api / 
sukhatyåge tapoyoga˙ sarvatyåge samåpanå //18// 
tasya mårgo ’yam advaidha˙ sarvatyågasya darßita˙ / 
viprahåˆåya du˙khasya durgatir hy anyathå bhavet //19// 
110. This opens the way for practices like the karmayoga of the Bhagavad G¥tå, 
devotion to God, etc. 
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to verse 2, illustrates this (MBh 12.232.10-18):111 
Meditation, study, liberality, truth, modesty, sincerity, 
forbearance, purification, purity of food, and restraining the 
senses (10); by these [means] the fire increases and removes sin. 
To him [who practises these means] all things are obtained and 
knowledge comes about (11). Acting the same way toward all 
beings, with [things] obtained or not obtained, having shaken off 
sin, full of fire, taking little food, having conquered the senses, 
having brought desire and anger under control, he should wish to 
bring [himself] to the place of Brahman (12). Having brought 
about one-pointedness of his mind and senses, concentrated, he 
should fix his mind with his self in the first and last parts of the 
night (13). If one sense leaks of this man possessed of five senses, 
then his insight flows away, like water from the bottom of a bag 
(14). But he should first take hold of his mind, just as a killer of 
fish [first takes hold of] small fish; then the knower of Yoga 
[should take hold of] his ear, then his eye, tongue and nose (15). 
Then, holding these together, the ascetic should place them in his 
mind; removing in the same way his volitions, he should fix his 
mind in his self (16). Bringing the five [senses] together with his 
knowledge, the ascetic should place them in his mind; and when 
these [five senses] with the mind as sixth stay in the self, and 
                                                
111. dhyånam adhyayanaµ dånaµ satyaµ hr¥r årjavaµ k∑amå / 
ßaucam åhårasaµßuddhir indriyåˆåµ ca nigraha˙ //10// 
etair vivardhate teja˙ påpmånaµ cåpakar∑ati / 
sidhyanti cåsya sarvårthå vijñånaµ ca pravartate //11// 
sama˙ sarve∑u bhËte∑u labdhålabdhena vartayan / 
dhutapåpmå tu tejasv¥ laghvåhåro jitendriya˙ / 
kåmakrodhau vaße k®två nin¥∑ed brahmaˆa˙ padam //12// 
manasaß cendriyåˆåµ ca k®tvaikågryaµ samåhita˙ / 
prågråtråpararåtre∑u dhårayen mana åtmanå //13// 
janto˙ pañcendriyasyåsya yad ekaµ chidram indriyam / 
tato ’sya sravati prajñå d®te˙ pådåd ivodakam //14// 
manas tu pËrvam ådadyåt kum¥nån iva matsyahå / 
tata˙ ßrotraµ tataß cak∑ur jihvåµ ghråˆaµ˛ ca yogavit //15// 
tata etåni saµyamya manasi sthåpayed yati˙ / 
tathaivåpohya saµkalpån mano hy åtmani dhårayet //16// 
pañca jñånena saµdhåya manasi sthåpayed yati˙ / 
yadaitåny avati∑†hante mana˙∑a∑†håni cåtmani / 
pras¥danti ca saµsthåya tadå brahma prakåßate //17// 
vidhËma iva d¥ptårcir åditya iva d¥ptimån / 
vaidyuto ’gnir ivåkåße paßyaty åtmånaµ åtmanå / 
[55] 
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come to rest staying together, then Brahman shines forth (17). 
Like a shining flame without smoke, like the bright sun, like the 
fire of lightning in the sky, he sees the self with the self. 
 
5.4. A further theoretical adjustment to the situation where both 
knowledge and practice are required in order to find liberation, may be 
witnessed in the Nyåya-Vaiße∑ika system of philosophy. Here, to be sure, 
the soul is conceived as acting and undergoing the fruits of its actions. 
But a closer inspection brings to light that this should not be accepted at 
its face value, but in a technical sense which modifies the situation 
considerably.112 
The soul, in Vaiße∑ika ontology, is an omnipresent and eternal 
substance (dravya); this implies that the soul is motionless. It is 
conceived as acting because it can have effort ( prayatna) as a quality 
(guˆa); this quality is required in order to bring about activity of the 
body. Effort itself is the result of two other qualities of the soul, desire 
(icchå) and repulsion (dve∑a). The activity of the body gives rise to yet 
two more qualities of the soul, virtue (dharma) and sin (adharma). Virtue 
and sin are responsible for rebirth and saµsåra. 
All these qualities inhere in the soul and cannot exist without it. The 
soul, on the other hand, can very well exist without them. Indeed, 
liberation is conceived of as freedom from the special qualities that 
inhere in it. The complete list of these qualities is as follows: knowledge 
(buddhi), happiness (sukha), pain (du˙kha), desire (icchå), repulsion 
(dve∑a), effort ( pratyatna), virtue (dharma), sin (adharma), subliminal 
impression (saµskåra).113 None of these survive in the liberated state. 
We see that the theoretical constructs of the Vaiße∑ikas, and following 
them the Naiyåyikas, force them to look at the liberated state as one 
                                                
112 Since the ontology of Nyåya-Vaiße∑ika derives from Vaiße∑ika, we shall confine 
ourselves to Vaiße∑ika texts, primarily Kaˆåda’s Vaiße∑ika SËtra and 
Praßastapåda’s Padårthadharmasa∫graha. 
An analysis of the road to liberation in Pak∑ilasvåmin’s Nyåya Bhå∑ya is given by 
Oberhammer (1984: 1-65), who however seems to misunderstand the nature of 
liberation adhered to by Pak∑ilasvåmin. 
113 Dharma, adharma and saµskåra are not enumerated among the qualities in 
Kaˆåda’s Vaiße∑ika SËtra (VS 1.1.5) and were not yet considered such in the 
Vaiße∑ika known to the Jaina author Jinabhadra (c. 6th century; see Halbfass, 1980: 
285n.55). 
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without knowledge and happiness; a fact for which they have been often 
ridiculed.114  
The order in the list of special qualities of the soul is not arbitrary. 
Knowledge of an object precedes the experience of happiness or pain 
connected with it; this in its turn gives rise to desire and repulsion 
respectively; then follows effort in order to obtain or avoid that object; as 
a result virtue and sin come into being, as well as subliminal impressions. 
The sequence also shows how liberation can be obtained. Right 
knowledge of the categories of reality, including the soul, prevents desire 
and repulsion from coming about. As a result no new virtue and sin arise. 
Life goes on until the old virtue and sin have produced experiences 
and consequently disappeared. Liberation is reached at the moment 
of death. Praßastapåda’s Padårthadharmasa∫graha (p.261-62) describes 
this process as follows:115  
When someone – as a consequence of knowledge and of the 
activity resulting therefrom, viz., [activity] without intended fruit 
– is born in a virtuous family and desires to know means to get rid 
of suffering, goes to a teacher and acquires true knowledge about 
the six categories [of Vaiße∑ika], then he becomes free from 
passion because his wrong knowledge ceases. Because there is 
then no passion nor repulsion, virtue and sin which are born from 
those do not come into existence; and [the virtue and sin] which 
have been accumulated before disappear after producing 
experiences. When he has thus brought about contentment and 
                                                
114 Already Pak∑ilasvåmin (Våtsyåyana) notes as one example of wrong ideas in his 
Nyåya Bhå∑ya on sËtra l.l.2 (p. 11-12): “Emancipation (i.e., liberation) is dreadful. 
It consists, as a matter of fact, in the cessation of all effects. Since emancipation is 
separation from everything, much that is good is lost in it. How could therefore a 
wise man find pleasure in this state of emancipation, in which all happiness has 
been cut off and which is without consciousness?” (apavargo bh¥∑ma˙ / sa khalv 
ayaµ sarvakåryoparama˙ sarvaviprayoge ’pavarge bahu ca bhadrakaµ lupyata iti 
kathaµ buddhimån sarvasukhocchedam acaitanyam amum apavargaµ rocayed 
iti /) Some later Naiyåyikas preferred to look upon liberation as blissful (Mishra, 
1936: 384-87). 
115 jñånapËrvakåt tu k®tåd asa∫kalpitaphalåd vißuddhe kule jåtasya du˙kha-
vigamopåyajijñåsor åcåryam upasa∫gamyotpanna∑a†padårthatattvajñånasyåjñåna-
niv®ttau viraktasya rågadve∑åbhåvåt tajjayor dharmådharmayor anutpattau 
pËrvasañcitayoß copabhogån nirodhe santo∑asukhaµ ßar¥raparicchedaµ cotpådya 
rågådiniv®ttau niv®ttilak∑aˆa˙ kevalo dharma˙ paramårthadarßanajaµ sukhaµ k®två 
nivartate / tadå nirb¥jasyåtmana˙ ßar¥rådiniv®tti˙ / puna˙ ßar¥rådyanutpattau 
dagdhendhanånalavad upaßamo mok∑a iti // 
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happiness, as well as separation from the body, and passion etc. 
have ceased, only virtue characterized by inactivity remains. [This 
too,] after producing the happiness born from insight in the 
highest truth, ceases. Then the body etc. disappear of [this] soul 
which is free from seeds [for rebirth]. The tranquillity [which 
arises] since no body etc. come again into existence, and which 
resembles a fire whose fuel has been burnt, is liberation. 
We see that the soul of the Vaiße∑ikas has something in common 
with the soul of the Såµkhyas. Both are in their deepest essence 
unconnected with what goes on in the world. But unlike the Såµkhyas, 
the Vaiße∑ikas admit that the soul can get into connection with the world, 
and into a close connection at that; the soul is connected with its qualities 
by the relation of inherence (samavåya), which is the closest relation that 
exists in this system of philosophy. 
Yet, in its deepest essence the soul remains free from activity and its 
fruits. This is underlined by the circumstance that the soul is conceived 
as omnipresent. The soul, even though actor, remains in this way free 
from action. This is, as far as I can see, the only reasonable explanation of 
the otherwise rather queer attribute of omnipresence of the soul. This 
explanation gains in strength if it is true that the oldest Vaißesika 
considered the soul as having the size of the body, as Frauwallner (1956a: 
62) surmises.116  
                                                
116 Frauwallner’s (1956a: 95-97) attempt to explain the omnipresence of the soul on 
the basis of ad®∑†a, a quality of the soul which is supposed to exert its influence 
almost everywhere, does not convince. The Vaiße∑ika SËtra speaks already of the 
omnipresence of the soul (VS 7.1.29), but contains no indication that ad®∑†a 
(mentioned in sËtras 5.1.15; 2.2; 4; 8; 14; 19; 6.2.2.; 15; in all but two cases in the 
compound ad®∑†akårita) was considered a quality of the soul (cf. Halbfass, 1980: 
285f.). Indeed, ad®∑†a is not enumerated among the qualities (cf. note 19 above). 
Moreover, Nyåya SËtra 3.2.69 uses the word ad®∑†a – in the compound ad®∑†akårita, 
so common in the Vaiße∑ika SËtra – in a sense which contrasts with karman (67); 
here it is no quality of the soul, nor even the same as dharma and adharma . 
Frauwallner’s reason for believing that early Vaiße∑ika considered the soul as 
having the size of the body is that this idea was present and survived among the 
Jainas. The early connection between the two systems seems supported by the Jaina 
tradition that the Vaiße∑ika SËtra was composed by a Jaina schismatic from the 
UlËka lineage (Leumann, 1885a: 121; Mehta and Chandra, 1970-72: 646 (s.v. 
Rohagutta), 664 (s.v. Vaisesiya)). Vaiße∑ika SËtra 5.2.18 has been presented as 
evidence that the soul of early Vaiße∑ika was deemed to have limited size. See 
Wezler, 1982: 653-55. A closer study of this sËtra, to be published in the 
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It is clear from the above passage from the Padårthadharmasa∫graha 
that knowledge is but the beginning of the process leading to liberation. 
It is succeeded by some kind of practice of the type with which we are 
now familiar. This is confirmed by the Vaiße∑ika SËtra,117 which 
describes Yoga as a state where the mind (manas) resides only in the soul 
and therefore not in the senses, resulting in the absence of happiness and 
pain (5.2.17); liberation is attained when this contact of mind and soul is 
also no longer there (5.2.20). We recognize what is elsewhere called 
pratyåhåra ‘withdrawal of the senses’. Again, liberation is the absence of 
contact of the soul with virtue and sin (6.2.19); the means thereto are, 
among other things, fasting, chastity, dwelling in a forest (6.2.2). 
 
5.5. The ‘pure’ forms of asceticism lived on, as in Ha†ha Yoga,118 beside 
the currents which emphasized meditation and knowledge of the soul. 
Where they had to confront these other currents, terms pertaining to 
meditation often were reinterpreted in such a manner that they came to 
refer to bodily practices. Elsewhere the mental practices were postponed 
until after the mastery of the – by now numerous and complex – bodily 
practices, i.e., postponed to a stage which few people would reach. 
Reinterpretation of terms pertaining to meditation is witnessed in 
Íivånanda Sarasvat¥’s Yogacintåmaˆi. There we read that “restraint of 
breath itself, in accordance with the degree of practice, is called by the 
names pratyåhåra, dhåraˆå, dhyåna and samådhi” (p. 28: pråˆåyåma 
evåbhyåsakrameˆa pratyåhåradhåraˆådhyånasamådhißabdenocyate). Of 
the same tenor, but more specific, is Skanda Puråˆa 4.41.94-95:119  
                                                                                                                   
Proceedings of the Bhart®hari Conference held in Pune 1992 (Asiatische Studien / 
Études Asiatiques 1993), has convinced me that it constitutes no such evidence. 
The omnipresence of the soul is explained by Vyomaßiva by arguing “that only 
on such a hypothesis can we explain the yogi’s ability to inhabit many bodies 
simultaneously” (Potter, 1977: 98). 
Other reasons why Brahmanical philosophies – unlike Jainism – introduced the idea of 
an omnipresent soul are given by Jaini ( 1980: 220 ). 
117 Wezler (1982) argues that the sËtras on Yoga and liberation were later added, 
perhaps after Praßastapåda (p. 665). This does not however affect my argument. 
118 On the ancient roots of Ha†ha Yoga, see Nowotny, 1976: 5-10. 
119 pråˆåyåmadvi∑a†kena pratyåhåra udåh®ta˙ / 
pratyåhårair dvådaßabhir dhåraˆå parik¥rtitå //94// 
bhaved ¥ßvarasaµgatyai dhyånaµ˛ dvådaßadhåraˆam / 
dhyånadvådaßakenaiva samådhir abhidh¥yate //95// 
These verses occur in slightly different form in Gorak∑a’s Gorak∑aßataka ( 114-15). 
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By twelve restraints of breath ( pråˆåyåma) pratyåhåra is named. 
By twelve pratyåhåras dhåraˆå is known (94). Dhyåna consists of 
twelve dhåraˆås and may lead to union with God. By twelve 
dhyånas samådhi is mentioned (95). 
We recognize in the terms pratyåhåra (‘withdrawal of the senses’), 
dhåraˆå (‘fixing the mind’), dhyåna (‘meditation’), and samådhi 
(‘concentration’) the last four limbs of the eightfold Yoga described in 
YS 2.29 (cf. also MU 6.18 discussed above, §4.1). We see that mental 
states are reinterpreted to be, or to be the result of, physical restrictions. 
Postponement of meditation is seen in, e.g., Svåtmåråma’s Ha†ha 
Yoga Prad¥pikå (HYPr). We are told in verse 1.2 that Ha†ha Yoga, which 
emphasizes bodily practices,120 is only taught by way of preparation for 
Råja Yoga:121 “Bowing to the respected teacher and patron, Yogin 
Svåtmåråma teaches the knowledge of Ha†ha [Yoga] merely for the sake 
of Råja Yoga.” And again (HYPr 4.103):122 “All the means of Ha†ha 
[Yoga] and Laya [Yoga] are for the attainment of Råja Yoga.” Råja 
Yoga is the name of the unified mind (4.77);123 it is the state without 
mind, samådhi (4.3-4). But a precondition for Råja Yoga is mastery over 
Kevala-kumbhaka (2.74-75):124 “Who is powerful through Kevala-
kumbha[ka] because he [can] hold his breath as long as he likes, he 
obtains even the state of Råja Yoga, there is no doubt about it.” Holding 
one’s breath as long as one likes is obviously beyond the reach of most 
(cf. Bernard, 1950: 57-58). 
Ha†ha Yoga belongs to the tradition of asceticism which we are 
investigating. The following verses (HYPr 4.106-09, 112) show this 
beyond doubt :125  
                                                
120 The Gheraˆ∂a Saµhitå (1.2) calls it gha†asthayoga ‘bodily Yoga’. 
121 praˆamya ßr¥guruµ nåthaµ svåtmåråmeˆa yoginå / 
kevalaµ råjayogåya ha†havidyopadißyate // 
122 sarve ha†halayopåyå råjayogasya siddhaye / 
123 ek¥bhËtaµ tadå cittaµ råjayogåbhidhånakam / 
124 ßakta˙ kevalakumbhena yathe∑†aµ våyudhåraˆåt // 
råjayogapadaµ cåpi labhate nåtra saµßaya˙ / 
125 ßa∫khadundubhinådaµ ca na ß®ˆoti kadåcana / 
kå∑†havaj jåyate deha unmanyåvasthayå dhruvam //106// 
sarvåvasthåvinirmukta˙ sarvacintåvivarjita˙ / 
m®tavat ti∑†hate yog¥ sa mukto nåtra saµßaya˙ //107// 
khådyate na ca kålena bådhyate na ca karmaˆå / 
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By virtue of the state without mind (unman¥ avasthå)126 the body 
becomes certainly like a piece of wood; it does not at any time 
hear the sounds of a conch-shell and of a large drum (106). Being 
free from all states and devoid of all thought, the Yogin is like a 
dead person; he is liberated, there is no doubt about it (107). The 
Yogin engaged in samådhi is not devoured by death and is not 
harassed by karman, nor is he subdued by anyone (108). The 
Yogin engaged in samådhi is not aware of smell, taste, form, 
touch, and sound, nor of himself or another (109). ... He is 
certainly liberated who is healthy, as if sleeping while awake, and 
without breathing out and breathing in (112). 
HYPr 4.31-32 amount to much the same:127  
Absorption (laya), in which breathing out and breathing in are 
destroyed and the grasping of objects has disappeared, in which 
there is no movement [of the body] nor modification [of the 
mind], is victorious in the Yogins (31). Some [state of] absorption 
comes about in which all conceptions are cut off and there are no 
movements whatever; it can only be experienced by oneself and is 
beyond words (32). 
We find here most of the features which have characterized main stream 
meditation from early times: motionlessness of body and mind, cessation 
of breathing, non-functioning of the sense-organs. 
It is interesting to quote in conclusion the final verse128 of Svåtmå-
råma’s Ha†ha Yoga Prad¥pikå (4.114), because it evinces a sceptical 
attitude toward the claim that knowledge alone may lead to the goal:129  
                                                                                                                   
sådhyate na sa kenåpi yog¥ yukta˙ samådhinå //108// 
na gandhaµ na rasaµ rËpaµ na ca sparßaµ na ni˙svanam / 
nåtmånaµ˛ na paraµ vetti yog¥ yukta˙ samådhinå //109//... 
svastho jågradavasthåyåµ suptavad yo ’vati∑†hate / 
ni˙ßvåsocchvåsah¥naß ca nißcitaµ mukta eva sa˙ //112// 
126 This is the same as Råja Yoga according to verses 4.3-4 (p. 125). 
127 prana∑†aßvåsanißvåsa˙ pradhvastavi∑ayagraha˙ / 
nißce∑†o nirvikåraß ca layo jayati yoginåm //31// 
ucchinnasarvasaµkalpo ni˙ße∑åße∑ace∑†ita˙ / 
svåvagamyo laya˙ ko ’pi jåyate vågagocara˙ //32// 
128 In the Lonavla edition this is not the final verse. A whole (fifth) chapter follows 
which is found in some Mss., as explained on pp. (5) - (7) of the Introduction. 
129 yåvan naiva pravißati caran måruto madhyamårge 
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As long as the breath, moving about, does not enter into the 
middle road; as long as the semen does not become steady as a 
result of binding the vital air; as long as in meditation reality does 
not become like the natural state;36 so long the knowledge that 
[some] talk of is deceitful and false chattering. 
                                                                                                                   
yåvad bindur na bhavati d®∂ha˙ pråˆavåtaprabandhåt / 
yåvad dhyåne sahajasad®ßaµ jåyate naiva tattvaµ 
tåvaj jñånaµ vadati tad idaµ dambhamithyåpralåpa˙ // 
36. This line is not very clear. The English translation in the Adyar Library edition, by 
Srinivasa Iyangar and revised by Radha Burnier and A. A. Ramanathan, reads (p. 
83-84): “as long as the mind does not, in meditation, reflect the natural state [of the 
object contemplated upon, i.e. Brahman]”. This translation depends on 
Brahmånanda’s commentary Jyotsnå (p. 182): yåvat tattvaµ cittaµ dhyåne 
dhyeyacintane sahajasad®ßaµ svåbhåvikadhyeyåkårav®ttipravåhavan naiva jåyate 
naiva bhavati. The Lonavla edition contains the translation (p. 176): “So long as ... 
the Supreme Reality does not appear as if it were its (the mind’s) Sahaja (native) 
state.” 
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VI.  The influence from Buddhist meditation. 
 
6.1. It seems that main stream meditation remained unaffected by 
Buddhist meditation for a long time. Only in the case of the Maitråyaˆ¥ya 
Upani∑ad did we have to consider the possibility that there was some 
influence from the side of Buddhist meditation (above, § 4.1). And even 
in this case it concerned a rather minor point, not one pertaining to the 
actual technique of meditation, nor to its immediate aim. We may 
assume that main stream meditation owed its strong position primarily to 
two factors. The first one is that, apparently, it had far wider currency 
than Buddhist meditation. This is indicated by its presence in both Jaina 
and Hindu scriptures. The second factor explains to some extent the first 
one. The idea that the misery resulting from activity must be combated 
by inactivity is so clear and simple that its immediate appeal must have 
been greater than that of the rather abstruse methods propagated in 
Buddhist meditation. 
Yet some influence from the side of Buddhist meditation is 
discernible. It is first noticeable in a passage of the Mahåbhårata, but 
here the influence remains confined to terminology. Strong influence can 
be shown in the Yoga SËtra. The important position acquired by this text 
explains that the Buddhist element in Hindu meditation came to stay. 
We turn to the texts. 
6.2. MBh 12.188.1-2, 5-10, 12-13, 15, 20-22 reads:130 
                                                
130. hanta vak∑yåmi te pårtha dhyånayogaµ caturvidham / 
yaµ jñåtvå ßåßvat¥µ siddhiµ gacchanti paramar∑aya˙ //1// 
yathå svanu∑†hitaµ dhyånaµ˛ tathå kurvanti yogina˙ / 
mahar∑ayo jñånat®ptå nirvåˆagatamanasa˙ //2// 
... 
tatra svådhyåyasaµßli∑†am ekågraµ dhårayen mana˙ / 
piˆ∂¥k®tyendriyagråmam ås¥na˙ kå∑†havan muni˙ //5// 
ßabdaµ na vindec chrotreˆa sparßaµ tvacå na vedayet / 
rËpaµ na cak∑u∑å vidyåj jihvayå na rasåµs tathå //6// 
ghreyåˆy api ca sarvåˆi jahyåd dhyånena yogavit / 
pañcavargapramåth¥ni necchec caitåni v¥ryavån //7// 
tato manasi saµsajya pañcavargaµ vicak∑aˆa˙ / 
samådadhyån mano bhråntam indriyai˙ saha pañcabhi˙ //8// 
visaµcåri nirålambaµ pañcadvåraµ calåcalam / 
pËrve dhyånapathe dh¥ra˙ samådadhyån mano ’ntaram //9// 
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See, oh king, I tell you the fourfold Yoga of meditation, knowing 
which the supreme seers reach eternal perfection (1). Yogins, great 
seers satiated with knowledge whose minds are set on nirvåˆa, 
perform meditation that is well-practised (2). ... A sage, sitting 
like a piece of wood, bundling his senses together, should fix his 
mind [so that it becomes] one-pointed and held together as a result 
of recitation, on that [own nature (?)] (5). He should not notice 
sound with his ear, nor should he feel touch with his skin; he 
should not perceive colour with his eye, nor tastes with his tongue 
(6). And the knower of Yoga should also abandon, by means of 
meditation, all odours; being energetic, he should not desire these 
things which trouble the five senses (7). Then, being wise and 
joining together his five senses in his mind, he should concentrate 
his wandering mind together with the five senses (8). Being 
resolute, he should concentrate his interior mind, which is moving 
here and there, having no point of support, with five gates, 
unsteady, in the first course of meditation (9). When he bundles 
together his senses and his mind, this is the first course of 
meditation described by me (10). ... Like a drop of water on a leaf, 
moving here and there, going in all directions, just so is that mind 
of his on the road of meditation (12); being brought together 
(samåhita) for some moment on the road of meditation, it stands 
                                                                                                                   
indriyåˆi manaß caiva yadå piˆ∂¥karoty ayam / 
e∑a dhyånapatha˙ pËrvo mayå samanuvarˆita˙ //10// 
... 
jalabindur yathå lola˙ parˆastha˙ sarvataß cala˙ / 
evam evåsya tac cittaµ bhavati dhyånavartmani //12 // 
samåhitaµ k∑anaµ kiµcid dhyånavartmani ti∑†hati / 
punar våyupathaµ bhråntam mano bhavati våyuvat //13 // 
... 
vicåraß ca vitarkaß ca vivekaß copajåyate / 
mune˙ samådadhånasya prathamaµ dhyånam ådita˙ //15 // 
... 
svayam eva manaß caiva pañcavargaß ca bhårata / 
pËrvaµ dhyånapathaµ pråpya nityayogena ßåmyati //20 // 
na tat puru∑akåreˆa na ca daivena kenacit / 
sukham e∑yati tat tasya yad evaµ saµyatåtmana˙ //21 // 
sukhena tena saµyukto raµsyate dhyånakarmaˆi / 
gacchanti yogino hy evaµ nirvåˆaµ tan niråmayam //22 // 
This passage occurs with few changes in the B®han-Nårad¥ya Puråˆa 44. 83-105. 
The differences are described on p. 2119 of the Poona ed. of MBh 12. 
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still, but again the mind roams about on the path of the wind, like 
the wind (13). ... When the sage concentrates on the first 
meditation from the beginning, vicåra, vitarka and viveka come to 
him (15). ... He himself, oh descendant of Bharata, as well as his 
mind and five senses, comes to rest when he has reached the first 
course of meditation by the incessant practice of Yoga (20). That 
bliss of him whose self is thus controlled, will not be attained by 
means of any kind of human effort or fate (21). Endowed with 
that bliss he will delight in the activity of meditation. In this way 
Yogins attain to that nirvåˆa which is free from disease (22). 
This passage speaks of a ‘fourfold dhyånayoga’ (v.1), and of a ‘first 
Dhyåna’ ( pËrva dhyånapatha, vv. 9, 10, 20; prathama dhyåna, v. 15) in 
which vicåra, vitarka and viveka are present, as well as bliss (v. 21-22). 
Yogins performing this kind of meditation reach nirvåˆa (vv. 2, 22.) All 
this sounds like pure Buddhism (cf. § 1,5 above) and cannot be due to 
coincidence.131 
But there are differences as well. It appears that the Four Dhyånas are 
really a foreign element in the Yoga of the Epic, which could only be 
made to fit clumsily. Note that only the First Dhyåna of the ‘fourfold 
dhyånayoga’ is mentioned – repeatedly – in the text, never the remaining 
three. The reason may well be that these later Dhyånas, especially the  
Third and Fourth, were an embarrassment for the author of this section  
because they go beyond his aim in discarding such desirable (see v. 21-
22) states as joy ( pr¥ti) and bliss (sukha). The immediate aim in this 
section of the Mahåbhårata – as elsewhere in the Epic – is control of the 
mind and the senses. This resembles the Second Dhyåna, where vitarka 
and vicåra come to rest. Our section of the Epic appears to be content 
with even less. The First Dhyåna is sufficient for its purposes because 
vitarka and vicåra are apparently looked upon as special faculties on the 
First Dhyåna, not as mere thought remaining from ordinary 
                                                
131 So Bedekar, 1963a; Pande, 1974: 534; Heiler, 1922: 46-47; Keith, 1923: 144; 
Oldenberg, 1915: 324; Barnes, 1976: 189 f. Nothing supports the contention that 
here the four stages of meditation are intended which figure in MBh 12.46.2-4, as 
maintained in the Critical Notes to the Poona ed. (p. 2161). In those stages no 
mention is made of vicåra, viveka and nirvåˆa. 
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consciousness.132 
Our passage contains clear indications that it belongs to the main, 
i.e., non-Buddhistic, tradition of meditation. The meditator sits ‘like a 
piece of wood’ (v. 5), tries to put his sense organs out of use (v. 6-7), 
wants to stop his mind (v. 20). The terminology of Buddhist meditation 
has been used, but its influence stopped at that. 
 
6.3. Influence from Buddhist meditation, i.e., from the form Buddhist 
meditation acquired under the influence of main stream meditation (see 
ch. VII below), is noticeable in the first chapter of the Yoga SËtra 
(YS).133 This will be shown by bringing to light a contradiction between 
the sËtras. 
SËtra 1.2 defines: yogaß cittav®ttinirodha˙ “Yoga is the suppression 
of the activities of the mind”. This agrees with all we have come to know 
about main stream meditation in Jaina and Hindu scriptures. SËtra 1.3 
explains that then the self abides in its own form. This too tallies with 
main stream meditation and the accompanying speculations about the 
nature of the soul (above, chapter V). Subsequent sËtras (1.5-11) specify 
what are the activities of the mind. YS 1.12 indicates that the desired 
suppression comes about as a result of practice (abhyåsa) and 
passionlessness (vairågya). These two terms are explained in sËtras 1.13-
16. There can be no doubt that sËtras 1.2-16 belong together and give a 
short description of main stream meditation. 
SËtras 1.17-20 then continue: 
YS 1.17: vitarkavicårånandåsmitårËpånugamåt saµprajñåta˙ : “Because 
it is accompanied by the form of deliberation, reflexion, happiness and 
the feeling ‘I am’ [there is concentration (samådhi) which is] 
saµprajñåta.” 
YS 1.18: viråmapratyayåbhyåsapËrva˙ saµskåraße∑o ’nya˙ :“The other 
[asaµprajñåta form of concentration (samådhi)] is preceded by practice 
                                                
132 Note that also the Yoga SËtra (1.44) appears to give vicåra a special sense, viz. of 
having subtle things as objects. Something similar is said in Vasubandhu’s 
Abhidharmakoßa and Abhidharmakoßabhå∑ya (II. 33) and in earlier Abhidharma 
works. 
133 Cf. already Senart, 1900, and esp. La Vallée Poussin, 1937a. 
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on the notion of cessation, [and is such that only] subliminal impressions 
(saµskåra) remain in it.” 
YS 1.19: bhavapratyayo videhaprak®tilayånåm: “In the case of the 
bodiless and the prak®tilayas, it depends on their state.” 
YS 1.20: ßraddhåv¥ryasm®tisamådhiprajñåpËrvaka itare∑åm:  “It is 
preceded by trust, energy, mindfulness (sm®ti), concentration (samådhi) 
and insight ( prajñå) in the case of others.” 
 
We note, to begin with, that sËtra 1.17 is not complete. The author 
of the Yoga Bhå∑ya supplies samådhi, a word which has not been used in 
the preceding sixteen sËtras. The incompleteness of sËtra 1.17 suggests 
that this sËtra together with the ones following it was taken from a 
different context. It is known that the Yoga sËtras were collected 
together, most probably by the author of the Yoga Bhå∑ya (Bronkhorst, 
1985a: § 1). The author of the Yoga Bhå∑ya gives evidence at a few 
places that he knew the original meaning and context of the sËtras, and 
this allows us to accept tentatively his proposal to supply samådhi˙ in 
sËtra 1.17. It is true that sËtra 1.20 now comes to convey the peculiar 
sense that asaµprajñåta samådhi is preceded by samådhi, but this may be 
due to the technical meaning assigned to asaµprajñåta samådhi. 
When we compare these four sËtras with the definition of Yoga 
given in sËtra 1.2, it becomes clear that samprajñåta samådhi cannot be 
considered the highest form of Yoga. Certainly deliberation (vitarka) and 
reflexion (vicåra), and perhaps also happiness (ånanda) and the feeling ‘I 
am’ (asmitå), must be looked upon as activities of the mind, even if it 
may be difficult to say how these must be brought in agreement with the 
five kinds of activity enumerated in sËtra 1.6. The case is different with 
asaµprajñåta samådhi. Here only subliminal impressions (saµskåra) 
remain, which cannot be looked upon as activities of the mind. Therefore 
asaµprajñåta samådhi must be considered the completion of Yoga, the 
total suppression of all activity of the mind. 
However, such an interpretation gives rise to difficulties. For it 
would mean that the bodiless – i.e., gods according to the Yoga Bhå∑ya – 
and those called prak®tilaya – those whose minds have been temporarily 
dissolved into primary matter – have reached the highest aim of Yoga, 
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which seems an unlikely supposition. What is worse, sËtra 1.18 
emphatically asserts that in asaµprajñåta samådhi subliminal 
impressions (saµskåra) remain, strongly suggesting that another state 
exists in which even these subliminal impressions are no longer present. 
It is confirmed by the last sËtra of the first chapter, which I shall 
give in its immediate context, that such a further state exists. SËtra 1.46 
speaks about a concentration with seed (sab¥ja˙ samådhi˙) and sËtra 1.47 
about an inner tranquillity (adhyåtmaprasåda). SËtras 1.48-51 then 
continue: 
YS 1.48: ®taµbharå tatra prajñå : “There there is truthbearing insight.” 
YS 1.49: ßrutånumånaprajñåbhyåm anyavi∑ayå viße∑årthatvåt : “It has 
other objects than the insight from the scriptures and the insight from 
inference, because it concerns particulars.” 
YS 1.50: tajja˙ saµskåro ’nyasaµskårapratibandh¥ : “From that [insight] 
arises a subliminal impression which obstructs the other subliminal 
impressions.” 
YS 1.51: tasyåpi nirodhe sarvanirodhån nirb¥ja˙ samådhi˙ : “When that 
[subliminal impression] too is destroyed,134 because all [subliminal 
impressions] have been destroyed, there is concentration without seed.” 
It seems clear that the definition of Yoga given in the first chapter of 
the Yoga SËtra does not fit the descriptions contained in that same 
chapter. The definition speaks merely of the suppression of mental 
activity, whereas the descriptions go far beyond this: they speak about a 
state also beyond happiness and the feeling ‘I am’, where even the 
subliminal impressions are destroyed. 
The author of the Yoga Bhå∑ya does not do much to solve the 
disagreement. On sËtra 1.18 he simply identifies asaµprajñåta samådhi 
with nirb¥ja samådhi (‘concentration without seed’). And on sËtra 1.46 he 
justifies the expression sab¥ja samådhi ‘concentration with seed’ by 
stating that “outer objects are the seed”. It is clear that in this way nirb¥ja 
samådhi ‘concentration without seeds/outer objects’ acquires a sense 
                                                
134 nirodha carries both the meanings ‘suppression’ and ‘destruction’. My choice of 
translation here and in YS 1.2 embodies a certain amount of interpretation. 
49 
close to asaµprajñåta samådhi . But the Yoga Bha∑ya does not explain 
how asaµprajñåta samådhi can retain the subliminal impressions where 
nirb¥ja samådhi does not. 
The Yoga Bhå∑ya gets into more trouble while explaining sËtra 
1.19. Obviously it does not want to grant the highest Yogic state – which 
it calls kaivalya ‘isolation’ – to the gods and the prak®tilayas, free of 
charge, so to say. It ‘solves’ the problem by adding iva ‘as if’ in the 
explanation: it is as if the gods and prak®tilayas experience isolation. 
The clumsy procedure of the Yoga Bhå∑ya further convinces us that 
two kinds of Yoga are being referred to in the first chapter of the Yoga 
SËtra .135 
The other kind of Yoga described in the first chapter of the Yoga 
SËtra shows far-reaching agreement with Buddhist meditation. YS 1.17 
says that deliberation (vitarka), reflection (vicåra), happiness (ånanda) 
and the feeling ‘I am’ (asmitå) are present in saµprajñåta (samådhi). 
Deliberation (vitarka) and reflection (vicåra) are also present in the 
First Dhyåna of the Buddhists (above, § 1.5). Joy ( pr¥ti) is present in the 
First and Second Dhyåna, bliss (sukha) in the First, Second and Third; 
this corresponds to happiness (ånanda). Only the feeling ‘I am’ has 
nothing corresponding to it in the early Buddhist texts.136  
Asaµprajñåta samådhi (?) may be compared with the five states 
which came to be added after the Four Dhyånas in the Buddhist 
scriptures, and which are characterized by a weakening and ultimately 
disappearance of samjñå ‘ideation’. The dependence on Buddhist ideas is 
confirmed by the fact that in YS 1.20 asaµprajñåta samådhi (if it is that) 
is said to be preceded by trust (ßraddhå), energy (v¥rya), mindfulness 
(sm®ti), concentration (samådhi), and insight ( prajñå). The last two of 
this list, samådhi and prajñå, are also the last two of the Buddhist triad 
ß¥la, samådhi, prajñå, which is often presented in the canon as the 
                                                
135 Frauwallner (1953: 437f.), too, distinguishes two kinds of Yoga in the Yoga SËtra, 
but considers the first chapter as describing but one of them. 
136 Unless we consider it equivalent to mindfulness (sm®ti) and circumspection 
(saµprajanya), as Heiler, 1922: 46 does. Note that the Buddhist texts speak 
occasionally of liberation as a result of, among other things, the destruction of all 
dispositions to egoism, selfishness and pride (sabbaaha∫kåramama∫kåramånånu-
sayånaµ khayå); see MN I.486. 
[70] 
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teaching of the Buddha in a nutshell (Eimer, 1976: 34f.; § 8.4.3, below). 
It is even more noticeable that all these five terms – ßraddhå, v¥rya, sm®ti, 
samådhi, prajñå, or rather their Påli equivalents – occur in the Påli 
version of the account of the Bodhisattva’s training under ÓÒåra Kålåma 
and Uddaka the son of Råma. Gotama proclaims to be the equal of his 
teachers in these five respects. (MN I.164-66; repeated I.240, II.212. 
Note that the Chinese parallels merely mention ßraddhå, v¥rya and 
prajñå; MÓc p. 776b14-17, c13-15; T 1428 p. 780b11-13, c4-5; cf. 
Bareau, 1963: 13-26). The terms occur also elsewhere in the canon (e.g. 
MN I.479), and frequently in the Abhidharma works. 
YS 1.18 and 1.48-51 (when combined) tell us that asaµprajñåta 
samådhi is not the final end. The subliminal impressions (saµskåra) 
which remain are to be destroyed with the help of insight ( prajñå). If we 
read åsrava for saµskåra, this is pure Buddhism.137 In addition to this, it 
can hardly be coincidence that the ‘truthbearing insight’ is said to follow 
an inner tranquillity (adhyåtmaprasåda); the Buddhist texts speak about 
an inner tranquillization (adhyåtmasamprasådana). 
 
6.4. Traces of the influence from Buddhist meditation are visible in other 
works. Yogakuˆ∂al¥ Upani∑ad 1-2 reads:138  
There are two causes for [the activity of] the mind: subconscious 
impression (våsanå) and air. Of these two when one is destroyed, 
both get destroyed (1). Of these two, a man should always 
conquer air first. [The means thereto are:] moderate eating, 
[practising] postures, and setting the Íakti in motion as the third 
(2). 
The words våsanå (‘subconscious impression’) and saµskåra (‘sub-
                                                
137 The Buddhist texts also speak about the destruction of saµskåras, e .g. in Sn 731; 
cf. DN II.36, MN I.167, SN I.136, Vin I.5. See also the argument concerning the 
mental nature of saµkhåra in Franke, 1913: 307-18; and Schneider, 1980: 100-01. 
Cf. Schumann, 1957; Johansson, 1979: 41-56. 
138 hetudvayaµ hi cittasya våsanå ca sam¥raˆa˙ / 
tayor vina∑†a ekasmiµs tad dvåv api vinaßyata˙ //1// 
tayor ådau sam¥rasya jayaµ kuryån nara˙ sadå / 
mitåhåraß cåsanaµ ca ßakticålas t®t¥yaka˙ //2 // 
The first of these two verses occurs almost identically (tu for hi) in Svåtmåråma’s 
Ha†hayogaprad¥pikå (4.22). 
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liminal impression’) are virtual synonyms, in the Yoga Bhå∑ya 
(Koelman, 1970: 154) and elsewhere.139 Therefore the above verses refer 
to the destruction of subliminal impressions, like certain sËtras of the 
Yoga SËtra (above, § 5.3). Similarly, the verses must be considered to 
have undergone influence from Buddhist meditation. 
Note however, that the element ‘destruction of subconscious 
impressions’ is grafted upon techniques which clearly belong to main 
stream meditation. The destruction of subconscious impressions is said to 
result from the destruction of breath, one of the most characteristic 
accompaniments of main stream meditation. The Upani∑ad nowhere 
returns to the question of the destruction of the subconscious 
impressions, whereas much room is dedicated to breath control. We must 
conclude that in the Yogakuˆ∂al¥ Upani∑ad the influence from Buddhist 
meditation is slight, and may even be merely terminological. 
Buddhist meditation is more strongly represented in the Muktikå 
Upani∑ad (MuktU).140 Verse 2.27 contains a statement very similar to the 
one above:141 
The tree which is the mind has two seeds: the movement of breath 
and subconscious impression. When one of these two is 
destroyed, both are quickly destroyed. 
 
The remainder of this Upani∑ad talks much about the destruction of 
the subconscious impressions, more than about the control of breath. 
Destruction of the subconscious impressions is said to be equal to 
liberation (MuktU 2.68). The subconscious impressions are of two kinds: 
pure and impure (MuktU 2.61); all are abandoned in the end (MuktU 
2.68-71); etc. Yet abandonment of the våsanås is said to be the same as 
suppression of the movement of breath (MuktU 2.45: våsanåsaµpari-
                                                
139 E.g. in Vidyåraˆya’s J¥vanmuktiviveka; see Sprockhoff, 1964: 226-27. 
140 The Muktikå Upani∑ad is late and may date from the 15th century A.D. 
(Sprockhoff, 1976: 260-64, 286). 
141 dve b¥je cittav®k∑asya pråˆaspandanavåsane / 
ekasmiµß ca tayo˙ k∑¥ˆe k∑ipraµ dve api naßyata˙ // 
This verse occurs almost identically in the Yogavåsi∑†ha according to the commentary 
Jyotsnå on HYPr 4.22, p. 143. 
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tyåga˙ pråˆaspandanirodhanam). Moreover, the aim is to free the soul 
from attributes which do not really belong to it, such as ‘being the actor’: 
“Properties of the mind, such as being the actor, being the enjoyer, bliss 
and suffering, are fetters of the soul ( puru∑a) because they are afflictions 
(kleßa) by nature; their destruction is liberation while being alive 
(j¥vanmukti)” (MuktU 2 .1: puru∑asya kart®tvabhokt®tvasukhadu˙khådi-
lak∑aˆaß cittadharma˙ kleßarËpatvåd bandho bhavati / tannirodhanaµ 
j¥vanmukti˙ /). This shows that this Upani∑ad belongs to the main 
tradition of meditation, in spite of the influence from Buddhist 
meditation. 
The notion of våsanå and its destruction appears here and there in 
other late Upani∑ads as well, but not usually in the predominant position 
it has in the Muktikå Upani∑ad. Examples are: Nådabindu Up. 49c-d = 
Yogaßikhå Up. 6.71a-b; AnnapËrˆa Up. 4.79; Mahå Up. 2.45; 5.78; 
etc.142 Nothing like the Four Dhyånas of the Buddhists recurs in any of 
these Upani∑ads, as far as I know. 
                                                
142 Cf. Sprockhoff, 1963: 200-201. 
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Part III: Buddhist meditation. 
 
VII.  Influence on Buddhist meditation (I) . 
 
7.1. We have seen that the main stream of ancient Indian meditation 
largely lived a life of its own, showing developments both theoretical and 
practical which could be explained without reference to Buddhism. 
Buddhist influence came late and remained marginal. The question is 
whether Buddhist meditation also remained unaffected by main stream 
meditation. 
A priori this seems unlikely. Buddhist meditation had to live in 
surroundings where apparently the other form of meditation held 
undisputed sway. Moreover, the other form of meditation was so simple 
and perspicacious in its aim that Buddhist meditation could not compete 
with it in appeal. 
There is another fact which supports this a priori supposition. The 
Buddhist scriptures, as we have seen, show that much attention was paid 
to other modes of meditation, or rather asceticism. We studied the most 
important passages in chapter I, above.143 The Jaina canon, on the other 
hand, says very little about Buddhism, and nothing whatever about 
Buddhist meditation (Bollée, 1974: 27-28; cf. Jacobi, 1880: 161). 
Therefore Buddhism is more likely to have adopted parts of the 
meditation current among the Jainas and elsewhere than vice versa. The 
fact that Buddhism appears to have been ‘a comparatively minor factor 
in the religious life of India before Asoka’ lends further support to this 
supposition; see Basham, 1982: 139-41 . 
A concrete instance of influence from mainstream asceticism on 
Buddhism is provided by the five demands of Devadatta to the Buddha 
(Mukherjee, 1966: 75-81). Three of them occur in a stereotyped 
description of heretics in the Buddhist canon. This has been discussed by 
Bollée ( 1971, esp. pp. 71, 76, 81, 83) and will not be repeated here. This 
case is particularly interesting because the five demands are in Buddhism 
not accepted as compulsory, but as optional. Four of them recur in the 
                                                
143. See further Bollée, 1971; Bhaskar, 1972; Jacobi, 1895: xv-xx; Tatia, date 
unknown. 
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list of thirteen dhuta∫gas enumerated in the canon (Vin V. 131, 193) and 
in the post-canonical Milindapañha (ch. 6) and Visuddhimagga (ch. 2).144 
Another instance occurs in the Mahåparinirvåˆa SËtra, in the 
discussion with Putkasa / Pukkusa, the different versions of which have 
been compared by Bareau (1970: 282-95). Putkasa tells that Órå∂a 
Kålåma at one occasion did not hear the sound of five hundred – in one 
version fifty – carts passing by, even though awake and conscious.145 
This ability, we know, is ascribed to practitioners of main stream 
meditation, along with the ability not to see, smell, taste and feel. The 
Buddhist texts ridicule it, as we have seen (§ 2.2, above). Here however 
the Buddha is said to surpass Órå∂a Kålåma in this respect. He tells 
Putkasa that once, in a violent thunderstorm when lightning killed two 
farmers and four oxen near him, he did not notice a thing. We see that a 
story of probably non-Buddhist origin (so Bareau) was accepted by the 
Buddhists. This could not fail to influence the way Buddhist meditation 
came to be looked upon subsequently. 
One more instance of borrowing from main stream meditation was 
pointed out in § 1.2, above. We saw that at one place in the Majjhima 
Nikåya (Vitakkasanthåna Sutta, nr 20; MN I.120-21) monks are advised 
to do what is shown to be incorrect elsewhere (MN I.242; and therefore 
in the Original Mahåsaccaka SËtra). It refers to the kind of meditation 
which consists of “closing the teeth, pressing his palate with the tongue, 
restraining thought with the mind, coercing and tormenting it”, in short, 
main stream meditation. 
Further cases were pointed out in notes 5 and 8 to ch. II. ‘Non-
performing of new actions’ and ‘annihilation of former actions’ – two 
characteristics of Jaina meditation criticized at some places – were found 
to be accepted at other places of the Buddhist canon.146 
                                                
144. On the dhuta∫gas, see Bapat, 1937; 1964: Introduction; and Dantinne 1991: esp. 
p. 25f. The tendency to accept painful practices is also apparent in the Ekottara 
Ógama where it makes the Buddha say that happiness can only be reached through 
hardship; elsewhere this point of view is ascribed to the Jainas; see note 5 to 
chapter II above. 
145. Something closely similar is told about the grammarian Íåka†åyana in Patañjali’s 
Vyåkaraˆa-Mahåbhå∑ya on P. 3.2.115, vol. II, p. 120, 1. 20-23. 
146. It is possible that the (first) stanza uttered by Anuruddha after the death of the 
Buddha (Bareau, 1971: 163-64), which stresses the latter’s cessation of breathing, 
likewise betrays influence from main stream meditation. 
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7.2. The above cases could relatively easily be shown to be due to 
outside influence. Each of them rests on at least two canonical passages 
which flatly contradict each other, while one agrees closely with what we 
know about main stream meditation and its accompaniments. We shall 
now turn to a few cases which are less immediately obvious. The idea 
remains the same: we shall propose outside influence where by this 
means contradictions in the Buddhist canon can be explained and where 
at the same time the origin of this influence can be indicated. 
 
7.2.1. A number of meditational states are mentioned in the Buddhist 
canon. These, as a rule, occur in lists. We first look at the eight 
Liberations (vimok∑a / vimokkha).147 They are the following:148 
1) Having visible shape, one sees visible shapes 
2) Having no ideation of visible shape in oneself, one sees visible 
shapes outside [oneself] 
3) One becomes intent on what is beautiful 
4) By completely going beyond ideations of visible shape and the 
coming to an end of ideations of aversion, by not fixing one’s 
mind on different149 ideations, [thinking] ‘space is infinite’, he 
reaches the Stage of Infinity of Space (åkåßånantyåyatana / 
åkåsånañcåyatana) and remains there 
5) Having completely gone beyond the Stage of Infinity of Space, 
[thinking] ‘knowledge is infinite’, one reaches the Stage of 
Infinity of Perception (vijñånånantyåyatana / 
viññåˆañcåyatana) and remains there 
6) Having completely gone beyond the Stage of Infinity of 
Perception [thinking] ‘there is nothing’ one reaches the Stage of 
                                                
147. See e.g. Sa∫g VIII.9; Daßo VIII.7; DN II.70-71, 111-12; DÓc p. 62b19-25; MN 
II.12-13; AN IV.306, 349; Lamotte, 1970: 1281-83. MN III.222 calls them a††hå 
diså ‘the eight directions’; cf . MÓc p . 694a2-b9. According to Mahåvibhå∑å 77 (T. 
1545, p. 399b20 f.; tr. La Vallée Poussin, 1937c: 12) heterodox teachers teach four 
liberations, viz. the four stages åkåßånantyåyatana until naivasaµjñånåsaµ-
jñåyatana. 
148. I translate the Påli version. Small variations occur in the other versions which are 
of no relevance for the present study. 
149. See note 14 below. 
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Nothingness (åkiñcanyåyatana / åkiñcaññåyatana) and remains 
there 
7) Having completely gone beyond the Stage of Nothingness, one 
reaches the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation 
(naivasaµjñånåsaµjñåyatana / nevasaññånåsaññåyatana) and 
remains there 
8) Having completely gone beyond the Stage of Neither Ideation 
nor Non-Ideation, one reaches the Cessation of Ideations and 
Feelings (saµjñåvedayitanirodha / saññåvedayitanirodha) and 
remains there. 
Even though it is difficult to understand fully what exactly is meant 
by this passage, one can easily see that it is a list of graded exercises by 
which the practitioner gradually puts an end to all ideations. In the Stage 
of Nothingness the most ethereal of ideations alone remain, described as 
“there is nothing”. In the following two states even this ideation 
disappears. 
It is not clear why two states follow the Stage of Nothingness. One 
might think that ideations are not yet completely absent in the Stage of 
Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation, however unlikely that may be.150 But 
even on this assumption the presence of feeling (vedayita) in the final 
Cessation of Ideations and Feelings must give rise to suspicion, since the 
whole list seems aimed at the dissolution of ideations and leaves no place 
for feelings. This suggests that the state of Cessation of Ideations and 
Feelings is an addition to the list. Other passages from the Buddhist 
canon confirm this. 
 
                                                
150. If we understand the term naivasaµjñånåsaµjñåyatana literally, there are no 
ideations in this ‘Stage of Neither Ideations nor Non-Ideations’. This interpretation 
is supported by DN II.69, according to which beings without ideations occupy that 
stage (see note 15 below). DN I.184, moreover, speaks of the ideation 
accompanying the Stage of Nothingness as ‘the topmost of ideations’ (saññagga), 
after which follows the cessation of all ideations. See further Franke, 1917: 70. 
Note that the later dogmatists had different opinions on this issue, the Theravådins 
holding that there are ideations in the Stage of Neither Ideations nor Non-Ideations, 
their opponents that there are none (Kathåvatthu III.12). These opponents are 
identified as Andhakas in the Kathåvatthuppakaraˆa-A††hakathå (p. 72). See also 
Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakoßabhå∑ya 8.4 (La Vallée Poussin, 1923-31: ch. viii, p. 
143-44). 
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The CËÒasuññata Sutta of the Majjhima Nikåya (nr. 121; III. 104-09) 
gives a list of states in which more and more is experienced as empty 
(suñña). The list can be briefly given as follows: 
1) He fixes his mind on the exclusive151 ideation of forest (arañña-
saññaµ pa†icca manasikaroti ekattaµ)152 
2) He fixes his mind on the exclusive ideation of earth 
( pa†hav¥saññå ) 
3) He fixes his mind on the exclusive ideation of the Stage of 
Infinity of Space (åkåsånañcåyatanasaññå) 
4) He fixes his mind on the exclusive ideation of the Stage of 
Infinity of Perception (viññåˆañcåyatanasaññå) 
5) He fixes his mind on the exclusive ideation of the Stage of 
Nothingness (åkiñcaññåyatanasaññå 
6) He fixes his mind on the exclusive ideation of the Stage of 
Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation (nevasaññånåsaññåyatana-
saññå) 
7) He fixes his mind on the exclusive mental concentration 
beyond [any ideation of] characteristics (or mental images)153 
(animitta cetosamådhi). 
The numbers 3)-6) of this list correspond to the numbers 4)-7) of the 
list of the eight Liberations. What precedes and follows differ. 
It is again possible to distinguish a list of graded exercises in which 
consciousness, by a process of ever increasing abstractions, is deprived 
of all content. The two introductory states fit well with this. But the last 
state, the animitta cetosamådhi, appears superfluous. Rather, in this list 
an unconvincing trick has been used which is apparently intended to 
provide a place for this animitta cetosamådhi. In all but the last states the 
mind is fixed on the exclusive ideation of something. In the final state the 
mind is fixed on the animitta cetosamådhi and now apparently goes 
                                                
151. See note 14 below. 
152. The Påli text adds tassa araññasaññåya cittaµ pakkhandati pas¥dati santi††hati / 
adhimuccati, and the same appropriately adjusted to each of the following 
sentences. But the Chinese (MÓc p. 736c f.) and Tibetan (not accessible to me) 
parallels omit this (Schmithausen, 1981: 234 n. 124). 
153. So Schmithausen, 1981: 235. 
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beyond all forms of ideation. In the preceding state the mind is said to be 
fixed on “the exclusive ideation of the Stage of Neither Ideation nor 
Non-Ideation”. This is absurd. Ideation is ascribed to a state which has 
no ideation. Perhaps we witness here an attempt to justify the final state, 
animitta cetosamådhi. 
It seems dubious that animitta cetosamådhi is identical with saµjñå-
vedayitanirodha (‘Cessation of ideations and Feelings’).154 Schmithausen 
(1981: 236 n. 133) gives one reference (SN 40.1-9) where the two terms 
seem to have been interchanged, as well as a few references (DN II. 100, 
AN 6.60 (III.397)) where the two denote different things. We note that, 
at any rate, the terms are different. 
The two lists discussed thus far share in common a unit of four 
meditational states, which may be looked upon as their ‘hard core’: 1. the 
Stage of Infinity of Space (åkåßånantyåyatana); 2. the Stage of Infinity of 
Perception (vijñånånantyåyatana); 3. the Stage of Nothingness 
(åkiñcanyåyatana); 4. the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation 
(naivasaµjñånåsaµjñåyatana). This ‘hard core’ occurs by itself in the 
Buddhist canon under the name ‘the four arËpas / årËpyas’ (DN III.224; 
Sa∫g IV.8; DÓc p. 50c25f.). 
One might expect that this list of four meditational states has to be 
reduced still further to account for the seven Places of Perception 
(vijñånasthiti / viññåˆa††hiti):155 
1) There are beings with different156 bodies and different 
ideations, such as men, some gods and some inhabitants of hell 
2) There are beings with different bodies and uniform157 ideations, 
such as the Brahmakåyika gods who came first into existence 
3) There are beings with uniform bodies and different ideations, 
such as the Óbhåsvara gods 
4) There are beings with uniform bodies and uniform ideations, 
                                                
154. For a different opinion, see Vetter, 1988:67 n.8. 
155. See e.g. DN III.253; DÓc p. 52a23 - 29; AN IV.39; Daßo VII.7. I translate the Påli 
version, ignoring the small deviations which occur in other versions. 
156. I translate nånatta ( Skt . nånåtman ) and ekatta ( Skt . ekåtman ) as proposed by 
Schmithausen (1981: 233-34, n. 122), even though the Sanskrit version has nånåtva 
and ekatva. 
157. MN I.169-70; MV I.7; MÓc p. 777a-b; T. 1428, p. 787b. 
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such as the Subhakiˆha gods 
5) There are beings which, by going completely beyond ideations 
of form, and the coming to an end of ideations of aversion, by 
not fixing their mind on different ideations, [thinking] ‘space is 
infinite’, reach the Stage of Infinity of Space (åkåßånantyå-
yatana) 
6) There are beings which, having completely gone beyond this 
Stage of Infinity of Space, [thinking] ‘perception is infinite’, 
reach the Stage of Infinity of Perception (vijñånånantyåyatana) 
7) There are beings which, having completely gone beyond the 
Stage of Infinity of Perception, [thinking] ‘there is nothing’, 
reach the Stage of Nothingness (åkiñcanyåyatana). 
Here the Stage of Infinity of Space, the Stage of Infinity of Perception 
and the Stage of Nothingness, occur together without the fourth, the 
Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation 
(naivasaµjñånåsaµjñåyatana). 
There is, however, an obvious reason why the Stage of Neither 
Ideation nor Non-Ideation is left out. This list enumerates Places of 
Perception. But perception (vijñåna) is always accompanied by ideation 
(saµjñå), which is absent in the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-
Ideation. This last stage, therefore, falls into another, higher category. 
The Buddhist canon also gives a list of nine Residences of Beings 
(sattvåvåsa / sattåvåsa; e.g., Daßo IX.3; Sa∫g IX.2; DN III.263) which is 
the seven Places of Perception plus two items. Between 4) and 5) is 
added the Residence of Beings of those without ideations and feelings 
(asaññino appa†isaµvedino, in the Påli version), or of those without 
ideations and discriminating ideations (asaµjñino ’pratisaµjñinas, in the 
Sanskrit version); and the Residence of Beings of those who have 
reached the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation (naivasaµ-
jñånåsaµjñåyatana) is added at the end. 
 
It appears from the above that the Stage of Nothingness 
(åkiñcanyåyatana) and the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation 
(naivasaµjñånåsaµjñåyatana) are the two final states of a row of graded 
exercises. By a process of increasing abstraction, in which the initial 
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stages seem to be variable, the aspirant works himself up to a state where 
there is ‘neither ideation nor non-ideation’. In the later stages of this 
process the mind is successively fixed on the notions “space is infinite”, 
“perception is infinite” and “there is nothing”. The Stage of Nothingness 
is the final state in which some kind of notion remains before the jump is 
made into (complete or almost complete) notionlessness, the real goal. 
There is some independent evidence that the Stage of Nothingness 
and the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation were at one time aims 
in themselves. 
The Buddha is said to have had two teachers before his enlighten-
ment: Órå∂a (P. ÓÒåra) Kålåma and Udraka (P. Uddaka) the son of 
Råma. From the former the Bodhisattva learned the Stage of 
Nothingness, from the latter the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-
Ideation. No credence can be given to this story, for the following 
reasons, presented by Bareau (1963: 20-21).158 
The episode of the Bodhisattva’s training under Órå∂a Kålåma and 
Udraka the son of Råma is found in three versions in the older parts of 
the canon: in the Majjhima Nikåya of the Theravådins (thrice: in the 
Ariyapariyesana Sutta, nr. 26, MN I.163-67; Mahåsaccaka Sutta, nr. 36, 
MN I.240, Nålandå ed. I, p. 294-98; Sa∫garåva Sutta, nr. 100, MN 
II.212, Nålandå ed. II, p. 484-87); in the Madhyamågama of the 
Sarvåstivådins (MÓc p. 776b5-777a4); in the Vinaya of the Dharma-
guptakas (T. 1428, p. 780b7-c19). The names of Órå∂a Kålåma and 
Udraka the son of Råma occur again in the scriptures of these schools, 
where they relate how the Buddha, after his enlightenment, wonders to 
whom he will preach his doctrine first. He thinks of Órå∂a Kålåma and 
Udraka the son of Råma, but learns that both have died recently. No 
word is said about the Buddha’s relationship to these two people, nor 
indeed do we hear what these men had been or done. This would be hard 
to explain if the training of the Bodhisattva under them had been related 
at that time a few pages earlier as it is now. One suspects that the names 
                                                
158. [Discussions with Ghiorgo Zafiropulo – whose book De la quête à l’annonce de 
l’éveil is expected to come out soon (Innsbrucker Beiträge zur Kulturwissenschaft, 
1993) – have now (1992) convinced me that Bareau’s reasons may not be 
compelling. This does not, however, affect – or if it does, it strengthens – the 
following arguments.] 
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of these two men originally occurred only where the Buddha thinks of 
possible persons with whom to start his missionary activity. In order to 
give some content to these mysterious names, the account of the 
Bodhisattva’s training under teachers with these names was added. This 
supposition finds support in the fact that the Vinaya of the Mah¥ßåsakas 
relates the Buddha’s doubt about whom to preach to first (T. 1421, p. 
104a11-21; Bareau, 1963: 145-46) and mentions in this context the 
names of Órå∂a Kålåma and Udraka the son of Råma, but does not refer 
to the Bodhisattva’s training under these two even though this Vinaya 
mentions a number of things about the Bodhisattva prior to his 
enlightenment (T. 1421, p. 101a10 - 102c14; tr. in Bareau, 1962).159 
If this story does not reflect the historical truth, why was it 
invented? Part of the reason has been given above: the occurrence of the 
two names ‘Órå∂a Kålåma’ and ‘Udraka the son of Råma’ required an 
explanation which could be given in this manner. But clearly this does 
not explain why the story took exactly this shape. In its actual form the 
story serves the additional purpose of denouncing the Stage of 
Nothingness and the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation. 
Let us note that in two of the three versions of this story (of the 
Theravådins and of the Sarvåstivådins) the Bodhisattva complains that 
these two stages do not lead to what he is looking for, an impossibility if, 
in the opinion of its author, they represented two steps which preceded 
the final steps of the way to enlightenment. If on the other hand, the 
criticism had been against, for instance, the eight Liberations (vimok∑a) – 
which have one more stage after the two stages mentioned in this story, 
viz. the Cessation of Ideations and Feelings, saµjñåvedayitanirodha – the 
Bodhisattva should have been depicted as also practising this final stage 
and finding it worthless. Consequently it is only reasonable to assume 
that the account of the training under Órå∂a Kålåma and Udraka the son 
of Råma contains an implicit criticism of those who considered the Stage 
of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation the final aim of a course of training, 
immediately preceded presumably by the Stage of Nothingness. 
The above observations have made it probable that in the early days 
                                                
159. Note further that the Mahåparinirvåˆa SËtra mentions a Putkasa / Pukkusa who is 
supposed to be a follower of Órå∂a Kålåma and visits the Buddha not long before 
the latter’s death. See Bareau, 1970: 282-95, esp. p. 284; and § 7.1 above. 
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of Buddhism the following list of meditational states existed (which may 
have been the end of a longer list of which the initial items were not 
strongly fixed): 
a) the Stage of Infinity of Space (åkåßånantyåyatana); 
b) the Stage of Infinity of Perception (vijñånånantyåyatana); 
c) the Stage of Nothingness (åkiñcanyåyatana); 
d) the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation (naivasaµ-
jñånåsaµjñåyatana). 
We know that this short list appears as a part of longer lists in the 
Buddhist canon and was therefore accepted in Buddhist circles. 
Interestingly enough, the evidence discussed above points to a time when 
this list was not accepted by at least some Buddhists. 
 
The list agrees well with what we know of main stream meditation. 
There the aim is to stop mental activity. This can be compared with the 
Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation studied above. It is striking 
that the Jaina scriptures describe reflection on infinity (aˆaµtavattiyå, 
Skt. anantavartitå or -v®ttitå) as one of the reflections (aˆuppehå, Skt. 
anuprek∑å) underlying pure (sukka, Skt. ßukla), i.e. the highest 
meditation (above, § 3.3). This corresponds with the Stage of Infinity of 
Space and the Stage of Infinity of Knowledge. A further point of 
resemblance is the fact that these four states of meditation, unlike the 
Four Dhyånas of Buddhism, are never described as pleasurable or 
blissful160 (as already remarked by Schmidt (1953: 65)). 
We hypothesize that the meditational states under discussion at 
present entered Buddhism from Jainistic or related circles. 
 
7.2.2. How could these meditational practices find entrance into 
Buddhism ? Where could they find a place side by side with the Four 
Dhyånas ? 
The Four Dhyånas can be briefly characterized as follows (cf. § 1.5 
above): 
                                                
160. The only exception occurs in the CËÒasaññata Sutta of the Majjhima Nikåya. 
However, the Chinese and Tibetan parallels leave out the sentences concerned. See 
note 10 above. 
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– In the First Dhyåna there is deliberation (vitarka), thought (vicåra), joy 
( pr¥ti) and bliss (sukha). 
– In the Second Dhyåna deliberation and thought come to rest. Inner 
tranquillization (adhyåtmasamprasådana), unification of the mind 
(cetaso ekot¥bhåva), concentration (samådhi), joy and bliss are present. 
– In the Third Dhyåna one is no longer attached to joy. Equanimity 
(upek∑å), mindfulness (sm®ti), circumspection (saµprajanya) and bliss 
are present. 
– In the Fourth Dhyåna bliss and misery (du˙kha) are abandoned, as well 
as cheerfulness (saumanasya) and dejectedness (daurmanasya). 
Equanimity and mindfulness remain. 
Clearly the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation can be 
compared with the Second Dhyåna, where deliberation and thought come 
to rest. Both states represent some kind of cessation of ordinary mental 
functioning. There is some evidence that an assimilation of this type was 
actually made at some time. 
A Buddhist SËtra (SN IV.297-300; SÓc p. 152b28 - 153a2) relates a 
discussion between Nigaˆ†ha Nåtaputta, i.e. the Jina, and the householder 
Citra / Citta. Citra is asked if he believes the recluse Gautama who says 
that there is a concentration free from deliberation and thought (avitakko 
avicåro samådhi), that there is cessation of deliberation and thought 
(vitakkavicåråˆaµ nirodho). Initially Citra gives an ambiguous answer, 
but then turns out not to believe, but to know these things from his own 
experience which he obtained while practising the Four Dhyånas (Påli) / 
the first two of the Four Dhyånas (Chinese). In this passage the leader of 
the Jainas is depicted as considering impossible the very aim of Jaina 
meditation. What is more, the Jaina road of meditation up to the 
cessation of all mental activity seems here to be identified with the first 
two of the Four Dhyånas of the Buddhists. Note that the word nirodha 
‘cessation’ which is common in the main tradition of meditation, is used 
in the context of the Second Dhyåna, where normally ‘coming to rest’ 
(vyupaßama / vËpasama) is used. 
 
Main stream meditation does not end with a mere cessation of all 
mental activity. In its highest stages there is a complete cessation of all 
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activity whatever, particularly of breathing. If the cessation of mental 
activity was identified with the Second Dhyåna, one might expect that 
cessation of breathing in particular was assigned to a later Dhyåna, 
preferably the Fourth one. This is confirmed by the list of Successive 
Cessations (anupubbanirodha; DN III.266; 290; AN IV.409). It reads: 
– For one who has reached the First Dhyåna the ideation of objects of 
sense (kåma) has ceased; 
– for one who has reached the Second Dhyåna deliberation and thought 
(vitakkavicåra ) have ceased; 
– for one who has reached the Third Dhyåna joy ( p¥ti) has ceased; 
– for one who has reached the Fourth Dhyåna breathing out and breathing 
in (assåsapassåsa) have ceased; 
– for one who has reached the Stage of Infinity of Space the ideation of 
form has ceased; 
– for one who has reached the Stage of Infinity of Perception the ideation 
of the Stage of Infinity of Space has ceased; 
– for one who has reached the Stage of Nothingness the ideation of the 
Stage of Infinity of Perception has ceased; 
– for one who has reached the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation 
the ideation of the Stage of Nothingness has ceased; 
– for one who has reached the Cessation of Ideations and Feelings 
ideations and feelings have ceased. 
We note the fourth item of this list, where the same terms are used as at 
MN I.242, where Jaina meditation is described (above, chapter I). 
 
If it is true that the early Buddhists (or some of them) made attempts 
to assimilate the four stages under discussion to the Four Dhyånas, it 
cannot have escaped their attention that in the Second Dhyåna, where 
vitarka and vicåra come to rest, joy ( pr¥ti) and bliss (sukha) remain 
together with other feelings which do not disappear until the Third and 
Fourth Dhyånas. This would imply that after the Stage of Neither 
Ideation nor Non-Ideation another stage would be required where not 
only ideations (saµjñå) but also feelings (vedayita) have stopped. Such a 
stage exists in the Cessation of Ideations and Feelings 
(saµjñåvedayitanirodha ) frequently met with in the texts. 
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The above assimilation of the four states and what follows them to 
the Four Dhyånas is clearly not very satisfactory. The differences 
between the four states and the Four Dhyånas are too great to allow of 
such an easy assimilation. No wonder that this assimilation was not 
accepted in the larger part of the Buddhist canon. The alternative, if one 
of the two groups was not to be discarded, was to place them one after 
the other. In the nine Successive States (anupËrvavihåra / 
anupubbavihåra)161 we find the following order : first the Four Dhyånas, 
then the Stage of Infinity of Space, the Stage of Infinity of Knowledge, 
the Stage of Nothingness, the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-
Ideation, and finally the Cessation of Ideations and Feelings. 
The list obtained was justified with the help of the nine Successive 
Cessations (see above): in each next stage something more is stopped. 
The Po††hapåda Sutta of the D¥gha Nikåya (nr. 9) contains a slightly 
different justification: the list162 is presented as bringing about the 
successive cessation of several forms of ideation (DN I.182-84): 
– In the First Dhyåna there is cessation of the ideation of objects of sense. 
– In the Second Dhyåna there is cessation of the subtle and true ideation 
of the joy and bliss born from seclusion (vivekajap¥tisukhasukhuma-
saccasaññå ). 
– In the Third Dhyåna there is cessation of the subtle and true ideation of 
the joy and bliss born from concentration 
(samådhijap¥tisukhasukhumasaccasaññå ). 
– In the Fourth Dhyåna there is cessation of the subtle and true ideation 
of indifference and bliss (upekkhåsukhasukhumasaccasaññå). 
– In the Stage of Infinity of Space there is cessation of the ideation of 
form (rËpasaññå). 
– In the Stage of Infinity of Perception there is cessation of the subtle and 
true ideation of the Stage of Infinity of Space (åkåsånañcåyatana-
sukhumasaccasaññå). 
                                                
161. See e.g. Daßo IX.8; Lamotte, 1970: 1308. 
162. Properly speaking, a slightly different list. The final Cessation of Ideations and 
Feelings is lacking here, and the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation is 
designated differently. See the next note. 
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– In the Stage of Nothingness there is cessation of the subtle and true 
ideation of the Stage of Infinity of Perception (viññaˆånañcåyatana-
sukhumasaccasaññå). 
– In the next and final state, simply described as Cessation (nirodha), 
there is cessation of all ideations.163 
 
The Successive States became quite prominent in the Buddhist 
canon and are often said to lead to the vanishing of the Intoxicants 
(åsrava / åsava), i.e., final liberation (e.g., SN 16.9-11; AN 9.34; 35; MN 
I.159-60; 174-75; II.42-45; MÓc p. 701b12). 
7.2.3. If it is true that the four states – from the Stage of Infinity of Space 
until the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation – were borrowed 
from main stream meditation in one form or another, we must assume 
that originally this list of graded exercises represented a road to 
liberation quite different from the authentic Buddhist one. Moreover, 
these states must then have been part of a scheme where liberation was 
not attained until the death of the body. Our idea that these states were 
borrowed from outside is therefore confirmed by the fact that several 
Buddhist schools were indeed of the opinion that an alternative road to 
liberation led through the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation; 
arhant-ship is here obtained at the end of one’s final existence. These 
schools are the Vibhajyavådins, Mah¥ßåsakas, Theravådins164 and the 
authors of the Íåriputråbhidharmaßåstra165 (Bareau, 1957: 248; 1955: 
175, 184, 198, 262). 
7.2.4. The above arguments make it likely that the four states discussed 
came into Buddhism from outside. The following, somewhat speculative 
considerations may support this. 
Space (åkåßa) and perception (vijñåna) are the last two in the list of 
                                                
163. This stage corresponds to the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation rather 
than to the Cessation of Ideations and Feelings, for, unlike the latter of these two, it 
does not stop feelings. There is at any rate nothing in the text to indicate this. 
164. Bareau gives no reference for the Theravådins. Cf. Pp 13: yassa puggalassa 
apubbaµ acarimaµ åsavapariyådånañ ca hoti j¥vitapariyådånañ ca, ayaµ vuccati 
puggalo samas¥s¥ “The person in whose case no sooner does the termination of 
sinful tendencies take place than the life terminates. Such a person is said to be one 
who is ‘equal-headed’.”(tr. Law, 1924: 20). 
165. Mahåsåµghikas? See Lamotte, 1958: 208 n.24. 
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six dhåtus, the earlier ones being earth, water, fire and wind (see, e.g., 
SN II.248) . This makes it tempting to think that these earlier dhåtus 
could be added before the above four meditational states. Indeed, in AN 
V.324 and elsewhere166 we find the following list of items which can, but 
should not be used as objects of meditation: (l) earth, (2) water, (3) fire, 
(4) wind,167 (5) Stage of Infinity of Space, (6) Stage of Infinity of 
Perception, (7) Stage of Nothingness, (8) Stage of Neither Ideation nor 
Non-Ideation, (9) this world, (10) the world beyond, (11) whatever is 
seen, heard, thought, known, obtained, searched, pondered over by the 
mind. 
If we leave out of consideration the last three items of this list, we 
arrive at something similar to what is described in a passage of the 
Mok∑adharmaparvan, viz. MBh 12.288.113-15. There we find a 
successive fixation of the mind (dhåraˆå) on earth, ether, water, fire, 
ahaµkåra, buddhi, and avyakta168 (cf. Bedekar, 1963b: 25-27; 
Frauwallner, 1953: 142-43; Hopkins, 1901: 351-52; Barnes, 1976: 66). 
Frauwallner (1953: 143) observed, no doubt correctly, that it was 
considered that the Yogin who practised these successive fixations was 
able to go through the process of creation in reverse order.169 It remains 
none the less possible that both these lists – the one of the Mahåbhårata 
and the one of the A∫guttara Nikåya – derive from a common ancestor. 
Their divergent developments may have been determined by ontological 
and other considerations. 
7.3. This may be the place to say a few words about the four Brahmic 
States (brahmavihåra). As far as I know, the practice of these mental 
states is nowhere criticized in the Buddhist canon. Nor are these states 
                                                
166. AN V.7-8; 318-20; 321-22; 353-58. 
167. Note that these four (six in the case of MÓc) elements are enumerated as objects 
of meditation in the Sm®tyupasthåna SËtra (MN I.57-58; DN II.294; MÓc p. 583b 
17-23; EÓc p. 568a23-b1). Schmithausen (1976: 252-53, n. 25) suggests that the 
four elements in this context are not original and derive from passages like MN 
I.185 f. and 421 f., where they occur in an analysis of rËpa. 
168. The text announces seven fixations but appears to give eight. Are we to exclude 
buddhi, which has the suffix -tas that is so hard to explain in this context, or should 
we look upon avyakta as belonging to another category ? 
169. Recall Eliade’s (1967: 107) remark that the Yogin aimed at the state which 
preceded creation, primordial unity. 
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immediately recognizable as belonging to main stream meditation. 
Indeed, it appears that they are not found in the old Hindu and Jaina 
scriptures.170 Yet certain passages in the Buddhist canon show that they 
were known to and practised by non-Buddhists. 
The Saµyutta Nikåya (SN V. 115f) and the Saµyukta Ógama (SÓc 
p. 197 b15f.) contain the story of Buddhist monks who are embarrassed 
by heretical wanderers. These heretics claim that the teaching of the 
Buddha does not differ from their own : both teach the four Brahmic 
States.171 In response to this allegation the Buddha is presented as saying 
that his followers practise the Brahmic States until their highest 
perfection, leading to purity in the case of benevolence (maitr¥ / P. 
mettå), to the Stage of Infinity of Space (åkåßånantyåyatana / P. 
åkåsånañcåyatana) for compassion (karuˆå), the Stage of Infinity of 
Perception (vijñånånantyåyatana / P. viññåˆañcåyatana) for joy (muditå), 
the Stage of Nothingness (åkiñcanyåyatana / P. åkiñcaññåyatana) for 
indifference (upek∑å).172 All this merely confirms the main point: the 
Brahmic States were practised by non-Buddhists. 
The Pa†hamamettå Sutta of the A∫guttara Nikåya (AN II. 128f.) 
does not even try to show the difference between Buddhists and non-
Buddhists in their practice of the Brahmic States. The only difference lies 
in the result. Both Buddhists and non-Buddhists attain to the state of 
certain gods as a result of these practices, and remain there for a long but 
finite period of time. After that the non-Buddhists go to hell, or become 
animals, or ghosts. The Buddhists, on the other hand, reach Nirvåˆa 
while in that divine state. We may conclude that at least for some time 
the Brahmic States were practised identically by Buddhists and certain 
non-Buddhists. 
Some SËtras indicate that their authors considered the Brahmic 
States older than and inferior to the practices taught by the Buddha. The 
Makhådeva Sutta (MN II.74-83; MÓc p. 511c-515b; EÓc p. 806c-810b) 
                                                
170. They are referred to in Umåsvåti’s Tattvårthådhigama SËtra 7.6 (Jacobi, 1906: 
523) but not in the Jaina canon (Schubring, 1935: 191). 
171. The term brahmavihåra is not used here, but the four practices are described. 
172. The Påli text also brings in the Constituents of Enlightenment (sambojjha∫ga). 
These are absent from the Chinese. 
69 
relates how king Makhådeva173 and his successors abandon the world as 
soon as they get grey hair, and practise the Brahmic States.174 The 
Buddha explains that he himself was Makhådeva in an earlier birth, but 
that Makhådeva’s practices brought him not to the end, whereas the 
practices now taught by the Buddha lead to liberation (MÓc p. 515a23) 
and Nirvåˆa (MN II.82; EÓc p. 810b12). 
The Påli version of the Mahågovinda Sutta (DN II.220-52) indicates 
the same thing. Mahågovinda practises the four Brahmic States and 
reaches the world of Brahman. The Buddha explains that he himself was 
Mahågovinda, but that his practice was not satisfactory. Only the Noble 
Eightfold Path (ariya a††ha∫gika magga) leads to enlightenment and 
Nirvåˆa (pp. 250-51). The fact that the Brahmic States are not clearly 
included in the Chinese (DÓc p. 30b-34b; T 8, p. 207c-210b) and 
Sanskrit (Mv III.197-224) versions of this story, makes it probable that 
they were inserted at a relatively late date, perhaps under the influence of 
the Makhådeva Sutta. 
The assimilation of the Brahmic States to three of the four Stages 
discussed in § 7.2 may give us a clue regarding the origin of these 
practices. In both the Brahmic States and the four Stages we find a heavy 
emphasis on infinity. In the four Brahmic States the world is pervaded by 
the mind which is suffused with benevolence, compassion, joy and 
equanimity respectively. It seems reasonable to assume a historical 
connection with the reflection on infinity of the Jainas (see § 7.2.1 and 
§ 3.3, above). 
7.4. We see that there is much reason to think that the influence from 
main stream meditation on Buddhist meditation was already widespread 
in canonical times. That this was solely due to the relatively small 
number of active Buddhists as compared with the much larger number of 
those who practised main stream meditation seems unlikely. Another 
factor must have been at work. Already early in the history of Buddhism 
there was uncertainty about the details of the practice taught by the 
                                                
173. The Chinese ( ) presupposes rather ‘Mahådeva’. 
174. The Chinese versions have  which also translates brahmacarya. However, 
the specifications given in the Ekottara Ógama (p. 808b15-16; c11-12; 809a21; 
810a13-14) leave no room for doubt. 
70 
Buddha. This explains why the Buddhist canon contains so many 
contradictions, some of which we have studied above. It also explains 
why very early disagreement arose about the nature of an arhant (see 
Bareau, 1957; La Vallée Poussin, 1937b). This uncertainty opened the 
door to foreign elements which could take the place of original but little 
understood elements. In this way outside influence could touch the very 
heart of the teaching of the Buddha. In this light we shall study some 
other questions. 
Before we turn to these questions, let us see what remains that can 
be considered authentic Buddhist meditation in view of the conclusions 
of the present chapter. The Four Dhyånas and the subsequent destruction 
of the intoxicants survive the present analysis easily. I know of no 
indications that they too must be looked upon as due to outside influence. 
Moreover, they occur very frequently in the canonical scriptures and 
already made the impression on other investigators of belonging to the 
oldest layers of the tradition.175 
Closely connected with the Four Dhyånas is the practice of 
‘mindfulness’ (sm®ti / sati). Mindfulness is mentioned in the description 
of the Four Dhyånas, but is also independently described in the canon. It 
is possible that, originally, mindfulness merely concerned the body 
(Schmithausen, 1976: 253). It may have been borrowed from outside 
movements, because it appears to be known to Jainism (Schmithausen, 
1976: 254). But this is no reason to doubt its role in original Buddhism, 
for mindfulness is nowhere criticized in the Buddhist canon, nor does it 
conflict with other practices accepted by the Buddhists. 
                                                
175. See Frauwallner, 1953: 162 f.; Pande, 1974: 529-34; Schmithausen, 1978: 101; 
Griffiths, 1983: § 2; cf. Heiler, 1922: 45; Schmithausen, 1981: 218-19. 
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VIII.  Influence on Buddhist meditation (II) .  
 
8.1. In the preceding chapter we discussed the influence of main stream 
meditation on the techniques of Buddhist meditation. In the present 
chapter we shall examine the extent to which main stream ideas 
influenced the Buddhist conception of liberation and its commencement. 
Recall that main stream asceticism led to liberation after death. Only 
where ascetic practices were wholly or partly replaced by insight, could 
the decisive transition take place in this life. Buddhism too promised 
liberation in this life (as will be shown in § 8.2). This leads us to expect 
two developments in Buddhism under outside influence: (i) liberation in 
Buddhism will tend to be postponed to the time after death (§ 8.3); 
(ii) liberating insight will tend to take an explicit form and a central 
position (§ 8.4). 
 
8.2. Numerous canonical passages confirm that Buddhism preached 
liberation in this life, i.e., before death. The Buddha himself is said to 
have reached liberation at his moment of enlightenment, attaining 
Nirvåˆa and accomplishing his task at that time (see Bareau, 1963: 72-
79). But with respect to others, or in general descriptions, the aim of the 
religious life is also said to be attained, or attainable, in this life (d®∑†e 
dharme / di††he va dhamme).176 A special case is constituted by the oft-
repeated formula: “Soon N. – having himself, in this very life, by means 
of his intuition witnessed that highest end of the religious life for which 
sons from good families completely go forth from their house to the state 
of houselessness – reached [that end] and remained there, and 
recognized: ‘Birth is destroyed, the religious life has been lived, what 
had to be done has been done, there is no more of this state [of 
existence]’.” (in Påli : ... na cirass’ eva yass’ atthåya kulaputtå sammad 
eva agårasmå anagåriyaµ pabbajanti, tad anuttaraµ brahmacariya-
pariyosånaµ di††he va dhamme sayaµ abhiññå sacchikatvå upasampajja 
vihåsi ‘kh¥ˆå jåti, vusitaµ brahmacariyaµ, kataµ karaˆ¥yaµ, nåparaµ 
                                                
176. E.g. DN I.167f.; II.71; MN I.55, 71; SN II. 15, 46; AN I.50; cf. DÓc p. 34a24, p. 
103c21; MÓc p. 596a24; SÓc p. 99a22, b7; EÓc p. 811b12; T. 1428, p. 788a4. See 
also Kumoi, 1969: 209. 
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itthattåyå’ti’ abbhaññåsi.)177 
The teaching of the Buddha is similarly characterized as ‘belonging 
to this life’ (såµd®∑†ika / sandi††hika) and ‘inviting to come and see’ 
(ehipaßyika / ehipassika).178 The attribute akålika, which often occurs 
along with the preceding two, appears to mean ‘not connected with 
death’ (Bronkhorst,1985b) and draws attention to the this-worldly 
relevance of the message of the Buddha as well. Sometimes these or 
similar attributes describe Nirvåˆa,179 which is thus seen to be attainable 
in this life. Both Nirvåˆa and Arhant-ness (arahatta) are defined as 
‘destruction of desire, destruction of hatred, destruction of delusion’ 
(rågakkhaya, dosakkhaya, mohakkhaya) in SN IV.251-52, which 
indicates that the two are identical or, at any rate, related and therefore 
(also) part of this world. 
 
8.3. The tendency to postpone liberation until after death becomes visible 
in those canonical passages which distinguish between Nirvåˆa – 
qualified in Sanskrit and Påli as ‘without a remainder of upadhi / upådi’ 
(anupadhiße∑a / anupådisesa) – and the ‘highest and complete 
enlightenment’ (anuttara samyaksaµbodhi / sammåsambodhi).180 The 
former occurs at death, the latter in life. 
The Nigrodhakappa Sutta of the Suttanipåta (Sn 343-58) also 
assigns Nirvåˆa to the time after death. The prose introduction tells us 
that Nigrodhakappa is aciraparinibbuta “recently entered into 
Parinirvåˆa”. The first verse states that he is dead (kålam akåsi). And Sn 
354 (= Th 1274) asks: “Has he reached Nirvåˆa or is he with a remainder 
of upådi ? Let us hear if he was liberated.” (nibbåyi so ådu sa-upådiseso, 
yathå vimutto ahu taµ suˆoma). 
Some passages, esp. in the Mahåparinirvåˆa SËtra, speak about the 
                                                
177. E.g. DN I.177; II.153; SN I.140, 161; AN II.249; III.70; Ud 23; Sn p. 16; p. 111-
12; cf. MN I.172, 177; MPS p. 380-82; DÓc p. 104c12-14; p. 25b22-25; p. 39a2-9; 
SÓc p. 309a16-17; EÓc p. 612b24-26. 
178. E.g. DN II.93, 217; MN I.37, 265; SN I.9, 220; AN I.149, 207; Mv III. 200. 
179. AN I.158-59; IV.453-54; Ud 37. 
180. E.g. DN II.108-09; III.135; AN II.120; IV.313; Ud 85; MPS p. 216-18; cf. DÓc 
p. 16a8-14; EÓc p. 753c23-26; T. 7, p. 192a1-5. 
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death of the Buddha as his ‘Parinirvåˆa’.181 (It is understandable that the 
opinion could arise that the term ‘Parinirvåˆa’ referred to the state after 
death of the Buddhist saint, ‘Nirvåˆa’ to the state while he was alive. 
This does not however appear to be correct. The canon also uses the term 
‘Parinirvåˆa’ with reference to living men.182 See Franke, 1913: 180n.; 
Thomas, 1947; Nyanatiloka, 1976: 160-61 (s.v. parinibbåna).) 
The Dhammasa∫gaˆi (Dhs 1017-18) differentiates between Arhant-
ness (upari††himaµ arahattaphalaµ) and Nirvåˆa (asa∫khatå dhåtu), 
disagreeing with SN IV.251-52 discussed above. See C.A.F. Rhys 
Davids, 1900: 153-54, 342. 
There is one canonical passage (It 38-39) where the conflict between 
Nirvåˆa in this life and Nirvåˆa after death is resolved by distinguishing 
two kinds of Nirvåˆa: with and without a remainder of upådi (Skt. 
upadhi; the terms used are sa-upådisesa and anupådisesa);183 the former 
applies to Nirvåˆa in this life, the latter to Nirvåˆa after death. We saw 
that the distinction between Nirvåˆa without a remainder of upådi on the 
one hand, and enlightenment on the other, is more common in the canon. 
Introducing a ‘Nirvåˆa with a remainder of upådi’ was consequently a 
rather obvious thing to do. We do not, however, have to know the exact 
significance of upådi184 in order to discover that the idea of a Nirvåˆa 
with a remainder of upådi does not agree with the use of the word 
elsewhere in the canon. An oft-recurring formula describes the two fruits 
of which certain advanced disciples will obtain either the one or the 
other: “perfect knowledge in this life, or – in case there is a remainder of 
upådi – the state of being a non-returner” (di††he va dhamme aññå, sati vå 
upådisese anågåmitå).185 Some other passages186 use both the terms 
anupådisesa and sa-upådisesa with reference to living monks. In Sn 354 
                                                
181. E.g. DN I.204, II.140; SN V. 260-62; AN IV. 310-11; Ud 63-64; Th 1045; MPS 
p. 192; T. 5, p. 169a23; T. 6, p. 185b15; T. 7, p. 199b16-19; MÓc p. 515b19. 
182. E.g. DN III.55, 97; MN I.235; AN I. 204-05; II.167; Sn 359; SÓc p. 57c8. 
183. Note that the Chinese translations, where they translate these terms at all, often 
skip the word upådi in it: sa-upådisesa corresponds to , anupådisesa 
to . See e.g. DÓc p. 16a13; MÓc p. 584b17, 20, 23; p. 752c2; EÓc p. 753c25. 
184. For opinions, see Welbon, 1968: 208-20; Bhattacharya, 1968. 
185. DN II. 314-15; MN I.62, 63, 481; SN V.129, 181, 285, 314; AN III. 81-82, 143; It 
39, 40, 41; Sn 140, 148; cf. MÓc p. 584b16-24, p. 752c1-2. 
186. AN IV. 75-78; 379-81. 
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(= Th 1274) the Buddha is questioned about the fate of Nigrodhakappa 
who died: “Has he reached Nirvåˆa or is he with a remainder of upådi ?” 
(see above). We must conclude that the distinction between Nirvåˆa with 
and without a remainder of upådi, in spite of its later currency (see La 
Vallée Poussin, 1925: 171-77, 179-80), was initially no more than an 
attempt to find a middle course between the original idea of Nirvåˆa in 
this life and the later tendency to place Nirvåˆa after death. 
Another solution of the problem of the two Nirvåˆas also came to be 
adopted. The highest stage of meditation – here nirodhasamåpatti, or 
saµjñåvedayitanirodha – is said to be similar to Nirvåˆa, or touching it. 
(See La Vallée Poussin, 1937b: 213 f.; Schmithausen, 1981: 241, 219 
n.67.) This opened the possibility for a Nirvåˆa which is really situated 
after death but can be anticipated in life. 
 
8.4. The early Buddhists believed in liberation in this life. They must 
therefore have often been asked which is the insight by which one is 
liberated. For the main stream of meditation could only acknowledge 
liberation in life after one had acquired insight into the nature of the soul 
(above, ch. V). The Buddhists could not answer by saying that the soul is 
essentially not involved in action, as their opponents did. A firm tradition 
maintained that the Buddha did not want to talk about the soul, or even 
denied its existence.187 Instead they adopted what they considered most 
essential to the Buddhist doctrine as liberating insight. We shall see that 
(l) this liberating insight varied along with what was considered most 
central to the teaching of the Buddha (§ 8.4.1); (2) insight and practice 
vied with each other, just as they did in main stream meditation (§ 8.4.2); 
(3) the Buddhist texts leave scope for the possibility that originally the 
liberating insight was not described in any explicit form – they even 
support this to some extent (§ 8.4.3). These three points go a long way to 
show that the explicit descriptions of the content of liberating insight are 
not original to Buddhism, and were added under the influence of main 
                                                
187. It is possible that original Buddhism did not deny the existence of the soul 
(Frauwallner, 1953: 217-53; Schmithausen, 1969: 160-61; Bhattacharya, 1973; 
Pérez-Remón, 1980; Vetter, 1983). One reason why it did not want to talk about it 
may well be that conceptions of the soul were too closely connected with the 
methods of liberation described in Part II, above. 
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stream meditation. 
 
8.4.1. In order to show that liberating insight in Buddhism varied along 
with what was considered central to the teaching of the Buddha, it is 
enough to recall some articles by Lamotte (1977, 1980) and esp. 
Schmithausen (1981). I quote Schmithausen (1981: 211-12): 
The principle that Enlightenment and, analogously, Liberating 
Insight188 are essentially characterized (and perhaps rendered 
effective) by the fact that ... their content must consist of, or at 
any rate contain, the most fundamental truth, can be observed to 
have been valid also in later periods, for we find that such 
concepts also were taken to be constitutive or essential to both as 
are expressive of what was, later on, regarded to be the most 
fundamental truth. E.g., in some obviously more or less later 
descriptions of Enlightenment or Liberating Insight, the 
Comprehension of the four Noble Truths is supplemented189 or 
even supplanted190 by the Comprehension of Origination-in-
Dependence ( prat¥tyasamutpåda) – in its two forms of anuloma 
and pratiloma corresponding to samudaya- and nirodhasatya, 
respectively191 –, a fact which is easily understood if we bear in 
mind that, as an expression of the most fundamental 
soteriologically relevant truth, prat¥tyasamutpåda seems to have 
gradually superseded the four Noble Truths. In most of the 
H¥nayåna schools, however, it was in its turn later superseded by 
the doctrine of the non-existence of a substantial self or person 
([ pudgala-]nairåtmya). Accordingly, it is not surprising to find 
this new fundamental truth, too, becoming the major content of 
Liberating Insight, which, e.g., according to one of three 
                                                
188. Schmithausen uses “the term ‘Enlightenment’ with exclusive reference to the 
(historical) Buddha, and the term ‘Liberating Insight’ either with special reference 
to his Disciples (ßråvaka), or in a comprehensive sense including both Enlighten-
ment and the Liberating Insight of the Disciples” (1981: 199). 
189. Schmithausen refers in a footnote to Waldschmidt, 1967: 410f. 
190. Schmithausen refers to Nobel, 1955: 8 (translated p. 57-59) and texts like SN 
12.65. 
191. Schmithausen refers again to SN 12.65. 
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alternative explanations found in the Íåriputråbhidharma,192 
consists in a realization of all the four Noble Truths under the 
aspect if ‘Lack of Self’. 
Schmithausen (1981: 219 f.) further points at other forms which 
liberating insight has in the Buddhist canon:193 “that the five Skandhas 
are impermanent, disagreeable, and neither the Self nor belonging to 
oneself”;194 “the contemplation of the arising and disappearance 
(udayabbaya) of the five Skandhas”;195 “the realization of the Skandhas 
as empty (rittaka), vain (tucchaka) and without any pith or substance 
(asåraka)”.196 
 
8.4.2. The competing roles of insight and practice already in canonical 
Buddhism have been pointed out by La Vallée Poussin in his article 
“Mus¥la et Nårada” (1937b; cf. Schmithausen, 1981: 214 f.; Griffiths, 
1981). Mus¥la (in SN II. 115 f.) represents those who know and thereby 
reach the goal. Nårada is one of those who strive to reach the goal 
through direct experience. The canon also shows that attempts were 
made to remove the opposition between these two groups, e.g., in AN 
III.355 f. La Vallée Poussin further shows that all three schools – of 
knowledge, of direct experience, and of their combination – survive in 
later times. These are the same schools which we met in main stream 
meditation. La Vallée Poussin rightly identifies the group represented by 
Mus¥la with såµkhya, the group of Nårada with yoga, as defined in the 
Bhagavad G¥tå. We must look upon this parallelism as due to influence 
                                                
192. At T. 1548, p. 595a3ff. Schmithausen further draws attention to Pa†is II.105: 
katih’åkårehi cattåri saccåni ekapa†ivedhåni ? catËh’åkårehi ... : tatha††hena, 
anatta††hena, ... ; Pa†is-a 594: anatta††henå’ti: catunnaµ saccånaµ attavirahitattå ... 
and explains that “in the latter passage, sacca has, of course, to be understood in a 
collective sense as denoting the totality of those dharmas the nature of which is 
Suffering, etc.” 
193. For later views see Schmithausen, 1981: 240f. 
194. This is mentioned at Vin I. 13-14; MN I. 138-39; III. 19-20; 278-80; SN II. 124-
25; III. 21-24; 195-98; 223; etc.; cf. further MN I. 500; III. 286-87; SN II. 244-52; 
etc. All these places have a formula in common which – as Schmithausen (1981: 
219-20, n. 69) has rightly argued – contains traces to show that originally it 
belonged in another context, in the stereotyped detailed description of the Path of 
Liberation, as Schmithausen calls it. 
195. AN II. 45. 
196. SN III. 140-42. 
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from main stream meditation on Buddhism. The explanations of the idea 
that liberation is obtained merely through insight given by La Vallée 
Poussin – that insight without meditation makes liberation accessible to 
more than just a few (1937b: 206) – and by Schmithausen – that there was 
an awareness of the difference of situation between the Buddha’s 
Enlightenment and the Disciple’s Liberating Insight, and that 
psychological plausibility was sought (1981: 222) – may add to our 
understanding, but only after we know that ideas of this type were 
already exerting an influence from the side of main stream meditation. 
Those who emphasized practice did so usually in connection with 
the Cessation of [all] Ideations and Feelings (saµjñåvedayitanirodha / 
saññåvedayitanirodha). What is particularly interesting is that in certain 
schools this state came to be looked upon as similar to Nirvåˆa, an 
anticipation in this life of Nirvåˆa; Nirvåˆa itself, and therefore 
liberation, was postponed until after death, just as was the case in main 
stream asceticism. See § 8.3, above. 
 
8.4.3. In the stereotyped detailed description of the path of liberation 
which often recurs in the Buddhist canon (see Schmithausen, 1981: 203 
f.) liberating insight takes place in the Fourth Dhyåna. It is described thus 
(e.g. MN I.23; cf. DN I. 83-84, 209; MN I. 183-84, 348; AN I. 165; II. 
211; etc.):197 
Then, when my mind was thus concentrated, pure, cleansed, free 
from blemish, without stain, supple, ready, firm, immovable, I 
directed my mind to the knowledge of the destruction of the 
intoxicants. Then I recognized in accordance with reality ‘this is 
suffering’, I recognized in accordance with reality ‘this is the 
                                                
197. so evaµ samåhite citte parisuddhe pariyodåte ana∫gaˆe vigatËpakkilese 
mudubhËte kammaniye †hite ånejjappatte åsavånaµ khayañåˆåya cittaµ 
abhininnåmesiµ / so idaµ dukkhan ti yathåbhËtaµ abbhaññåsiµ ayaµ 
dukkhasamudayo ti yathåbhËtaµ abbhaññåsiµ, ayaµ dukkhanirodho ti  
yathåbhËtaµ abbhaññåsiµ, ayaµ dukkhanirodhagåmin¥ pa†ipadå ti yåthabhËtaµ 
abbhaññåsiµ / ime åsavå ti yathåbhËtaµ abbhaññåsiµ, ayaµ åsavasamudayo ti 
yathåbhËtaµ abbhaññåsiµ, ayaµ åsavanirodho ti yathåbhËtaµ abbhaññåsiµ, ayaµ 
åsavanirodhagåmin¥ pa†ipadå ti yathåbhËtaµ abbhaññåsiµ / tassa me evaµ jånato 
evaµ passato kåmåsavå pi cittaµ vimuccittha, bhavåsavå pi cittaµ vimuccittha, 
avijjåsavå pi cittaµ vimuccittha / vimuttasmiµ vimuttam iti ñåˆaµ ahosi / kh¥ˆå 
jåti, vusitaµ brahmacariyaµ, kataµ karaˆ¥yaµ, nåparaµ itthattåyå ’ti abbhaññåsiµ 
/ 
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origin of suffering’, I recognized in accordance with reality ‘this 
is the cessation of suffering’, I recognized in accordance with 
reality ‘this is the path leading to the cessation of suffering’. I 
recognized in accordance with reality ‘these are the intoxicants 
(åsava)’, I recognized in accordance with reality ‘this is the origin 
of the intoxicants’, I recognized in accordance with reality ‘this is 
the cessation of the intoxicants’, I recognized in accordance with 
reality ‘this is the path leading to the cessation of the intoxicants’. 
Then, when I knew and saw this, my mind was liberated from the 
intoxicant of desire, and from the intoxicant of existence, and 
from the intoxicant of ignorance. In [the mind thus] liberated the 
knowledge arose that it was liberated. I recognized: ‘Birth is 
destroyed, the religious life has been lived, what had to be done 
has been done, there is no more of this state [of existence].’ 
In many passages this insight is preceded by two other insights, but those 
must be later additions (see below, § 9.2.7). Consequently we can 
concentrate on the present passage. 
There can be no doubt that this passage does not represent the original 
account of enlightenment (so also Schmithausen, 1981: 205). The 
recognition of the intoxicants, their origin, cessation, and the path 
leading to their cessation is obviously modelled on the pattern of the 
recognition of suffering, its origin, cessation, and the path leading there. 
It is tempting to follow Bareau (1963:87) in thinking that the recognition 
of the intoxicants, their origin, etc., was added later to the text.198 This 
would also solve problems relating to the origin of the intoxicants 
(Schmithausen, 1981: 205-06). Yet we may share Schmithausen’s (1981: 
206) misgivings about dropping this part, for åsava “seems to be a key 
term of the whole passage”. 
The truth seems to be that the part on the recognition of the 
intoxicants, their origin, etc., is a bridge linking the recognition of the 
Four Noble Truths (suffering, its origin, etc.) with the destruction of the 
intoxicants. This bridge was necessary because destruction of the 
intoxicants is mentioned just before and after the Four Noble Truths. 
                                                
198 Some versions are without it; see Schmithausen, 1981: 205 n. 21. 
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This bridge – regardless of the question whether it was added by the 
composer of this passage or later – therefore emphasizes the fact that the 
Four Noble Truths just do not fit here. They do not fit because the 
connection between their knowledge and the destruction of the 
intoxicants is not clear. 
But the Four Noble Truths do not fit in this context for another far 
more serious reason. Recognition of the Four Noble Truths culminates in 
knowledge of the path leading to the cessation of suffering. This is useful 
knowledge for someone who is about to enter upon this path, but it is 
long overdue for someone at the end of the road. Knowledge of the path 
must and does precede a person commencing upon it. This also applies to 
the Buddha himself. In the passage which we studied above (§ 1.5, MN I. 
246-47) we were told that the Bodhisattva remembered how once in his 
youth, he reached the First Dhyåna and wondered if this could be the 
road towards enlightenment. The text then continues: “following this 
memory I had this knowledge: ‘This is really the road towards 
enlightenment’.” In other words, also the Bodhisattva knew the path he 
was to traverse, and knowledge of the Four Noble Truths could not 
thereafter bring him anything new. 
We observed that knowledge of the Four Noble Truths must come at 
the beginning of the path leading to ‘the cessation of suffering’. We find 
this confirmed in many places in the Buddhist canon. The first sermon 
which the Buddha is supposed to have preached deals with them in many 
of its versions (Bareau, 1963: 172 f.; Feer, 1870; Waldschmidt, 1951: 
96 f. (176 f.)). Here his listeners are obviously completely uninitiated in 
the Buddhist doctrine. Elsewhere the Four Noble Truths are often 
presented as the preaching of the Buddha in a nutshell, as in the 
following passage (SN V.438; similarly DN I.189; MN I.431; SN II.223; 
DÓc p.111a21-22; MÓc p.805c2-3):199  
What then, monks, have I taught ? ‘This is suffering’; thus, 
monks, have I taught. ‘This is the origin of suffering’; thus have I 
taught. ‘This is the cessation of suffering’; thus have I taught. 
                                                
199 kiñ ca, bhikkhave, mayå akkhåtaµ ? ‘idaµ dukkhaµ’ ti, bhikkhave, mayå 
akkhåtaµ, ‘ayam dukkhasamudayo’ ti mayå akkhåtaµ, ‘ayaµ dukkhanirodho’ ti 
mayå akkhåtaµ, ‘ayaµ dukkhanirodhagåmin¥ pa†ipadå’ ti mayå akkhåtaµ / 
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‘This is the path leading to the cessation of suffering’; thus have I 
taught. 
Here too they constitute what an aspirant must know before he can 
actually go the path and become liberated. 
The Four Noble Truths are specified at a number of places.200 The 
specification shows what we knew already, viz., that the Four Noble 
Truths must be known before one can properly start out upon the path; 
the reason is that the Four Noble Truths specified contain a description of 
the path to be traversed. I translate the Påli version:201  
– This moreover, monks, is indeed the Noble Truth of suffering. Birth is 
suffering, union with what is not dear is suffering, separation from 
what is dear is suffering, that one does not get what one desires is 
suffering. In short, the five aggregates of grasping are suffering. 
– This moreover, monks, is indeed the Noble Truth of the origin of 
suffering. It is the thirst which leads to renewed existence, is 
accompanied by enjoyment and passion, finding its delight here and 
there, viz., thirst for sensual pleasure, thirst for existence, thirst for 
non-existence. 
- This moreover, monks, is indeed the Noble Truth of the cessation of 
suffering. It is the complete detachment from and cessation of that 
same thirst, its rejection, renunciation, the liberation from it, the 
absence of attachment to it. 
– This moreover, monks, is indeed the Noble Truth of the path leading to 
                                                
200 Vin I. 10; SN V. 421-22; Mv III. 332; CPS p. 158-62; T. 1421, p. 104b29-c7; T. 
1428, p. 788a16-29; cf. DN II. 305-14; MN I. 185-91; SN V. 425, 426; AN I. 176-
77; MÓc p. 435c26-436a6, p. 464b27f.; T. 109, p. 503b21-c2. 
201 idaµ kho pana, bhikkhave, dukkhaµ ariyasaccaµ / jåti pi dukkhå, jarå pi dukkhå, 
vyådhi pi dukkhå, maraˆaµ pi dukkhaµ, appiyehi sampayogo dukkho, piyehi 
vippayogo dukkho, yaµ p’icchaµ na labhati tam pi dukkhaµ / saµkhittena, 
pañc’upådånakkhandhåpi dukkhå / idaµ kho pana, bhikkhave, dukkhasamudayaµ 
ariyasaccaµ / yå’yaµ taˆhå ponobbhavikå nandirågasahagatå tatratatråbhinandin¥, 
seyyath¥’dam: kåmataˆhå, bhavataˆhå, vibhavataˆhå / idaµ kho pana,bhikkhave, 
dukkhanirodhaµ ariyasaccaµ / yo tasså yeva taˆhåya asesaviråga nirodho, cågo, 
pa†inissaggo, mutti, anålayo / idaµ kho pana, bhikkhave, dukkhanirodhagåmin¥ 
pa†ipadå ariyasaccaµ / ayam eva ariyo a††ha∫giko maggo, seyyath¥’dam: 
sammådi††hi, sammåsa∫kappo, sammåvåcå, sammåkammanto, sammååj¥vo, 
sammåvåyåmo, sammåsati, sammåsamådhi / 
On the irregular gender of -nirodhaµ and -samudayaµ, see von Hinüber, 1976: 39 n. 
28. 
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the cessation of suffering. It is the Noble Eightfold Road, viz., right 
view, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right 
exertion, right mindfulness, right concentration. 
A number of versions of the account of the Buddha’s first sermon202 
give evidence that the Buddhists themselves did not feel comfortable 
about recognizing the Four Noble Truths as liberating insight. They put 
into the mouth of the Buddha some remarks with respect to each of these, 
to the extent that the Noble Truth of suffering had to be fully known by 
him, then that it was actually fully known by him; the Noble Truth of the 
origin of suffering had to be abandoned, then was indeed abandoned; the 
Noble Truth of the cessation of suffering had to be seen with his own 
eyes, then it had indeed been seen with his own eyes; the Noble Truth of 
the path leading to the cessation of suffering had to be practised, then it 
had actually been practised by him. It is likely that these remarks are 
later additions to the text.203 But it can be seen that they change the 
picture of the Buddha at his moment of enlightenment considerably. No 
longer does he simply know suffering, its origin, its cessation, and the 
path leading thereto. He now knows suffering, has abandoned the origin 
of suffering, has seen with his own eyes the cessation of suffering, and 
has completed practising the path leading to the cessation of suffering. 
The ill-fitting ‘liberating insight’ has in this was become something quite 
different from just an insight. The fact that the texts add that all this was 
clearly realized by the Buddha does not alter this at all. 
The different versions of the first sermon in Benares show another 
peculiarity, to which Bareau (1963: 178-81) has drawn attention. The 
versions which belong to Vinaya texts (Vin I. 10-11; Mv III.331f.; 
T.1421, p. 104b28-c17; T.1428, p. 788a14-b23) and the versions which 
have apparently been adjusted to or influenced by the Vinaya versions 
(SN V.421-23; CPS p. 142 f.; SÓc P 103c14f.; T.109; T.110) contain the 
part dealing with the Four Noble Truths; the versions which belong to 
SËtra texts (MN I. 171-73; MÓc p 778a; EÓc p 593b24f.) do not. This 
seems to indicate that initially those Four Noble Truths were not part of 
                                                
202 Vin I. 11; SN V. 422; CPS p. 146-48; T. 1421 p. 104c7-17; T. 1428 p. 788a16-b14; 
cf. SN V. 424-25, 436; Mv III. 332-33. 
203 Feer, 1870: 429-35; Schmithausen, 1981: 203. 
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the sermon in Benares, and consequently probably not as central to 
Buddhism as they came to be. We may surmise that the concise 
formulation of the teaching of the Buddha in the shape of the Four Noble 
Truths had not yet come into being, not necessarily that the contents of 
this teaching deviated from what they were meant to express.204 If then 
the Four Noble Truths did not yet exist when the primitive version of 
what came to be known as the Dharmacakrapravartana SËtra was 
composed, we can be sure that in that time they were not considered as 
constituting the insight which immediately preceded and brought about 
liberation. Let us be clear about it that we are not sure that the Four 
Noble Truths had not yet been formulated in earliest Buddhism. But the 
indications in that direction which we possess go a long way toward 
undermining the idea that these Four Noble Truths constituted liberating 
insight in earliest Buddhism. 
If then, in all probability, neither the Four Noble Truths nor any of 
the other, later, specifications of liberating insight which we find in the 
Buddhist scriptures played this role in earliest Buddhism, how could they 
come to fill this place? One answer we know already: it is likely that the 
Buddhists were often asked what their liberating insight was like because 
they believed in liberation in this life. It may be, however, that another 
factor aided this development. The Buddhist texts often speak about 
‘insight’ ( prajñå / paññå) as something immediately preceding 
liberation205 or characterize the teaching of the Buddha as especially 
concerning ß¥la (‘morality’), samådhi (‘concentration’) and prajñå 
(‘insight’), to which sometimes vimukti (‘liberation’) is added.206 This 
may have made it plausible to the Buddhists themselves that the 
Buddhist doctrine knew some ‘liberating insight’ as well which had to be 
specified. The choice fell on the Four Noble Truths and on the other 
contents which we have seen were subsequently given to this insight. 
                                                
204 Note that Dhammapada 191 expresses the same truth in different words: dukkhaµ 
dukkhasamuppådaµ, sukkhassa ca atikkamaµ / ariyaµ c’a††ha∫gikaµ maggaµ, 
dukkhËpasamagåminaµ //. Cf. Feer, 1870: 418f. 
205 See Schmithausen, 1981: 216, and note 33 below. 
206 E.g. DN I. 206, II. 81, 91; AN II. 1-2, III. 15-16, IV. 105-06; It 51; Th 634; MPS p. 
160, 228; DÓc p. 12a20f., p. 13a3-4; MÓc p. 486c23f.; T. 6 p. 178b5-6; T. 1421 p. 
135b7. 
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What I propose can be expressed more specifically. Perhaps the 
passages which now contain a description of ‘liberating insight’ as 
consisting in the Four Noble Truths etc., originally merely made a short 
reference to prajñå. Later tradition inserted the Four Noble Truths etc. in 
the place of prajñå wherever possible. Such a replacement was not 
however possible in the contexts where liberation comes about while 
there is Cessation of Ideations and Feelings (saµjñå- / saññåvedayita-
nirodha).207 There is properly speaking no place for such an insight here 
because there are no ideations (see Schmithausen, 1981: 216-17; La 
Vallée Poussin, 1937 b: 220). The replacement was not made and the 
older short reference to prajñå – which originally belonged after the 
description of the Four Dhyånas – survived only here. 
This proposal, though hypothetical, explains the facts which 
confront us in the extant canon. However, it raises another question. If 
prajñå was originally not intended to refer to the Four Noble Truths etc., 
what then was it ? And whatever it was, does not this term clearly point 
to some kind of liberating insight ? 
The answer to these questions must be that prajñå referred to some 
unspecified and unspecifiable kind of insight. The reason to think so is as 
follows. If my reconstructions up to now are correct, prajñå became 
necessary at the stage where the aspirant had reached the Fourth Dhyåna. 
It is not in accordance with the line of approach adopted in this book to 
try and specify what kind of psychic state this fourth Dhyåna – or any of 
the other Dhyånas – is. It will be agreed, to use very general terms, that it 
must be a state of consciousness different from what we call normal. 
After reaching the fourth Dhyåna the next step consists in the 
‘destruction of the intoxicants (åsava/åsrava)’. I have little doubt that 
this phrase ‘destruction of the intoxicants’ sounded almost as mysterious 
to the early listeners to the Buddha’s words as it sounds to us, the reason 
being that it apparently refers to an inner-psychic process, the conditions 
for which are not fulfilled until the fourth Dhyåna has been reached. This 
means that the aspirant had to find his way to the most crucial and 
                                                
207 Since Cessation of Ideations and Feelings appears to be a borrowed element in 
Buddhism (ch. VII, above), its mention in descriptions of liberation must be looked 
upon as a later adjustment of an earlier text. This explains the puzzling mention of 
insight (prajñå) in a state without ideations. 
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decisive steps of the process which he was undergoing while in a state of 
changed consciousness! One does not need to refer to psychiatric 
literature in order to know that many altered states of consciousness 
rather have the tendency to make a person lose his way. All this makes it 
plausible that the aspirant who had reached the fourth Dhyåna could do 
with, or rather could not do without, an insight into his psychic state and 
its possibilities. This, I propose, is prajñå.208 
If this proposal is correct, it is not without consequences for the way 
the Buddha must have taught his advanced disciples. General statements 
– such as the Four Noble Truths etc. – would not be of help to them, but 
rather personal advice, adjusted to the needs of each person. It is 
therefore in direct support of the above proposal that the two main SËtras 
which record the ‘first sermon’ of the Buddha without mentioning the 
Four Noble Truths, continue in a way which leaves no doubt regarding 
the personal nature of the Buddha’s instruction (MN I. 173; similarly 
MÓc 778a3-5; cf. Bareau, 1963: 183f.):209 
I could indeed, monks, convince the monks belonging to the group 
of five. Monks, I instructed two monks, [while] three monks went 
for alms. What the three monks who had gone for alms brought 
with them, we six lived on that. Monks, I instructed three monks, 
[while] two monks went for alms. What the two monks who had 
gone for alms brought with them, we six lived on that.210 
I do not claim that this passage embodies a memory of an historical 
event. It does, however, appear to preserve the idea of how the early 
                                                
208 This seems confirmed by, or at any rate in agreement with, phrases like åsavånaµ 
khayo paññåya sacchikaraˆ¥yo (DN III. 230; AN II. 183; cf. DÓc p. 51a12); 
paññåya ca me / c’assa disvå åsavå parikkhayaµ agamaµsu / parikh¥ˆå honti (e.g. 
MN I. 160, 175; AN IV. 448, 453; cf. MÓc p. 582a29; p. 701b12; see 
Schmithausen, 1981: 216 n.55); paññåparibhåvitaµ cittaµ sammad eva åsavehi 
vimuccati (e.g. DN II. 81, 91; cf. MPS p.160, 228; DÓc p. 12a21-23). 
209 asakkhiµ kho ahaµ bhikkhave pañcavaggiye bhikkhË saññåpetuµ / dve pi sudaµ 
bhikkhave bhikkhË ovadåmi, tayo bhikkhË piˆ∂åya caranti / yaµ tayo bhikkhË 
piˆ∂åya caritvå åharanti tena chabbaggo yåpema / tayo pi sudaµ bhikkhave 
bhikkhË ovadåmi, dve bhikkhË piˆ∂åya caranti / yaµ dve bhikkhË piˆ∂åya caritvå 
åharanti tena chabbaggo yåpema / 
210 Note that according to the Nidånakathå (p. 82) four of the five monks are each 
instructed individually, while the remaining four go for alms. See Waldschmidt, 
1951: 96 (176). 
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monks conceived what the Buddha’s instruction had been like. 
It is no doubt significant that the versions of the ‘first sermon’ which 
do mention the Four Noble Truths – the ones which occur in Vinaya texts 
or are influenced by them – do not contain the above episode (CPS  
p.142 f.; T. 1421, p. 104b-105a; SN V. 421-24) or preserve part of it in a 
context which completely changes the meaning of it (Vin. I.13; T. 1428, 
p. 789a). The five monks, moreover, become enlightened while the 
Buddha is still preaching. This shows that the accounts which include the 
Four Noble Truths had a completely different conception of the process 
of liberation than the one which includes the Four Dhyånas and the 
subsequent destruction of the intoxicants. This too supports our thesis 
that the Four Noble Truths were inserted later in the description of 
liberation by way of the Four Dhyånas and the destruction of the 
intoxicants. This modified description represents a hybrid of two views 
of the matter: according to one view an insight into the Four Noble 
Truths is sufficient for enlightenment; according to the other view 
liberation is rather attained by way of the Four Dhyånas and the 
destruction of the intoxicants. We cannot but be struck, once again, by 
the parallelism with main stream meditation, where we also find insight 
alone, practice alone, and the combination of both insight and practice as 
different ways to reach the goal. It is reasonable therefore to suspect 
influence from that side. 
 
We can sum up the results of this section by stating that there is 
good reason to think that the Four Noble Truths did not constitute 
liberating insight in the earliest period of Buddhism. However, they were 
apparently considered to do so before any of the other ‘liberating 
insights’ which we find specified in the canon took their place. We must 
conclude that if the earliest Buddhist tradition acknowledged the 
existence of any liberating insight at all – and it possibly did – this insight 
remained unspecified. One of the main reasons why it came to be 
specified must have been that in main stream meditation liberation in life 
was always accompanied by an explicit ‘liberating insight’. 
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IX. The origin of Buddhist meditation. 
 
9.1. We have seen that Buddhist meditation formed a tradition different 
from the meditation and ascetic practices found in Jainism and in many 
Hindu scriptures. There is little reason to doubt that this main stream of 
asceticism existed before the beginnings of Buddhism, i.e. before the 
historical Buddha. It is a far more interesting question, however, whether 
Buddhist meditation existed before the Buddha. This will be investigated 
in the present chapter. 
 
9.2. Nothing like Buddhist meditation is, understandably, referred to in 
early Jaina literature. Vedic literature is for the most part silent about any 
form of meditation. Not until the oldest Upani∑ads do we find any 
references to it. The earliest sentence211 that is of interest to us is 
B®hadåraˆyaka Upani∑ad (BÓU) 4.4.23: tasmåd evaµvic chånto dånta 
uparatas titik∑u˙ samåhito212 bhËtvåtmany evåtmåˆaµ˛ paßyati 
“Therefore, knowing this, having become calm, subdued, quiet, patiently 
enduring, concentrated, one sees the soul in oneself.” 
It is most probable that this sentence refers to main stream 
meditation. However, its brevity and consequent lack of information 
leave this to some extent undecided. In order to invalidate the opinion 
that perhaps this sentence refers to an earlier form of meditation of the 
Buddhistic type, I shall try to show that this sentence is later than the 
beginnings of Buddhism, i.e., later than the Buddha. I shall present a 
number of arguments, of varying force, in support of this.213 
 
                                                
211. Chåndogya Upani∑ad 8.15 has ... åtmani sarvendriyåˆi saµprati∑†håpy[a] ... 
“having concentrated his senses upon the soul”. This, if it refers to meditation at all, 
then clearly to that of the main stream. Taittir¥ya Upani∑ad 2.4 identifies a number 
of abstract things with the parts of a person. Here the phrase occurs: yoga åtmå. 
This is most naturally translated: “exertion is the body”. There is no reason 
whatever, contextual or otherwise, to think that yoga here refers to anything like 
meditation. The word yoga is not attested in that sense until rather late; even the 
entry yuja samådhau in Påˆini’s Dhåtupå†ha (IV.68) was added after Patañjali 
(Bronkhorst, 1983: § 1). 
212. Thus the Kåˆva version. The Mådhyandina version has ßraddhåvitta˙˝. 
213. I am of course looking forward to the definitive study announced by M.Witzel 
(e.g. StII 13/14, 1987, p.407 n.96). 
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9.2.1. My first argument is based on Horsch, 1966: 391f. I shall briefly 
and in a somewhat modified way restate Horsch’s view. 
SËtra 4.3.105 of Påˆini’s A∑†ådhyåy¥ reads: puråˆaprokte∑u 
bråhmaˆakalpe∑u [tena proktam 101, ˆini˙ 103] “In the case of 
Bråhmaˆa and Kalpa works uttered by ancient [sages], [the taddhita 
suffix] ˆini is [semantically equivalent to]214 tena proktam (‘uttered by 
him’).” Kåtyåyana restricts the scope of this sËtra in his first and only 
vårttika on it (vol.II, p.326, l.12-13): puråˆaprokte∑u bråhmaˆakalpe∑u 
yåjñavalkyaØdibhya˙ prati∑edhas tulyakålatvåt “A prohibition [of P. 
4.3.105:] puråˆaprokte∑u bråhmaˆakalpe∑u [must be stated] after 
yåjñavalkya etc., because [they are] of the same time.” Patañjali explains 
(1.14-16): puråˆaprokte∑u bråhmaˆakalpe∑v ity atra yåjñavalkyådibhya˙ 
prati∑edho vaktavya˙ / yåjñavalkåni bråhmaˆåni / saulabhån¥ti / kiµ 
kåraˆam / tulyakålatvåt / etåny api tulyakålån¥ti //. We learn from this 
that, according to Patañjali, the Bråhmaˆa works uttered by Yåjñavalkya, 
rather than Yåjñavalkya himself, are meant to be considered ‘of the same 
time’ in this vårttika. 
The sense requires, in spite of Kaiya†a, that the Bråhmaˆa works 
uttered by Yåjñavalkya are of the same time as Påˆini. We do not have to 
take such a remark by Kåtyåyana very literally. It is doubtful whether 
Kåtyåyana was well informed about Påˆini’s time, for tradition had not 
even been able to preserve knowledge regarding certain essential features 
of the A∑†ådhyåy¥ (see Kiparsky, 1980; Bronkhorst, 1980). We must 
rather understand from this vårttika that Kåtyåyana was still aware of the 
recent origin of the ‘Bråhmaˆa works uttered by Yåjñavalkya’. 
But Kåtyåyana must also have been aware that these Bråhmaˆa 
works were ascribed to an ancient sage, for otherwise this vårttika would 
serve no purpose in the context of P. 4.3.105 which is about ‘Bråhmaˆa 
and Kalpa works uttered by ancient sages’. What Kåtyåyana must have 
had in view was a Bråhmaˆa work recently composed and ascribed to 
Yåjñavalkya, where in reality Yåjñavalkya was an ancient sage who 
could not have composed this work. 
This description fits BÓU 3-4 very well. Since Påˆini does not use 
the term Upani∑ad in connection with Vedic literature, and divides Vedic 
                                                
214. I translate as proposed by Wezler (1975: 5 etc.) 
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literature in mantra, bråhmaˆa and kalpa (cf. Thieme, 1935: 67f.), his use 
of the word bråhmaˆa is wide and fit to cover the BÓU. This is all the 
more true since the BÓU is, indeed, the last part of the Íatapatha 
Bråhmaˆa (ÍB 14.4-9). Moreover, the subsections of the BÓU are called 
bråhmaˆa in their colophons. The reason that BÓU 3-4 must be meant by 
Kåtyåyana, rather than any other text, is that only here Yåjñavalkya is 
clearly the dominating person. Yåjñavalkya is mentioned elsewhere, 
primarily in ÍB 1-4 and 11-13, further Jaimin¥ya Bråhmaˆa 1.19, 23; 
2.76; Íå∫khåyana Óraˆyaka 9.7 and 13.1, but nowhere as the sole 
dominating figure. Moreover, the BÓU is one of the youngest parts of 
the ÍB. 
Horsch (1966: 396) further shows that the compilatory nature of the 
ÍB was still known to Patañjali215 and the Mahåbhårata.216 This further 
corroborates that BÓU 3-4 is late. 
The facts (i) that Påˆini does not make an exception for the 
yåjñavalkåni bråhmaˆåni, (ii) that Kåtyåyana indicates that he considers 
these recent, and (iii) that Patañjali still knows the compilatory nature of 
the ÍB, allow of the conclusion that BÓU 3-4 is later than Påˆini and but 
little earlier than Kåtyåyana. Patañjali lived probably in the middle of the 
second century B.C. (Cardona, 1976: 263-66). If we assume that 
Kåtyåyana wrote a century earlier, BÓU 3-4 very well fits in the time 
after the death of the Buddha, even if we accept this to have taken place 
as late as 370 B.C. (Bechert, 1982).217 
                                                
215. Patañjali – in a verse on P. 4.2.60 – appears to have known a work named 
S˛a∑†ipatha, which may have contained sixty of the present one hundred Adhyåyas 
of the ÍB. Weber (1850b: 185n.) assumed that these are the sixty Adhyåyas of the 
first nine books of the ÍB. But Minard (1968) argues for the sixty Adhyåyas 
contained in books I-V (35) and XI-XIII (25) of the Mådhyandina recension. 
216. Mahåbhårata 12.306.16 (where Yåjñavalkya speaks) reads: 
tata˙ ßatapathaµ k®tsnaµ sarahasyaµ sasaµgraham / 
cakre sapariße∑aµ ca har∑eˆa parameˆa ha // 
Here Yåjñavalkya is said to have composed the whole of the ÍB. In BÓU 6.5.3 
(ådityån¥måni ßuklåni yajËµ∑i våjasaneyena yåjñavalkyenåkhyåyante), 
Yåjñavalkya is said to have declared the sacrificial formulas of the Våjasaneyi 
school. Patañjali’s yåjñavalkåni bråhmaˆåni may therefore cover all the later 
portions of the ÍB, not just, but certainly including, BÓU 3-4. See Weber, 1850a: 
57n.; Goldstücker, 1861: 146f. 
217. The section on Påˆini's acquaintance with the Vedic Saµhitås (§9.2.2.), which 
followed in the first edition of this book, has now been superseded by Bronkhorst, 
1991. 
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9.2.3. Further evidence regarding the late date of the BÓU, and of the 
later chapters of the ÍB as well, can be derived from a closer inspection 
of the figure of Yåjñavalkya. 
Pronouncements of Yåjñavalkya occur repeatedly in ÍB 1-4. There 
is no reason to doubt that he was an authority on ritual, along with other 
ritualists. He appears again in ÍB 11-13, but often in a legendary context: 
a number of times he is depicted as debating with king Janaka of Videha. 
Moreover, since these parts of the ÍB are younger than its beginning 
(Eggeling, 1882: xxixf.; Weber, 1876: 130f.), we may assume that, at 
this time, Yåjñavalkya had become a legendary person.218 This is 
confirmed by the fact that later again (in the BÓU and the Mahåbhårata) 
Yåjñavalkya’s fame had reached such proportions that he is said to have 
declared the sacrificial formulas ( yajus) and composed the ÍB (see note 
6). This development is parallel to the one of Íåkalya, who, really being 
the maker of the Padapå†ha of the Ùgveda, came to be considered the 
person who had ‘seen’ the Veda (see below). 
The parallel development of Yåjñavalkya and Íåkalya is of special 
significance for the chronological problem we are investigating, as 
follows. At ÍB 2.5.1.2 Yåjñavalkya’s opinion is contrasted with that of 
the ®c, and therefore of the Ùgvedins. A way of visualizing this disagree-
ment would be to describe a debate between Yåjñavalkya and Íåkalya. 
And indeed, we find such a debate described twice over, at ÍB 11.6.3 
and BÓU 3.9.1-26. Both times the debate ends in the utter defeat and 
consequent death of Íåkalya.219 The important fact is that the 
disagreement between the followers of Yåjñavalkya and the Ùgvedins 
could not be visualized in this way until after Íåkalya had become the 
most important representative of the Ùgveda, rather than merely the 
representative of one of its versions and the maker of its Padapå†ha. 
What we know about the development of the legend of Íåkalya can 
be summarized as follows : Påˆini’s A∑†ådhyåy¥ and Yåska’s Nirukta 
know him as an early grammarian and as the maker of the Padapå†ha of 
                                                
218. This is more extensively established in Horsch, 1966: 380f. 
219. The Ùgvedins perhaps took revenge by not mentioning Yåjñavalkya in their 
Kau∑¥taki Upani∑ad, in spite of mentioning Uddålaka Óruˆi and Ívetaketu who 
occur in the BÓU (Esnoul, 1968: 280). 
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the Ùgveda. In Patañjali’s Mahåbhå∑ya he has become the redactor of the 
Ùgveda Saµhitå (Bronkhorst, 1981: 142-43, 147), and apparently the 
most important representative of the Ùgveda. In the Anuvåkånukramaˆ¥ 
Íåkalya is even said to have seen the Veda (Bronkhorst, 1982b: §4). The 
legend of the debate between Yåjñavalkya and Íåkalya seems to fit best 
at a time closer to Patañjali than to Påˆini, i.e., closer to 150 B.C. than to 
350 B.C.220 
 
9.2.4. We turn to a question which is directly related to our chronological 
observations. The ÍB, including the BÓU, is one of the late Vedic texts 
which preserve Vedic accents. Both were composed in a time when 
Vedic accents were still in use. Also the language described by Påˆini 
contains Vedic accents as an integral part. If then the origin of Buddhism 
is earlier than (portions of) the BÓU, can it be that the earliest layers of 
Buddhist literature contain indications that Vedic accent was still used ? 
An affirmative answer to this question has been given by Lévi 
(1915, esp. p. 426-47), in a study where he shows, on the basis of Vinaya 
texts of a variety of schools,221 that in an early period the tendency 
existed to use Sanskrit with Vedic accent in the recitation of Buddhist 
texts. Lévi thinks that this accent could not have been transposed 
mechanically from the sacred texts of the Veda onto the sacred texts of 
Buddhism and concludes (1915: 447): “Les premier essais de littérature 
canonique iraient donc rejoindre l’époque des derniers textes accentués 
du canon védique: le Bråhmaˆa, l’Óraˆyaka des Taittir¥ya et le Íatapatha 
Bråhmaˆa.” 
Lévi argues his case on the basis of texts taken from the Vinaya 
work Skandhaka. This allows us – with Frauwallner (1956b: 62-63) – to 
be more precise about the period when Vedic accents were still in use. 
The Skandhaka was composed, according to Frauwallner (1956b: 67), 
shortly before or after the second council, which is at least 40 years after 
                                                
220. This is the date which best seems to fit the evidence studied by Hinüber, 1989:  
34-35. 
221. The most important passages have again been discussed by Brough (1980), who 
gives references to the TaishØ edition for the Chinese passages (p. 37), and refutes 
Norman’s (1971: 329-31; cf. 1980: 61-63) alternative interpretation of a Påli 
passage. Also see Lin Li-kouang, 1949: 216f; Demiéville, 1929; Lamotte, 1958: 
610f.; De Jong, 1982: 215. 
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the demise of the Buddha (Bechert, 1982: 36). Parts of the BÓU may 
therefore be as late as this period. The fact that the bhå∑ika accent used in 
the ÍB is later than the accent system described by Påˆini (Kiparsky, 
1982: 74) agrees well with the above results. 
 
9.2.5. Perhaps conclusions can be drawn from the fact that BÓU 2.1222 
features a K∑atriya named ‘Ajåtaßatru’. Ajåtaßatru is approached by 
D®ptabålåki Gårgya, who proposes to tell about Brahman. Ajåtaßatru 
offers thousand (cows) in response, and compares himself to Janaka, the 
former king of Videha. Apparently also Ajåtaßatru was a king. Our text 
describes him as kåßya, which can be taken to mean that he ruled over 
Kåß¥. 
The name223 Ajåtaßatru occurs nowhere in Vedic literature except 
here in the BÓU and in the parallel version in Kau∑¥taki Upani∑ad 4. It is, 
however, well-known from Buddhist literature. Ajåtaßatru (Påli 
‘Ajåtasattu’) is there described as the son of king Bimbisåra, from whom 
he seized the throne eight years before the death of the Buddha 
(Malalasekera, 1937-38: I: 31-35, s.v. Ajåtasattu). 
A serious difficulty is that the Buddhist texts depict Ajåtaßatru as 
king of Magadha, not Kåß¥. He is not, to be sure, entirely without 
connection with Kåß¥. He is said to have fought battles in Kåß¥ against 
king Prasenajit (Pasenadi) of Kosala and to have come in the possession 
of a village in Kåß¥ (Malalasekera, 1937-38: I: 33). Ajåtaßatru later 
reputedly battled and defeated king Ce†aka of Vaißål¥, who was joined, 
among others, by the gaˆaråjas of Kåß¥ (Lamotte, 1958: 100-01). 
The discussion between Gårgya and Ajåtaßatru in the BÓU (and in 
the Kau∑¥taki Up.) is clearly legendary. This means that if there ever was 
a king Ajåtaßatru of Kåß¥, he must have lived a considerable time before 
this discussion was laid down, long enough, perhaps, to make a 
confusion between Kåß¥ and Magadha possible. If, further, this 
Ajåtaßatru is identical with the king who ruled over Magadha during the 
                                                
222. Almost the same episode, with the same actors (Bålåki for D®ptabålåki), is found 
at Kau∑¥taki Upani∑ad 4 (= Íå∫khåyana Óraˆyaka 6). 
223. The word ajåtaßatru ‘whose enemies are unborn, having no enemies’ occurs in 
several Vedic Saµhitås, but not as a name. 
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last years of the Buddha’s life,224 we can be sure that this part of the 
BÓU was composed a considerable time after the Buddha. 
 
9.2.6. BÓU 2.4 and BÓU 4.5 give two versions of a discussion between 
Yåjñavalkya and one of his wives, Maitrey¥. The former version appears 
to be the older one. Hanefeld (1976: 71-115) has argued that two 
independent texts underlie it, one (BÓU 2.4.5-6, 12 [na pretya] - 14) 
dealing with the åtman, the other (BÓU 2.4.7-12 [vinaßyati]) dealing 
with mahad bhËtam. This latter concept has a universal-cosmic aspect, in 
that mahad bhËtam is said to be the origin of all literary texts (BÓU 
2.4.10). At the same time it has an individual aspect, viz. vijñåna 
‘discerning knowledge’: BÓU 2.4.12 describes the mahad bhËtam as a 
mass of discerning knowledge (vijñånaghana). The ‘Great Being’ 
(mahad bhËtam) apparently unites a universal-cosmic and an individual 
aspect. 
But classical Såµkhya unites these two aspects in its mahån / 
buddhi as well, whereas the Såµkhya texts in the Mahåbhårata do not, or 
hardly, do so (Frauwallner, 1925: 200f. (76f.)). Hanefeld (1976: 114-15) 
raises the question as to whether or not the older Upani∑ads in their 
present form must be dated much later than has generally been supposed. 
 
9.2.7. We come to an important point. Buddhism presupposes a belief in 
transmigration determined by one’s preceding (mental or physical) 
behaviour or state.225 The BÓU, on the other hand, presents such a belief 
as something new. At BÓU 3.2.13 Yåjñavalkya takes Jåratkårava 
Órtabhåga apart to inform him, in secret, about karman. “What they said 
was karma (action). What they praised was karma. Verily, one becomes 
good by good action, bad by bad action.” (tr. Hume, 1931: 110). Similar 
remarks occur at BÓU 4.4.5. A more primitive idea seems to prevail at 
BÓU 6.2.16. Does this not show that the BÓU represents an earlier phase 
in the development of these ideas, and that it is consequently older than 
                                                
224. This point of view was accepted by Hoernle (1907: 106) and, it seems, by Lassen 
(Weber, 1850b: 213). 
225. See Schmithausen (1986: 205), who points out that craving (t®∑ˆå) etc., rather than 
karman, is said to be responsible for suffering and rebirth in numerous canonical 
texts. 
93 
the beginning of Buddhism ? 
Not necessarily. The BÓU originated in surroundings quite different 
from those of early Buddhism. The former was part of an esoteric 
movement confined to Brahmins who dwelt in villages; the latter centred 
in the cities (cf. Horsch, 1966: 400). What is more, Jainism, as much as 
Buddhism, presupposes a belief in transmigration determined by one’s 
preceding behaviour or state (cf. Malvania, 1981).226 But Jainism may 
have existed, in the form preached by Pårßva (Pkt. Påsa), as many as 250 
years before Mahåv¥ra (Schubring, 1935: 24f.), which is certainly earlier 
than the BÓU. Therefore it is not possible to see in the passages on 
transmigration in the BÓU evidence that this Upani∑ad preceded the 
Buddha. Rather, they may have been attempts to sanctify a belief which 
was anyhow irresistibly gaining adherents among the Brahmins. 
There is some reason to think that the early Buddhists were 
confronted with people who did not believe in transmigration of the kind 
described: 
The majority of versions of the long account of the enlightenment of 
the Buddha describe three insights:227 memory of earlier lives; 
knowledge of the births and deaths of beings; knowledge regarding the 
destruction of the intoxicants. Only the third insight has an obvious 
connection with liberation, which consists in the destruction of the 
intoxicants. The first two insights make the impression of having been 
added to the text which underlay these versions, and which was therefore 
without these first two insights. 
And indeed, one version of the long account of the Buddha’s 
liberation survives in which only the knowledge regarding the 
destruction of the intoxicants precedes final liberation: a SËtra of the 
Sarvåstivådins (MÓc p. 589c14-23). A closer study of all these parallel 
versions – undertaken by Bareau (1963: 81f.) – confirms that the long 
                                                
226. Jaini (1980: 225-29) thinks that certain ‘inconsistencies’ of the Jaina doctrine may 
point to an earlier linear-evolutionary scheme similar to that of the Ój¥vikas, and 
asks (p. 227-28): “Is it possible that, for the Jainas, the doctrine of karma represents 
a relatively late (albeit prehistorical) accretion, a set of ideas imposed upon [that 
linear-evolutionary scheme]?” Even if this is indeed the case, we must date this 
‘accretion’ well before Mahåv¥ra. 
227. MN I. 22-23, 117, 247-49; EÓc p. 666b22-c20; T. 1421, p. 102c18-20; T. 1428 p. 
781b5-c11. These passages have been translated and discussed by Bareau (1963: 
75f.), whom I mainly follow. 
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account of the Buddha’s liberation originally made no mention of his 
earlier lives and of the knowledge of the births and deaths of beings. 
Schmithausen (1981: 221-22, n. 75) comes to the same conclusion, 
also basing himself on texts which describe the way to salvation for 
others than the Buddha. The Madhyama Ógama (T. 26), Schmithausen 
observes, seems to have fewer accounts with memory of earlier lives and 
knowledge of the births and deaths of beings, than without. 
Schmithausen further points at the difference in tense in the description 
of this memory and of the knowledge of the birth and death of beings 
(present tense), and everywhere else in the account (aorists). 
Why then were these first two insights added? The reason must be 
sought in the circumstance that what the Buddha realized in his moment 
of liberation cannot but be the most essential in Buddhism (see § 8.4, 
above). The memory of earlier lives and the knowledge of the births and 
deaths of beings may therefore have been added in order to press a point 
which was considered essential to the teaching of the Buddha. There can 
be no doubt that this point is the belief in transmigration determined by 
one’s earlier behaviour or state. 
The faculty to remember former lives is not, in most of Buddhist 
literature, confined to Buddhist sages (Demiéville, 1928). This seems to 
indicate that soon belief in transmigration had become common to 
Buddhists and all those they were confronted with. But in such a time the 
addition of the memory of former lives and of the knowledge of the 
births and deaths of beings to the account of the Buddha’s liberating 
insight would be inexplicable. We must rather assume that this addition 
took place when such a belief had not yet become common to all.228 
Among those who were not yet fully convinced we may have to count 
the Brahmins. These had to wait until new ‘old’ scriptures like the BÓU 
gave them free way to accept this belief. 
In this connection it must be pointed out that the Buddhist canon 
knows a few characters who deny transmigration and the moral efficacy 
of acts. One is Påyåsi, appearing in the Påyåsi Sutta (DN II. 316f.; cf. 
                                                
228. At least twice the Jaina canon mentions the memory of former lives, but not 
together with the knowledge of the births and deaths of beings. It seems less 
concerned with establishing the correctness of rebirth. See Samavåya 10.2, and 
Tatia and Kumar, 1980: 37, 39. 
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DÓc p. 42bf.). Then there are some of the six heretic teachers, in 
particular Ajita Keßakambalin and PËraˆa Kåßyapa (Malalasekara, 1937-
38: I: 37; Basham, 1951: 10-26; Vogel, 1970: 20-21). It is, however, 
unlikely, at least in the case of Påyåsi, that we must see in his opinion a 
leftover from early times. Påyåsi’s opinion is described as very 
exceptional, not held by anyone known to his opponent Kumåra Kassapa. 
Further, in the Jaina version of the story of Påyåsi – there Paesi – in the 
Råyapaseˆaijja, the second Uva∫ga of the Jaina canon, this opinion is not 
ascribed to Paesi; see Leumann, 1885b: 467-539. 
9.2.8. A possible counterargument against some of the preceding 
arguments will be that the language of the BÓU still contains Vedic 
features, and must therefore be older than classical Sanskrit, older also 
than the grammar of classical Sanskrit which is Påˆini’s A∑†ådhyåy¥. 
This counterargument can be answered by pointing out that there is 
reason to believe that Vedic and classical Sanskrit were used for some 
time side by side. Since this point has been discussed elsewhere 
(Bronkhorst, 1982c), I need not dwell upon it here. 
 
9.3. The preceding observations have made it clear that no traces of a 
pre-Buddhistic form of ‘Buddhist meditation’ survive in the non-
Buddhist literature of India. What do the Buddhist scriptures say in this 
regard ? 
9.3.1. We have become acquainted with a number of descriptions of non-
Buddhist religious practices in the Buddhist canon in the course of this 
book. None of them ascribe to outsiders what we have come to regard as 
authentic Buddhist meditation. 
In this connection it deserves notice that the ideas in the canon 
usually ascribed to the ‘six heretics’ contain nothing regarding 
meditation (see Basham, 1951: 10-26; Vogel, 1970).229 
The Buddhist canon tells us that the Buddha learned the Stage of 
Nothingness and the Stage of Neither Ideation nor Non-Ideation from 
                                                
229. The opinions ascribed to these heretics may have been put together on the basis of 
different sources; see Basham, 1951: 25, 218-19; Norman, 1976a: 120-21. 
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two teachers, Órå∂a Kålåma and Udraka the son of Råma. Since the two 
stages which they allegedly taught him are not part of authentic Buddhist 
meditation (see ch. VII, above), we cannot draw any conclusions 
regarding pre-Buddhistic ‘Buddhist meditation’ from this account. 
 
9.3.2. If then the Buddhist scriptures contain no reliable information that 
the Buddha got his meditational techniques from someone else, they 
contain some very clear passages that claim that the Buddha discovered 
these techniques himself. 
First among these is the passage in which the Buddha to be 
remembers how he reached the First Dhyåna while still a child (§ 1.5, 
above). On the basis of this memory he is then said to have discovered 
the path leading to liberation. 
Second come the passages where the Buddha is said to have made 
his discoveries ‘among the things (dharma) which had not been heard of 
before’.230 The phrase pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu cakkhuµ udapådi, 
ñåˆaµ udapådi, paññå udapådi, vijjå udapådi, åloko udapådi and its 
equivalents in other languages occur in many different contexts.231 In the 
‘first sermon’ it applies to the Four Noble Truths and consequently to the 
path of liberation discovered by the Buddha. Since this appears to be the 
oldest context to which the phrase applies, we must again conclude that 
the path taught by the Buddha, including his method of meditation, was 
considered a new discovery by his early followers. 
 
9.4. We can sum up our findings regarding the origin of Buddhist 
meditation as follows. None of the early scriptures of India, whether 
Buddhist or non-Buddhist, contain any indication that the Buddhist form 
of meditation existed prior to the beginnings of Buddhism. Some 
passages in the Buddhist canon, on the other hand, describe the Buddha 
as an innovator, also where the technique of meditation is concerned. 
                                                
230. pËrvam ananußrute∑u dharme∑u / pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu. See CPS p. 144-
48; Mv III. 332-33; Vin I.11; SN II. 10-11, 105; IV. 233-34; V. 178-79; 258, 422; 
AN III.9; cf. SÓc p. 103c-104a; T. 1428, p. 788 a-b. T. 1421, p. 104c7 etc. 
interprets, no doubt incorrectly, ‘things (dharma) which had not before been heard 
of by me’. 
231. It is a ‘pericope’. For an explanation and application of this useful concept see 
Griffiths, 1983. 
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There seems little reason to doubt that Buddhist meditation was 
introduced by the founder of Buddhism, i.e., by the historical Buddha. 
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X. Pratyekabuddhas,  the Sutta Nipåta,  and the early Sa∫gha. 
 
10.1. The previous chapter has made it clear that the early Buddhist 
tradition supports the view that the method of salvation preached by the 
Buddha was new and unknown before him. Unfortunately this point of 
view was not retained in the Buddhist tradition. On the one hand the 
historical Buddha came to be looked upon as one in a chain of Buddhas. 
On the other hand, a second category of Buddhas came to be accepted – 
the Pratyekabuddhas (P. Paccekabuddha) – who obtained enlightenment 
without the help of a Buddha (Samyaksaµbuddha, P. Sammåsambuddha, 
contrasted with Pratyekabuddha), and did not preach the doctrine; they 
were supposed to have lived in periods not covered by the preaching of a 
Samyaksaµbuddha, i.e., before Íåkyamuni. 
The acceptance of Pratyekabuddhas conflicts with our assumptions 
in a way which demands attention. The Påli canon, it is believed, 
preserves utterances of Pratyekabuddhas in the Khaggavisåˆa Sutta of 
the Sutta Nipåta. This belief has essentially been accepted in a recent 
study by Wiltshire (1990),232 who further argues that the Pratyekabuddha 
tradition in Buddhism preserves the memory of the time before 
Íåkyamuni. 
There is no doubt that the Khaggavisåˆa Sutta is old. It is 
commented upon in the canonical Culla Niddesa. At the same time, it 
contains an unmistakable reference to the Fourth Dhyåna in Sn 67.233 
Does this mean that the four Dhyånas were already known before 
Íåkyamuni ? 
                                                
232. Wiltshire (1990:17) takes care to state that he regards the Gåthås of the 
Khaggavisåˆa Sutta “as shedding light conceptually on [Pratyekabuddhas]”. 
233. vipi††hikatvåna sukhaµ dukhañ ca 
pubbe va ca somanadomanassaµ 
laddhån ’upekhaµ samathaµ visuddhaµ 
eko care khaggavisåˆakappo 
“Turning one’s back on bliss and pain, 
and earlier already on cheerfulness and dejection. 
Obtaining pure indifference and calm, 
one should walk alone like the horn of a rhinoceros.” 
Compare this with the description of the Fourth Dhyåna in § 1.5, above. 
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The answer to this question must be negative. There is no evidence 
that the Khaggavisåˆa Sutta is pre-Íåkyamuni. Rather, this SËtra 
contains a clear indication that it is later than ‘our’ Buddha: it refers to 
him. Sn 54cd reads:234 “Observing the word of Ódiccabandhu, one 
should walk alone like the horn of a rhinoceros.” Ódiccabandhu 
‘kinsman of the Ódicca family’ (Fausböll, 1881: 8) is “[a]n often-used 
epithet of the Buddha” (Malalasekara, 1937-38: I: 245). In Sn 423 – to 
take but one example – the Buddha specifies the family to which he 
belonged as follows:235 “Ódiccas by lineage, Såkiyas by birth; from that 
family I have wandered forth, oh king, not longing for sensual 
pleasures.” The Khaggavisåˆa Sutta must therefore have been composed 
after, or at the earliest during the preaching of the Buddha. 
How then could it be thought of as being composed by Pratyeka-
buddhas ? The commentators obviously invented this explanation in 
order to be able to keep the Sutta without having to draw the 
consequences.236 We must conclude that here again we have no reason to 
think that the Four Dhyånas existed before Íåkyamuni. 
 
10.2. Why were the later Buddhists hesitant to accept the Khaggavisåˆa 
Sutta as part of the post-Íåkyamuni tradition ? The answer is not 
difficult. The Khaggavisåˆa Sutta celebrates the lonely wanderer. The 
later Buddhist monk, on the other hand, was part of a community of 
monks, and lived as a rule in a monastery. Solitary life was no longer 
common. 
But the Khaggavisåˆa Sutta constitutes evidence that in the early 
days of Buddhism monks did often live alone. Other parts of the canon 
confirm this. The solitary life is often praised in the Sutta Nipåta, 
Dhammapada, Thera Gåthå, and elsewhere.237 Life in monasteries seems 
                                                
234. ådiccabandhussa vaco nisamma 
eko care khaggavisåˆakappo. 
235. ådiccå nåma gottena, såkiyå nåma jåtiyå 
tamhå kulå pabbajito ’mhi råja na kåme abhipatthayaµ 
236. Pj II. 104, Ap-a 181, Nidd II. 103. 
237. Cf. Nakamura, 1979: 574-75. Przyluski (1926: 292) surmises that solitary 
ascetics primarily joined Buddhism in western regions, whereas in the east groups 
of monks travelled with a teacher. He derives support from the 12th Khandhaka of 
the Cullavagga (Vin II. 299) where åraññakas are found to be numerous in the west, 
no mention of them being made in the east, at the time of the Second Council. 
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to be still rather uncommon in the time the Vinaya work called 
Skandhaka was composed (Frauwallner, 1956b: 121), i.e., at least forty 
years after the death of the Buddha (p. 117 above). This same work 
prescribed that “the monk should ... live under trees” (Frauwallner, 
1956b: 74). Life in monasteries probably developed out of the habit to 
spend the rainy season at one place (Olivelle, 1974; Dutt, 1962: 53f.). 
Before this took place, and perhaps also to some extent simultaneously 
with it, followers of the Buddha led a wandering and often solitary life. 
Works like the Sutta Nipåta, Dhammapada and Thera Gåthå derived 
wholly or in part from these early wanderers. This is confirmed by the 
fact that these works or parts of them are known to be among the oldest 
portions of the Buddhist canon.238 The language of parts of the Sutta 
Nipåta is archaic (Fausböll, 1881: xi-xii). The A††haka Vagga, Påråyaˆa 
and Khaggavisåˆa Sutta – all part of the Sutta Nipåta – are commented 
upon in the Niddesa, itself considered a canonical work. The 
Arthavarg¥yåˆi SËtråˆi (= A††haka Vagga) are referred to in all the 
versions corresponding to the original Skandhaka (Frauwallner, 1956b: 
149; Lévi, 1915: 40l-17; Bapat, 1951: Intr. p. 1-2). Other early 
enumerations often include Påråyaˆa, Satyad®ßa (Satyad®∑†a), Munigåthå, 
Íailagåthå, probably all of them corresponding to parts of the Sutta 
Nipåta; and Dharmapada, Thera (Sthavira) Gåthå239 (Lamotte, 1956: 
258-61; 1957: 346-47). 
 
10.3. If then the Sutta Nipåta and other collections of verses arose in 
circles where solitary wandering was held in high esteem, one might 
expect that these works in particular are likely to show traces of outside 
influence. Wanderers are more exposed to such influence than monks 
who reside in monasteries among their likes. 
Many of the verses in these works are such that they would be 
acceptable to Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike. They cannot help us to 
find outside influence. Some verses of the Sutta Nipåta however do show 
such influence: 
                                                
238. Bechert (1961: 43f.) argues for a long and complicated history of the origin of 
the Thera and Ther¥ Gåthå. 
239. On the correspondence of Thera and Sthavira Gåthå see Bechert, 1961: 10-12. 
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The Dvayatånupassanå Sutta (Sn 724-65) enumerates a number of 
items – many of them also occur in the Prat¥tyasamutpåda – which cause 
suffering. Three of them are: årambha ‘effort’, åhåra ‘food’, iñjita 
‘movement’ (Sn 744-51). These three, like the other ones, have to be 
suppressed in order to prevent further suffering. Suppression of effort, 
food and movement sounds much like the asceticism we encountered in 
Jainism and Hinduism; the use of årambha as a synonym of karman is 
familiar from the Jaina texts we studied in chapter III, above. Asceticism 
(tapas) is often approvingly referred to (Sn 77; 267; 284; 292; 655). 
Sleep is disapproved of (Sn 926).240 
The presence of borrowed elements in the Sutta Nipåta and other 
collections of verses may be part of the reason why the canonicity of 
these works – though old – remained uncertain (Lamotte, 1956; 1957). 
                                                
240. Main stream asceticism includes restriction of breathing, as we know. This is 
possibly meant in Sn 1090-91, where a question and answer regarding the one 
without desire, thirst and doubt is translated as follows by Fausböll (1881: 
202-03): “Is he without breathing or is he breathing ... ? ... He is without breathing, 
he is not breathing ...” (niråsaso so uda åsasåno ... niråsaso so na so åsasåno ... ). 
This translation can be defended by deriving -åsasa and åsasåna from å-ßvas. 
However, most scholars take the sense of these verses differently, either by 
accepting a v.l. (niråsayo; åsamåna) or by interpreting the words in another way 
(see CPD s.v. -åsasa, åsasåna). 
Dixit (1978: 86-92) argues that “there are Suttanipåta passages which throw 
interesting light on certain technical concepts of Jainism, concepts which obviously 
are not current among Buddhists” (p. 87). He concludes that “the presumption is 
strengthened that the two traditions were particularly close kins in the beginning” 
(p. 92). The Sutta Nipåta does not share many lines with the oldest books of the 
Jainas (Bollée, 1980). 
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Conclusion 
 
XI.  The position and character of early Buddhist meditation. 
 
11.1. The results of this study can be briefly restated as follows : in the 
ancient Indian religious movements other than Buddhism there was a 
tradition of asceticism and meditation which can be described and 
understood as direct and consistent answers to the belief that action leads 
to misery and rebirth. In this tradition some attempted to abstain from 
action, literally, while others tried to obtain an insight that their real self, 
their soul, never partakes of any action anyhow. Combinations of these 
two answers were also formed. 
The Buddhist scriptures criticize this tradition repeatedly. Yet 
practices and ideas connected with this tradition appear to have made 
their way into the Buddhist community. Some of these practices and 
ideas even came to occupy rather central positions in the Buddhist 
tradition. Practices of this kind include the Eight Liberations, or at any 
rate the last five steps of them, which also occur in other contexts in the 
Buddhist canon; and the Brahmic States. Among the ideas which 
influenced Buddhism, the gradual postponement of liberation to the time 
after death, and the prominence of an explicit liberating insight must be 
mentioned. 
 
11.2. We have come as far as philology could take us, it seems. For a 
further understanding of Buddhist meditation, philology will probably 
not be of much help. An altogether different approach may be required to 
proceed further. Such a different approach does not fall within the scope 
of the present book. I may return to it in another study. 
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 Abbreviations 
 
AMg. 
AN 
Ap-a 
ÓpDhS 
Óv. 
Óyår. 
BÓU 
BhG 
CPD 
CPS 
DÓc 
Daßo 
Dhs 
DN 
EÓc 
HYPr 
It 
KU 
MÓc 
MBh 
MN 
MPS 
MU 
MuktU 
Mv 
Nidd I 
Ardha Mågadh¥ 
A∫guttara Nikåya (PTS ed.) 
Apadåna-a††hakathå (PTS ed.) 
Ópastamb¥ya Dharma SËtra 
Óvassaya Sutta 
Óyåraµga Sutta 
B®hadåraˆyaka Upani∑ad 
Bhagavad G¥tå 
Critical Påli Dictionary 
Catu∑pari∑atsËtra 
D¥rghågama (T. l) 
Daßottara SËtra (= Mittal, 1957, and Schlingloff, 1962) 
Dhammasa∫gaˆi 
D¥gha Nikåya (PTS ed.) 
Ekottara Ógama (T. 125) 
Ha†ha Yoga Prad¥pikå of Svåtmåråma 
Itivuttaka (PTS ed.) 
Ka†ha Upani∑ad 
Madhyamågama (T. 26) 
Mahåbhårata 
Majjhima Nikåya (PTS ed.) 
MahåparinirvåˆasËtra (ed. Waldschmidt) 
Maitråyaˆ¥ya Upani∑ad 
Muktikå Upani∑ad 
Mahåvastu 
Mahå-niddesa (PTS ed.) 
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Nidd II 
P. 
Pa†is 
Pa†is-a 
Pj II 
Pkt. 
Pp 
PTS 
SÓc 
Sang 
ÍB 
SN 
Sn 
Sp 
SËy. 
T. 
Th 
Èhåˆ. 
Ud 
Uttar. 
Uvav. 
Vin 
Vism 
Viy. 
VS 
YS 
Culla-niddesa (PTS ed.) 
Påli 
Pa†isambhidå-magga (PTS ed.) 
Saddhammapakåsin¥ (Ct. on Pa†is), Bangkok 1922 
Sutta-nipåta-a††hakathå, Paramattha-jotikå II (PTS ed.) 
Prakrit 
Puggala-paññatti (PTS ed.) 
Påli Text Society 
Saµyuktågama (T. 99) 
Sang¥ti SËtra (= Stache-Rosen, 1968) 
Íatapatha-Bråhmaˆa (Mådhyandina version) 
Saµyutta Nikåya 
Sutta-nipåta (PTS ed.) 
Samanta-påsådikå, ct. on Vin (PTS ed.) 
SËyaga∂aµga Sutta 
TaishØ edition of the Tripi†aka in Chinese 
Thera-gåthå (PTS ed.) 
Èhåˆaµga Sutta 
Udåna (PTS ed.) 
Uttarajjhayaˆa 
Uvavåiya 
Vinaya-pi†aka I-V (PTS ed.) 
Visuddhi-magga (PTS ed.) 
Viyåhapaˆˆatti Sutta 
Vaiße∑ika SËtra of Kaˆåda 
Yoga SËtra 
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